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"FROM   THE 


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ANNUAL   FEE   OF    MEMBERSHIP. 


For  Pamilif.s,  including  children, 
"    SiJiOLE  Men, 
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LIBRARY    REGULATIONS. 

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between  10  o'clock  A.  M.,  and  10  o'clock  P.  M. 

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full  set. 

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I 


r: 


THE    PEOPLE 


The  Sovereigns 


A  COMPARISON  OF  THE  GOVERXMENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

WITH  THOSE  OF  THE  REPUBLICS  WHICH  HAVE  EXISTED 

BEFORE,  WITH  THE  CAUSES  OF  THEIR 

DECADENCE  AND  FALL. 

By  JAMES  MONROE 

Ex-Presicleiit   of  the  XJiiited.   States 


DEDICATED  BY  THE  AUTHOR  TO  HIS  COUNTRYMEN 

EDITED    BY 

SAMUEL    L.   GOUVEENEUE 

HIS   GRANDSON  AND   ADMINaSTRATOR. 


PHILADELPHIA 

J.    B.     LIPPINCOTT    &    CO, 

18  6  7. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  j'ear  1867,  by 

J.    B.    LIPPINCOTT    &    CO., 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  for  the  Eastern  District 
of  Pennsylvania. 


Lippincott's   Press, 
philadelphia. 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 


CONTENTS. 


PAQB 

PREFACE 5 

BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF  THE  AUTHOR 7 

CHAPTER  I. 

V 

A  Comparative  Elementary  view  of  Government  and  of 
Society 17 

CHAPTER   II. 

A  Comparative  Historical  view  of  the  Government  op 
THE  United  States  and  the  Republics  of  Athens,  Lace- 
demon  AND  Carthage 103 

ATHENS 171 

LACEDEMON 234 

CARTHAGE 263 

3 


PEEFACE 


The  following  work  was  written  by  Mr.  Monroe  between 
the  years  1825,  when  he  retired  from  the  Presidency,  and 
1831,  that  of  his  death.  In  a  letter,  now  before  me,  dated 
April  8,  1830,  to  an  old  friend,  he  says:  "I  have  composed 
in  part  another  work* — a  comparison  between  our  govern- 
ment and  that  of  the  Ancient  Republics.  Of  this,  I  have 
already  extended  it  to  a  view  of  Lacedenion,  of  Greece, 
and  of  Carthage,  to  which  I  have  drawn  an  Introductory 
view  of  Government  and  Society,  as  the  basis  of  the  work. 
This  I  could  also  finish  in  about  the  same  time  by  devoting 
myself  to  it."  The  work,  as  it  came  into  my  hands,  was  in 
its  rough  and  incomplete  state ;  I  have  reflected  upon  it  for 
years,  and  after  considerable  time  and  labor  have  joined  its 
several  parts  together,  until  it  comprises  the  whole  as  it 
now  stands.  Not  one  word  has  been  added  to  the  original 
text,  neither  has  one  been  erased  from  the  manuscript 
copy. 

These  few  words  are  deemed  necessary  by  way  of  expla- 

*  The  other  manuscript  papers  of  Mr.  Monroe  were  purchased 
in  1849,  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  and  are  now 
among  the  Archives  of  the  Department  of  State,  Washington 

City. 

1  *  5 


G  PREFACE. 

nation,  in  orJer  that  any  apparent  omissions,*  defects  or 
errors,  might  be  pardoned  by  those  to  whom  the  work  is 
dedicated,  as  the  Author  had  no  opportunity  to  revise  and 
correct,  and  the  Editor  has  not  presumed  to  exercise  any 
critical  interpolation  of  its  contents.  Before  publication, 
the  work  was  submitted  to  some  of  the  most  distinguished 
literary  gentlemen  of  the  country,  including  the  Hon. 
George  Bancroft,  the  American  Historian,  and  Mr.  Samuel 
Tyler,  known  in  the  United  States  and  Europe  from  his 
Philosophical  Writings ;  and  the  Editor  has  been  encour- 
aged by  them  to  give  it  to  the  world,  incomplete  as  it  is. 
The  style  and  language  of  the  work  are  plain,  in  character 
with  the  man  who  wrote  it,  and  of  his  countrymen,  to 
whom  it  is  addressed.  The  People,  whom  he  considers  the 
originators  and  supporters  of  all  Governments,  and  the 
Sovereigns  in  the  exercise  of  the  Powers  of  Government — 
(this  being  the  true  exposition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine)— 
will,  I  trust,  as  a  voice  of  warning  from  the  past,  compre- 
hend its  precepts.  That  its  teachings  may  be  salutaiy, 
and  that  they  may  profit  by  the  lessons  the  treatise  incul- 
cates, is  the  sincere  wish  and  hope  of 

The  Editor. 

»  The  author  intended,  judging  from  notes  found  with  the 
papers,  to  have  also  instituted  a  comparison  with  the  Eoman 
Republic  and  the  Government  of  Great  Britain,  but  owing  to 
advanced  age  and  declining  health,  failed  to  do  so. 


BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF  THE  AUTHOE. 


James,  the  son  of  Spence  Monroe,  was  born  on  the 
banks  of  the  Potomac  River,  in  the  County  of  Westmore- 
land, Virginia.  He  was  descended  from  Hector  Monroe, 
an  officer  of  the  army  of  Charles  the  First,  who  emigrated 
with  other  cavaliers  to  Virginia,  after  the  battle  of  Mars- 
ton  Moor  in  1644,  and  at  the  time  of  his  birth  his  father 
resided  on  the  original  grant  to  his  ancestor.  His  educa- 
tion was  commenced  at  a  classical  school  in  the  county, 
superintended  by  the  Rev.  Mr.  Campbell.  At  the  age  of 
sixteen,  he  was  entered  at  William  and  Mary's  College.* 
"The  opportunities  it  afforded  for  liberal  instruction  were 
great;  here  he  pursued  his  studies  until  1776,  when  the 
college  was  partially  closed  by  the  preparation  for  the 
Revolutionary  War.  The  same  feeling  which  animated  the 
Fathers  of  American  Libertj',  gradually  diffused  among 
those  who  were  to  constitute  the  next  generation,  had  pene- 
trated the  halls  of  learning,  and  was  rapidly  converting 
the  sons  of  science  into  the  youthful  and  enthusiastic 
champions  of  their  country's  rights  and  honors.  Par- 
taking in  a  high  degree  of  the  spirit  which  pervaded  the 

'■•  Memoir  of  James  Monroe,  in  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington. 

7 


8  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF 

Colony  of  Virginia,  James  Monroe  and  John  Francis  Mer- 
cer, early  and  steadfast  friends  through  life,  both  at  the 
age  of  eighteen  years,  with  others  of  high  claims  to  merit, 
abandoned  their  literary  pursuits,  and-  devoted  themselves 
entirely  to  the  military  service  of  their  country,  entering 
as  Cadets  in  the  3d  Virginia  Regiment.  It  was  raised  and 
then  commanded  by  Col.  Hugh  Mercer  of  that  state,  soon 
after  appointed  a  Brigadier-General. "  He  was  soon  after 
appointed  a  Lieutenant  and  ordered  to  the  army  under 
Greneral  Washington.  The  same  year  he  led  his  company  in 
the  battle  of  Harlem  Heights  and  White  Plains,  and  was 
with  the  army  in  their  retreat  through  the  Jerseys.  At 
the  battle  of  Trenton,  perceiving  that  the  enemy  were 
13lacing  in  position  a  battery  to  rake  the  American  line,  he 
gallantly  advanced  at  the  head  of  a  small  detachment, 
charged  the  battery,  drove  the  artillerymen  from  their 
guns,  and  took  possession  of  them. 

In  this  engagement  he  received  a  ball  in  the  shoulder, 
which  he  carried  to  his  grave,  and  having  attracted  the 
attention  of  his  superior  officers  by  his  quickness  of  per- 
ception, and  gallantry  on  the  occasion,  was  immediately 
promoted  to  a  Captaincy.  While  scarcely  recovered  and 
sulFering  from  his  wound,  he  was  offered  and  accepted  the 
appointment  of  Aide-de-Camp  on  the  Staff  of  Lord  Stir- 
ling with  the  rank  of  Major,  and  served  in  that  capacity 
during  the  campaigns  of  1777  and  1778,  distinguishing 
himself  for  zeal  and  gallantry  at  the  battles  of  Brandywine 
and  Germantown,  and  was  by  the  side  of  Lafayette  when 
the  latter  was  wounded  at  Monmouth. 

By  the  acceptance  of  the  position  of  Aide-de-Camp  to 
Lord  Stirling,  he  lost  his  rank  in  the  regular  line  of  the 
Army;  and  General  Washington,  who  at  that  early  period 
entertained  a  high  opinion  of  his  abilities,  recommended 


JAMES  MONROE.  9 

him  to  the  Legislature  of  Virginia  for  a  command  in  one 
of  the  new  regiments  to  be  raised  in  that  state.  The 
appointment  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  was  accordingly  con- 
ferred upon  him.  He  immediately  commenced  action, 
looking  to  the  organization  and  recruiting  of  the  regiment 
to  the  command  of  which  he  was  assigned.  But  finding 
after  a  time,  from  the  exhausted  condition  of  the  state,  all 
his  efforts  at  success  fruitless,  he  retired  as  supernumerary 
officer. 

Returning  to  Richmond,  Virginia,  he  commenced  the 
study  of  the  law  under  Mr.  Jefferson,  then  Governor  of 
Virginia,  devoting  himself  more  especially  to  the  study  of 
topographical  law.  At  this  period  he  corresponded  with 
some  of  the  most  distinguished  men  in  the  Colonies;  and 
among  others,  Gleneral  Charles  Lee,  who  resided  in  Berkeley 
County,  living  in  retirement  almost  isolated  from  the  world. 
In  a  letter  to  this  erratic  but  distinguished  general,  he 
complains  of  the  lack  of  books  to  pursue  his  studies.  To 
this.  General  Lee  replies  in  a  characteristic  letter,  dated 
June  25,  1780,  urging  him  to  cultivate  the  talents  with 
which  nature  had  gifted  him,  and  stating  his  views  in  re- 
lation to  the  aspect  of  affairs  generally  ' '  on  the  Continent. ' ' 

General  Charles  Lee  to  James  Monroe. 

Berkeley  County,  June  ye  25th,  1780. 
My  Dear  Monroe  : — 

I  received  two  days  ago  your  letter  dated  from  Ei&hmond  up- 
braiding me  for  not  writing.  I  do  assure  you  that  I  have  written 
twice  immediately  addressed  to  you,  and  a  third  time  addressed 
to  you  conjointly  with  Mercer;  but,  whether  you  have  received 
them  I  cannot  say,  as  amongst  the  many  admirable  qualities 
pervading  the  inhabitants  of  this  Continent,  the  noble  ambition 
of  opening  every  letter,  in  order  to  obtain  knowledge,  is  one  of 
the  most  predominant;  it  is  not  always  that  I  am  master  of  pen, 


10  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF 

ink  and  paper,  and  seldom  that  I  have  an  opportunity  of  assur- 
ing you  how  much  and  sincerely  I  am  yours,  or  you  may  depend 
on  it  that  you  should  receive  these  assurances  very  frequently, 
as  without  compliment  there  are  few  young  men  for  whom  I 
have  a  higher  esteem  and  affection.  I  am  extremelj'  concerned 
that  Fortune  has  been  so  unkind  as  not  to  admit  of  your  culti- 
vating the  talents  which  nature  has  bestowed  on  you  to  greater 
advantage  than  your  present  situation  seems  to  promise,  for  in  my 
opinion  (but  perhaps  I  am  a  prejudiced  man)  the  study  of  topogra- 
phical law  (unless  daily  corrected  by  other  more  liberal  studies)  is 
a  most  horrid  narrower  of  the  mind ;  and  you,  as  you  justly  com- 
plain, have  not  the  proper  books  for  this  necessary  correction.  If  I 
remain  on  the  Continent,  nothing  will  give  me  greater  pleasure,  or 
more  flatter  my  ambition  than  to  communicate  my  ideas  and  assist 
you  with  all  the  means  in  my  power  in  your  pursuit  of  private 
letters,  and  if  any  circumstances  arise  to  make  me  alter  my 
present  plan,  I  hope  it  may  be  so  contrived  that  we  may  be 
much  together.  Your  present  assembly  I  have  many  reasons 
to  believe  is  composed  of  most  wretched  materials  ;  but  wretched 
as  it  is,  I  have  as  many  reasons  to  believe,  that  it  is  one  of  the 
least  abominable  on  the  Continent;  in  fact  the  power  in  every 
state  is  fallen  into  the  very  worst  hands.  We  have  now  neither 
Monarchy,  Aristocracy,  nor  Democracy ;  if  it  is  anything,  it  is 
rather  Mac-oc-racy,  by  which  I  mean  that  a  banditti  of  low 
Scotch  Irish  who  are  either  themselves  imported  servants,  or 
the  immediate  descendants  of  imported  servants  are  the  lords 
paramount,  and  in  such  wild  bea'stly  hands  as  these  respuhlica 
diutius  stare  non  potest,  God  knows  what  is  to  become  of  us;  I 
possibly  see  with  a  jaundiced  eye,  but  I  am  myself  fully  per- 
suaded that  after  some  months,  or  at  farthest  a  couple  of  years' 
anarchy  and  confusion,  an  absolute  tyranny  will  be  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  piece;  but  whether  the  tyrant  will  be  foreign  or 
domestick  is  out  of  the  reach  of  my  foresight.  What  do  you 
think  of  the  policy  or  virtue  of  Congress,  in  inviting,  or  if  not 
i  nvited,  in  admitting  a  large  body  of  French  troops  into  our  bosom  ? 
How  are  we  to  get  rid  of  'em  ?    Is  there  an  instance  in  the  history 


JAMES  MONROE.  11 

of  a  strong  nation  sending  an  army  for  the  protection  of  an  im- 
potent one,  when  the  protectors  have  not  ultimately  stripped  or 
attempted  to  strip  the  protected  of  their  liberties  ?  You  have,  I 
am  sure,  read  the  historj-^of  Britain,  and  must  be  acquainted  with 
the  conduct  of  our  Saxon  ancestors.  You  have  likewise  probably 
read  the  history  of  Charles  the  Fifth  and  Philip  the  Second,  and 
of  course  must  know  that  armies  of  Germans,  Italians,  and 
Spaniards,  introduced  under  the  pretext  of  protecting  the  low 
countries  against  the  French,  were  employed  to  enslave  these 
very  low  countries,  and  that  afterwards,  vice  versa,  the  French 
caird  in  to  protect  'em  from  the  tyranny  of  the  Spaniards  and 
Italians,  attempted  to  accomplish  the  very  same  purposes  they 
were  called  in  to  defeat — in  short  the  measure  is  so  very  big  with 
mischief,  so  repugnant  to  the  first  axioms  of  policy,  that  I  cannot 
persuade  myself  but  that  those  who  have  acquiesced  must  have 
been  bribed  out  of  the  little  sense  they  set  out  with ;  but  I  am 
warmed  by  the  subject  into  a  tedious  political  essay;  it  has  been 
revealed  to  Mrs.  Gates  in  a  dream  that  South  Carolina  is  not  of  the 
least  importance,  which  revelation  she  has  communicated  to  the 
general  to  his  unspeakable  comfort;  the  general  has  communi- 
cated it  to  a  McAUaster  and  the  other  commissioners,  who  have 
comforted  the  whole  country  with  the  glad  tidings,  and  it  is 
resolved  by  a  committee  of  Whigs,  that  whoever  insinuates  that 
'  South  Carolina  and  the  army  taking  it  are  of  the  least  conse- 
quence, is  ipso  facto  a  daran'd  Tory upon  my  word  I  pity 

Gates,  he  is  an  honest  man,  and  has  many  good  qualities,  and 
that  dsemoness,  his  wife,  occasions  him  to  make  a  very  ridiculous 

figure.     Adieu.     God  bless  you. 

C.  Lee. 

P.  S.  I  suppose  an  army  of  Russians  will  likewise  be  intro- 
duced as  well  as  an  army  of  French,  and  then  the  Continent 
will  be  a  blessed  theatre  of  war  and  desolation ;  one  side  or  other 
must  be  victorious,  or  it  must  be  a  drawn  battle;  if  the  former 
happens,  the  victor  will  dictate  what  measures  he  pleases,  and 
if  the  latter  happens,  a  treaty  of  partition  will  take  place — upon 
the  whole  it  is  a  damnable  measure. 


12  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF 

The  enemy,  however,  soon  after  appearing  in  this  state, 
he  exerted  himself  in  the  organization  of  the  mihtia  of  the 
lower  counties;    but  upon  their  retiring  soon  after,  by 
direction  of  Governor  Jefferson  he  proceeded  as  military 
commissioner  to  the  army  in  the  South.    Cornwallis  having 
surrendered  at  York  town,  he  returned  to  Richmond.     In 
1782   he  was  elected  to  the  Assembly,  and  although  but 
in  the  twenty-third  year  of  his  age,  elected  a  member 
of  the  executive  council.     In  1783  he  was  elected  to  Con- 
gress for  the  term  of  three  j'ears,  where  in  1785,  he  offered 
a  resolution  that  Congress  be  authorized  to  regulate  trade 
between  the  states.      This  resolution  was  referred  to  a 
committee  of  which  he  was  chairman,  and  reported  upon 
favorably ;  and  led,  it  is  said,  to  the  Convention  at  Anna- 
polis, and  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution.     He 
was  appointed  a  member  of  the  commission  to  settle  the  con- 
troversy in  relation  to  the  boundary  between  Massachusetts 
and  New  York.    He  strongly  opiwsed  the  demand  of  Spain 
for  a  relinquishment  of  the  right  to  navigate  the  Missis- 
sippi River.     Having  served  out  his  term  in  Congress,  and 
being  ineligible  for  the  next  three  years,  he  returned  to 
Virginia  with  his  wife,  Miss  Kortright  of  New  York,  whom 
he  had  married  the  previous  year,  and  established  himself 
in  the  practice  of  the  law  at  Fredericksburg.     In  1787  he 
was  again  elected  to  the  General  Assembly  of  Virginia, 
and  in  1788  was  chosen  a  delegate  to  the  Virginia  Con- 
vention, to  decide  upon  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution.    In  1790  he  became  a  member  of  the  United 
States  Senate.      In  1794  he  was   appointed   Minister  to 
France,  and  was  recalled  in  1796.     In  1799  he  was  elected 
Governor  of  Virginia.     In  1803   he  was  appointed  Envoy 
Extraordinary  to  negotiate,  in  conjunction  with  the  Minister 
Resident,  Mr.  Livingston,  for  the  purchase  of  Louisiana. 


JAMES  MONROE.  13 

The  result  exceeded  his  most  sanguine  expectations. 
Within  a  fortnight  after  his  arrival  in  Paris,  for  the  sum 
of  fifteen  millions  of  dollars,  the  entire  "Territory  of 
Orleans,  District  of  Louisiana, ' '  comprising  a  larger  extent  of 
country  than  the  then  whole  United  States,  was  added  to  the 
territory  of  the  Union.  In  1803  he  was  appointed  Minis- 
ter Plenipotentiary  to  England.  When  in  the  midst  of  the 
negotiations  pending  for  the  protection  of  neutral  rights, 
and  against  the  impressment  of  seamen,  he  was  directed 
to  proceed  to  Madrid,  as  Minister  Extraordinary  and  Pleni- 
potentiary to  adjust  the  boundaries  of  the  purchase  of 
Louisiana,  In  1806  he  was  recalled  to  England,  to  act 
with  Mr.  Pinkney  in  the  negotiation  for  the  protection  of 
neutral  rights.  In  1810  he  was  again  elected  to  the 
General  Assembly  of  Virginia,  and  in  1811  again  chosen 
governor  of  the  state.  In  the  same  year  he  was  appointed 
by  President  Madison  Secretary  of  State;  and  on  the 
resignation  of  the  War  Department  by  General  Armstrong, 
after  the  capture  of  Washington,  at  the  earnest  solicitation 
of  Mr.  Madison,  he  also  took  charge  of  the  administration 
of  that  department,  performing  the  duties  of  both  of  these 
laborious  and  important  branches  of  the  government. 
While  in  the  performance  of  these  double  functions,  he 
refused  to  accept  the  higher  salary  of  Secretary  of  State, 
receiving  only  that  of  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  difierence 
between  the  two  rates  of  pay,  over  $2,000,  remained  on  the 
books  of  the  Treasuiy  Department  to  his  credit,  until  the 
year  1849,  when  it  was  claimed  and  paid  to  his  executor. 
Retiring  from  the  Department  of  War,  on  the  conclusion 
of  peace,  he  continued  to  serve  as  Secretary  of  State  until 
the  end  of  Mr.  Madison's  administration  in  1817.  In  that 
year  he  succeeded  to  the  Presidency  with  Daniel  D.  Tomp- 
kins for  Vice-President.  Among  the  important  public 
2 


14  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF 

events  which  marked  his  first  term  as  President,  were  the 
admission  of  the  states  of  IlHnois,  Mississippi,  and  Maine. 
In  1818  a  Convention  was  concluded  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States,  in  relation  to  the  Newfoundland 
fisheries  and  other  objects.  In  1819  Spain  ceded  to  the 
United  States  the  Floridas.  In  1820  he  and  Mr.  Tompkins 
were  again  nominated  and  elected ;  the  former  by  a  vote 
of  231  out  of  232,  there  being  but  one  vote  against  him  in 
the  Electoral  College;  the  latter  by  a  vote  of  218.  In 
1820  Missouri  was  admitted  into  the  Union.  In  1822  the 
independence  of  Mexico  and  the  South  American  Pro- 
vinces was  recognized.  On  the  2d  of  December,  1823,  he 
sent  to  Congress  a  Message  on  the  policy  of  neither  entang- 
hng  ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe,  nor  suff"ering  the 
powers  of  the  Old  World  to  interfere  with  the  New,  known 
as  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  He  declared  that  any  attempt  on 
the  part  of  the  European  Powers  ' '  to  extend  their  system 
to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere ' '  would  be  regarded  by 
the  United  States  "  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety." 
In  1824  General  Lafayette  visited  the  United  States,  and 
for  a  time  was  the  guest  of  Mr.  Monroe,  at  his  residence, 
Oak  Hill,  Loudon  County,  Virginia.  He  was  subsequently 
chosen  a  Justice  of  the  Peace  ;  was  elected  one  of  the  Board 
of  Visitors  of  the  University  of  Virginia,  and  in  1829  be- 
came a  member  of  the  Virginia  Convention,  to  revise  the 
Constitution  of  that  state,  and  was  chosen  to  preside  over 
their  deliberations.  In  1831,  whilst  on  a  visit  to  his 
younger  daughter  in  the  City  of  New  York,  he  was  taken 
ill  and  died,  like  his  predecessors,  Adams  and  Jefferson,  on 
the  4th  of  July,  the  anniversary  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  of  the  country  to  whose  service  he  had 
devoted  the  chief  portion  of  his  life,  at  the  age  of  seventy- 
foui'  years.    On  the  2d  of  July,  1858,  his  remains,  escorted 


JAMES  MONROE.  15 

by  a  grand  military  and  civil  procession,  were  removed  from 
the  vault  where  they  had  lain  for  twenty-seven  years,  to  the 
steamer  Jamestown,  on  which  they  were  conveyed  to  Rich- 
mond, arriving  on  the  5th  of  July,  and  were  escorted  by  the 
military  and  civil  authorities  to  Hollywood  Cemetery,  where 
they  were  finally  interred,  in  the  one  hundredth  year  from 
the  date  of  his  birth.  His  epitaph  is  unwritten,  his  eulogy 
in  the  words  of  John  Quincy  Adams : — 

"Mr.  Monroe  strengthened  his  country  for  defense  by  a 
system  of  combined  fortifications,  military  and  naval,  sus- 
taining her  rights,  her  dignity,  and  honor  abroad,  soothing 
her  dissensions,  and  conciliating  her  acerbities  at  home ; 
controlling  by  a  firm  though  peaceful  policy  the  hostile 
spirit  of  European  alliance  against  republican  South 
America ;  extorting  by  the  mild  compulsion  of  reason,  the 
shores  of  the  Pacific  from  the  stipulated  acknowledgment 
of  Spain  ;  and  leading  back  the  Imperial  Autocrat  of  the 
North  to  his  lawful  boundaries,  from  his  hastily  asserted 
dominion  over  the  Southern  Ocean.  Thus  strengthening 
and  consolidating  the  federative  edifice  of  his  country's 
union,  till  he  was  entitled  to  say,  like  Augustus  Caesar,  of 
his  imperial  city,  that  he  had  found  her  built  of  brick, 
and  left  her  constructed  of  marble. 


The  People  The  Sovereigns. 


CHAPTER  I, 


A   COMPARATIVE    ELEMENTARY   VIEW   OF    GOVERN- 
MENT  AND   or   SOCIETY. 

Having  served  my  country,  from  very  early  life, 
in  its  most  important  trusts,  abroad  and  at  home, 
my  mind  has  been  turned  in  the  discharge  of  my 
public  duties  to  the  principles  of  the  system  itself, 
in  the  success  of  which  I  have  taken,  and  always 
shall  take,  a  deep  interest.  I  have  witnessed  our 
difficulties,  and  have  seen  with  delight  the  virtue 
and  talent  by  which  they  were  surmounted.  In 
looking  to  our  future  progress,  some  important 
questions  occur  to  which  great  attention  is  due. 
Are  we  not  still  menaced  with  dangers?  Of  Avhat 
nature  are  they  and  to  what  cause  or  causes  im- 
putable? To  these  objects  my  mind  has  also  been 
drawn  with  great  interest;  and  having  now  leisure, 
it  is  my  intention  to  express  my  sentiments  freely 
2 »  17 


18  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEBEIGNS. 

on  them,  in  the  hope  that  I  may  thereby  render 
some  service,  and  under  the  conviction  that  in 
those  instances  in  which  I  may  err  I  shall  do  no 
harm. 

It  has  been  often  affirmed  that  our  Revolution 
forms  the  most  important  epoch  in  the  history  of 
mankind,  and  in  this  sentiment  I  fully  concur. 
But  whence  does  it  derive  its  importance?  The 
sentiment  is  founded  in  a  belief  that  it  has  intro- 
duced a  system  of  new  governments  better  calcu- 
lated to  secure  to  the  people  the  blessings  of  liberty, 
and  under  circumstances  more  favorable  to  success, 
than  any  which  the  world  ever  knew  before.  If 
such  be  the  fact,  the  truth  of  the  affirmation  must 
be  conceded,  for  surely  no  event  can  be  so  impor- 
tant, as  the  establishment  of  a  new  system  of 
government,  wdiich  by  its  intrinsic  merit,  and  the 
force  of  example,  promises  to  promote  so  essentially 
the  happiness  of  mankind. 

Other  republics  have  failed.  Their  career,  though 
brilliant,  was  marked  by  contentions  which  fre- 
quently convulsed  and  finally  overthrew  them. 
To  what  causes  were  those  contentions  imputable? 
Was  it  that  the  governments  respectively  were  so 
defective  that  their  failure  was  inevitable?  Or 
were  the  societies,  of  which  those  republics  were 
composed,  incapable  of  such  governments?  To 
one  or  other  of  those  causes,  or  to  a  combination 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  19 

of  them,  their  fate  must  have  been  imputable.  Do 
like  causes  exist  here?  If  they  do,  it  follows  that 
we  are  exposed  in  a  certain  degree  at  least  to  a  like 
fate.  These  are  fair  objects  of  inquiry,  and  I  pro- 
pose to  inquire  into  them. 

To  present  in  a  clear  and  distinct  light  the  dif- 
ference between  the  governments  and  people  of  the 
United  States,  and  those  of  other  countries,  ancient 
and  modern,  and  to  show  that  certain  causes  which 
produced  disastrous  effects  in  them  do  not  exist  in 
most  instances,  and  are  inapplicable  in  all,  to  ours, 
is  an  inquiry  of  great  extent,  if  pursued  in  all  its 
parts.  It  involves  all  the  great  principles  of  free 
government,  with  a  comparative  view  of  their 
respective  merits,  and  likewise  of  the  society,  re- 
garding the  state  in  which  it  may  be,  over  which 
such  government  is  established.  The  subject,  never- 
theless, admits  of  great  condensation,  without  im- 
pairing its  necessary  illustration.  The  questions  to 
be  solved  are,  have  we  so  far  avoided  the  errors 
and  corrected  the  defects  of  other  free  governments, 
as  to  have  attained  a  degree  of  perfection  which 
was  unknown  to  them?  Are  our  societies  in  a 
state  better  adapted  to  the  support  of  such  govern- 
ments, than  those  of  any  other  people  ever  were, 
over  whom  such  governments  were  established? 
If  we  have  been  thus  blessed,  it  must  follow  that 
the  example  of  other  republics  cannot  touch  ours. 


20  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

and  that  we  have  just  cause  to  calculate  on  a  des- 
tiny altogether  different  from  that  which  befel 
other  people,  even  those  who  were  most  free.  We 
shall  have  gained  an  eminence,  which  no  other 
nation  ever  reached,  and  from  which,  if  we  fall, 
the  fault  will  be  in  ourselves,  and  we  shall  thereby 
give  the  most  discouraging  example  to  mankind 
that  the  world  ever  witnessed. 

To  do  justice  to  the  subject,  we  must  not  only 
go  to  first  principles,  but  trace  all  the  causes  which 
bear  on  them  to  their  source.  If  a  people  be  free 
and  their  government  be  defective,  why  do  they 
not  amend  it?  As  the  injury  arising  from  the 
defects  of  the  government  must  be  felt  in  its  ope- 
ration, and  the  defects  be  in  consequence,  apparent, 
it  is  strange  having  the  power  exclusively  in  their 
hands,  if  they  do  not  amend  them.  And  if  the 
people  participate  only  in  the  government,  by  the 
occupation  of  any  strong  and  independent  ground 
in  the  system,  it  cannot  but  excite  surprise,  having 
numbers  and  force  on  their  side,  if  they  should  be 
driven  from  it ;  if  instead  of  improving  their 
position,  they  should  lose  it  altogether.  However 
defective,  therefore,  the  government  of  the  ancient 
republics  may  have  been,  it  is  obvious  that  their 
overthrow  could  not  have  been  imputable  to  those 
defects  only;  that  it  may  be  traced  in  part  at  least, 
to  a  higher  source,  to  the  people  themselves.     No 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  21 

people  blessed  with  liberty  could  be  deprived  of  it, 
if  they  were  not  made  dupes  and  the  instruments 
of  their  own  destruction.  If  they  possessed  the 
necessary  intelligence  and  virtue,  acted  together, 
and  made  a  common  cause  in  defense  of  their 
rights,  the  artifices  of  unprincipled  and  designing 
men,  however  deep  and  well-contrived  they  might 
be,  would  be  sure  to  fail. 

It  follows  then,  that  the  subject  on  which  I  have 
to  treat,  merits  attention  in  two  views;  the  first,  as 
to  the  different  kinds  of  government  which  have 
existed  in  different  communities  in  different  ages; 
the  second,  as  to  the  condition  of  the  society,  in  the 
several  communities,  over  which  such  governments 
respectively  were  established.  In  both  branches 
there  are  many  grades  or  classes.  Government  is 
divisible,  from  one  which  is  compatible  with,  and 
secures  to  the  people  under  it  perfect  liberty,  to 
that  which  subjects  them  to  abject  slavery;  and 
society,  from  a  state  of  entire  barbarism,  ignorance 
and  depravity,  to  that  of  great  improvement,  intel- 
ligence and  purity.  No  proposition  according  to 
my  judgm.ent,  admits  of  a  more  satisfactory  demon- 
stration, than  that  in  the  formation  of  government, 
the  condition  of  the  society  on  which  it  is  to  ope- 
rate is  to  be  regarded ;  that  the  government  which 
suits  one  state  will  not  suit  another,  and  that  the 
most  improved  state  of  society   is  that  which  is 


22  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

best  suited  to  the  most  free  government,  if  it  is  not 
the  only  one  that  admits  of  it.  In  treating  then 
of  government,  we  must  treat  of  man,  for  it  is  for 
him  that  the  government  is  formed,  and  for  whom 
it  is  indispensable,  from  the  aggregation  of  a  few 
individuals  to  that  of  the  most  stupendous  masses. 
"What  then  is  man?  Naturalists  give  him  the 
highest  grade  among  created  beings,  and  our  reli- 
gion makes  his  soul  immortal.  Still  he  is  in  a 
great  measure  the  creature  of  circumstances.  His 
natural  endowments,  his  passions  and  principles, 
are  always  the  same,  but  these  are  essentially  con- 
trolled by  moral  causes;  by  the  state  in  which  he 
is,  and  in  consequence  in  which  the  society  is,  of 
which  he  is  a  member.  The  two  branches  are 
therefore  intimately  connected  with,  and  in  the 
view  suggested,  inseparable  from  each  other.  I 
will  commence  with  that  of  government,  it  being 
the  power  which  acts  on  the  people,  and  on  which 
under  whatever  form,  or  on  whatever  principle 
founded,  their  happiness  must  depend.  As  every- 
thino-  which  mav  be  said  on  this  branch  must  be 
guided  by  principle,  I  will  bring  to  view  those, 
which  it  is  presumed  are  too  well  established,  to 
be  controverted  by  any  one. 

Our  system  is  two-fold.  State  and  National. 
Each  is  independent  of  the  other,  and  sovereign  to 
the  extent,  and  within  the  limit  of  specified  powers. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  23 

The  preservation  of  each  is  necessary  to  that  of 
the  other.  Two  dangers  menace  it;  disunion  and 
consolidation.  Either  would  be  ruinous.  It  was 
by  one  Union  that  we  achieved  our  independence 
and  liberties,  and  by  it  alone  can  they  be  main- 
tained. It  must  therefore  be  preserved.  Consoli- 
dation would  lead  to  monarchy  and  to  despotism, 
which  would  be  equally  fatal.  That  danger  must 
be  averted.  Both  governments  rest  on  the  same 
basis,  the  sovereignty  of  the  people.  Other  nations 
have  given  us  examples  of  both,  of  national  as 
well  as  state,  with  each  of  which  a  comparison  of 
our  institutions  may  be  useful,  and  with  which  I 
propose  to  make  it.  As  however  the  powers  of  the 
National  Government  originated  with  the  people 
of  each  state,  and  passed  from  them  in  the  extent 
to  which  granted,  in  their  character,  as  separate 
and  distinct  communities,  the  people  of  each  state 
form  the  basis  of  the  system.  Consolidation,  so 
far  as  it  has  gone,  is  a  diminution  of  state  power, 
but  still  the  basis  in  other  respects  remains  un- 
changed. In  looking  to  either  branch,  we  must 
look  to  the  source  from  whence  the  powder  ema- 
nated, as  that  is  the  great  feature  in  our  system,  in 
both  branches,  with  the  modification  given  to  it  in 
each,  wdiich  has  placed  us  on  more  advantageous 
grounds  than  was  ever  held  by  any  other  jDcople. 
In  executing  this  work,  therefore,  the  view  which 


24  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

I  shall  take  of  the  principles  of  government,  and 
of  the  state  of  society,  will  be  equally  applicable  to 
both,  as  well  to  form  a  just  estimate  of  the  merits 
of  our  system,  as  a  fair  comparison  between  it  and 
those  of  other  countries,  in  both  branches. 

The  view  which  I  shall  present  in  this  paper 
will  be  elementary,  founded  on  the  lights  derived 
from  history,  and  my  own  observations  and  reflec- 
tions, or  what  I  have  read  and  seen  through  life. 
In  this  form  and  in  this  stage  it  is  presumed  that 
an  illustration  may  be  given,  and  principles  be 
established,  aj^plicable  to  the  whole  subject  in  all 
its  parts,  which  will  be  more  perspicuous,  be  better 
understood,  and  likewise  lessen  the  labor,  than  if 
delayed,  until  I  reach  the  republics  with  whose 
governments  and  people  the  comparison  will  be 
made. 

There  are  two  great  principles  in  government, 
in  direct  opposition  to  each  other,  on  one  or  other 
of  which,  singly  and  exclusively,  or  on  a  compound 
of  both,  all  governments  have  been  and  must  be 
founded.  One  supposes  the  sovereignty  to  be  in 
the  people,  and  in  them  only.  The  other  that  it  is 
in  an  individual  or  a  few,  and  that  the  people  have 
no  participation  in  it,  but  are  the  subject  matter  on 
which  it  operates.  A  third  class  is  compounded  of 
those  two  jii'inciples,  partaking  in  a  greater  or  less 
degree  of  the  one  or  the  other,  and  with  two  or 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  25 

more  orders.  If  in  the  people,  according  to  our 
view,  it  is  called  a  Democracy ;  if  in  an  individual,  a 
Despotism;  and  if  in  a  few,  Aristocracy.  If  the 
government  be  founded,  partly,  on  each  principle, 
with  distinct  orders  and  an  hereditary  chief  at  its 
head,  invested  with  the  executive  power,  we 
should  call  it  Monarchy.  If  there  be  no  hereditary 
chief,  and  the  executive  power  be  vested^ in  an 
oflScer  elected  by  the  people,  we  should  call  it  a 
Republic.  This  is  a  generic  term,  applicable  alike 
to  all  governments,  in  which  the  people  hold  the 
sovereignty  exclusively,  or  particijiate  in  it,  and 
which  are  of  a  mixed  character,  in  which  there  is 
no  hereditary  chief.  The  ancient  authors  who 
have  written  on  the  subject  of  government  have 
made  many  distinctions  which  do  not  accord  with 
the  view  herein  presented.  They  all  had  just  ideas 
of  the  great  distinction  betM^een  liberty  and  sla- 
very, and  of  the  cause  which  produced  the  one  or 
the  other  state;  but  in  the  classification  of  govern- 
ments, they  seem  to  have  been  guided  more  by  the 
comparative  wealth  of  the  parties,  and  merit  or 
demerit  of  those  who  held  the  office,  and  exercised 
its  powers,  and  by  the  manner  in  which  they  were 
exercised,  than  as  a  just  regard  to  principle.  Aris- 
totle, one  of  the  most  profound  writers  of  that 
epoch,  if  not  the  most  profound,  on  the  subject  of 


2&  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

government,  made  four  species  of  Democracy  ;* 
four  of  Aristocracy  ;t  and  five  of  Monarchy  ;| 
whereas,  I  can  conceive  regarding  principle,  but 
one  of  the  two  first  classes,  let  the  government  be 
organized,  and  its  powers  be  distributed  as  they 
may;  and  but  two  of  the  latter,  limited  and  unlim- 
ited. He  likewise  made  four  species  of  Oligarchy, 
which  he  blended  so  much  with  the  different  grades 
or  classes  of  Aristocracy,  that  it  is  hardly  possible 
to  distinguish  the  one  from  the  other.  The  basis 
of  both  was  the  rule  of  a  few,  but  that  seems  to 
have  been  more  on  the  contingencies  above  stated, 
than  of  hereditary  right  in  the  parties;  Book  the 
4th,  chap.  5.  The  cause  to  which  this  vague  clas- 
sification is  attributable  may,  I  presume,  be  easily 
explained;  and  in  the  prosecution  of  this  work,  I 
may  endeavor  to  explain  it.  I  shall  simply  remark 
here,  that  names  count  for  nothing:  that  principle 
is  everything,  and  that  the  great  distinction  is 
between  a  government  in  which  the  peojile  rule, 
and  one,  in  which  they  are  ruled  by  a  power  which 
is  absolute.  Governments  of  the  latter  kind,  what- 
ever be  their  modification,  can  furnish  no  example 
apj^licable  to  us.  A  despot,  if  a  good  and  wise 
man,  may  govern  ^vlth.  integrity,  humanity  and 
wisdom.      A    weak    and   depraved   one    can    do 

*  Aristotle  on  Politics  :  Book  4,  chap.  4. 

t  lb.  Book  4,  chap.  7.  J  lb.  Book  3,  chap.  10,  11. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  27 

nothing  well.  The  difference  reflects  honor  or  dis- 
grace on  the  individual.  It  may  give  to  the  one 
exalted  fame,  for  personal  merit,  and  to  the  other 
infamy,  for  his  vices  and  his  follies.  Such  govern- 
ments, whether  the  power  be  in  an  individual,  or  a 
few,  turn  on  different  principles  from  our  own,  and 
are  ^subject  to  consequences  corresponding  with 
their  j^rinciples.  The  same  remark  is  applicable, 
in  a  certain  extent,  to  mixed  governments,  such  as 
are  compounded  of  the  two  principles.  Where 
distinct  orders  exist,  an  arrangement,  by  which  the 
people  form  one,  must  always  have  been  an  affair 
of  compromise,  and  on  their  part,  of  compulsion. 
Numbers  and  power  being  on  their  side,  they  could 
never  have  consented,  voluntarily,  to  elevate  any 
class  above  themselves.  Compromises  in  such 
cases  must  have  been  the  result  of  conflicts,  in 
which  each  party  obtained  all  that  it  could,  and 
the  preponderance  was  given  to  either,  according  to 
its  good  or  bad  fortune.  In  the  formation  of  such 
a  government,  principle  can  never  have  been  the 
ruling  object,  nor  can  its  example,  either  in  its 
career  or  fate,  be  considered  as  applicable  to  us.  It 
may  easily  be  shown  that  many  of  the  causes 
which  convulsed  governments  of  this  mixed  char- 
acter, and  finally  overthrew  them,  do  not  exist 
here.  It  is  only  from  governments  of  the  first 
class,  such  as  3vere  founded  on  the  sovereignty  of 


28  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVERETGNS. 

the  people,  that  incidents  which  had  any  influence 
on  their  fortune  can  be  cited  as  strictly  applicable 
to  us;  nor  indeed  can  they  be  so  considered,  unless 
they  were  formed  in  all  respects,  precisely  like  our 
own :  and  there  was  likewise  a  concurrence  in  every 
other  circumstance  to  which  those  incidents  were 
imputable.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  principle 
be  sound.  The  government  must  be  sound  also, 
in  the  organization  of  its  powers,  or  it  will  inevi- 
tably fiil. 

It  will  nevertheless  be  proper  to  recur  to  the 
three  classes  of  government,  to  those  which  are 
founded  on  each  of  the  opposite  principles,  and 
likewise  to  those  which  are  mixed,  or  compounded 
of  both.  It  is  impossible  to  treat  of  governments 
in  their  most  perfect  form,  or  of  mixed  govern- 
ments in  any  form,  so  as  to  take  a  comparative  view, 
of  their  respective  merits,  without  looking  at  them 
likewise  in  their  worst  state.  They  all  furnish 
instruction,  though  it  be  in  different  ways,  and  for 
opposite  purposes.  Those  in  which  the  sovereignty 
is  vested  in  an  individual,  or  a  few,  show  an  abyss, 
into  which  if  we  fall  we  are  lost.  The  tendency 
that  way  should  be  guarded  against,  and  to  do 
which  it  Avill  be  useful  to  see  all  the  avenues 
which  lead  to  it.  Those  of  a  mixed  character, 
which  recognize  distinct  orders,  in  which  opposite 
and  conflicting  principles  are  brought  into  opera- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  29 

tlon,  furnish  instruction  peculiar  to  themselves, 
each  class  according  to  its  modification.  This  is 
the  class  which  stands  in  competition  with  our 
own,  and  to  which  of  course  particular  attention  is 
due.  Whether  a  government  composed  of  dis- 
cordant materials  can,  under  any  circumstances, 
and  from  any  cause  whatever,  preserve  equal  har- 
mony in  its  movement,  and  promote  as  effectually 
the  happiness  of  the  people,  as  one  which  is  homo- 
geneous in  all  its  parts,  is  the  point  in  contest 
between  them.  The  organization  of  those  mixed, 
witli  the  power  which  each  order  holds  in  them, 
respectively;  where  deposited,  and  how  exercised, 
must  be  looked  into.  Some  of  them  were  better 
than  others.  The  slightest  shade  of  difference 
must  have  been  sensibly  felt.  These  differences 
must,  therefore,  be  shown,  and  be  tested,  by  the 
consequences  attending  them  in  each. 

I  have  so  far  treated  of  the  principles  on  which 
all  frovernments  must  be  founded,  in  the  outline 
only.  There  are  incidents  to  those  principles, 
which  form  distinctions  between  the  governments 
founded  on  each,  which  it  is  proper  to  notice  here. 
These  incidents  are  inseparable  from  those  princi- 
ples, and  may  be  considered  constituent  parts 
thereof.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  trace  them 
in  their  consequences,  to  enable  us  to  form  a  correct 
idea  of  the  governments  founded  on   each  prin- 


30  THE  PEOPLE    THE  80VEEEIGN8. 

ciple,  and  by  means  thereof,  a  fair  comparison  of 
their  respective  merits.  The  subject  must  be  thor- 
oughly analyzed  in  all  its  parts.  The  government 
to  be  compared,  and  those  with  which  it  is  to  be 
compared,  must  be  placed  respectively  in  a  clear 
and  distinct  light,  with  all  their  features,  with  the 
differences  between  them,  in  every,  the  most  minute 
circumstance,  or  the  comparison  cannot  lead  to  a 
satisfactory  result.  (There  are  differences  in  gov- 
ernments of  the  same  class,  as  well  as  in  the  classes 
themselves).  These  differences  must  also  be  no- 
ticed, since  they  enter  essentially  into  the  character 
of  each  government,  and  form  important  distinc- 
tions between  our  own  and  all  othei's  that  have 
ever  existed. 

The  terms  Sovereignty  and  Government  have 
generally  been  considered  as  synonymous.  Most 
writers  on  the  subject  have  used  them  in  that  sense. 
To  us,  however,  they  convey  very  different  ideas, 
as  they  must  to  all  who  analyze  the  subject  on 
pi'inciple.  The  powers  may  be  separated  and 
placed  in  distinct  hands,  and  it  is  the  faculty  of 
making  that  separation,  which  is  enjoyed  by  one 
class  of  governments  alone,  which  secures  to  it 
many  of  the  advantages  which  it  holds  over  all 
others.  This  separation  may  take  place  in  the 
class  in  which  the  sovereign  power  is  vested  in  the 
])eople.     It  cannot  in  that  in  which  it  is  vested  in 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  81 

an  indivitlual,  or  a  few,  nor  can  it  in  that  which 
is  mixed,  or  compounded  of  the  two  principles. 
This  view  admits  of  a  clear  and  simple  illustra- 
tion. 

The  sovereign  j^ower,  Avherever  vested,  is  the 
highest  in  the  state,  and  must  always  remain  so. 
If  vested  in  an  individual  or  a  few,  there  is  no 
other  order  in  the  state.  The  same  may  be  said 
of  those  governments  which  are  founded  on  the 
opposite  principle.  If  the  people  possess  the  so- 
vereignty, the  king  and  nobility  are  no  more.  A 
king  without  power  is  an  absurdity.  Dethroned 
kings  generally  leave  the  country,  as  do  their 
descendants.  Whatever  the  sovereign  power  may 
perform  at  one  time,  it  may  modify  or  revoke  at 
another.  There  is  no  check  in  the  government  to 
prevent  it.  In  those  instances  in  which  it  is  vested 
in  an  individual  or  a  few,  the  government  and  the 
sovereignty  are  the  same.  They  are  both  held  by 
the  same  person  or  persons.  The  sovereign  con- 
stitutes the  government,  and  it  is  impossible  to 
separate  it  from  him  without  a  revolution.  Create 
a  body  in  such  a  government  with  competent 
authority  to  make  laws,  treaties,  etc.,  without 
reference  to  the  party  from  whom  it  was  derived, 
and  the  government  is  changed.  Such  agents 
must  be  the  instruments  of  those  who  appoint 
them,  and  their  acts  be  obligatory  only   after  tliey 


32  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

are  seen  and  approved  by  their  masters^  or  the 
government  is  no  more. 

In  mixed  governments  in  which  there  are  two  or 
more  orders,  each  participating  in  the  sovereignt}'-, 
the  principle  is  the  same.  Neither  can  the  king 
or  nobility  in  such  governments  create  a  power, 
with  competent  authority,  to  rule  distinct  with 
themselves.  In  these  governments  tlie  sovereignty 
is  divided  between  the  orders,  and  each  must  take 
care  of  its  own  rights,  which  the  privileged  orders 
cannot  do  if  their  powers  should  be  transferred 
from  them.  The  government  is  divided  between 
the  orders  in  like  manner,  each  holding  the  station 
belonging  to  it,  and  performing  its  appropriate  du- 
ties. They  therefore  constitute  the  government. 
It  follows  as  a  necessary  consequence,  that  the  sov- 
ereign power  and  the  government  even  in  govern- 
ments of  this  class  are  the  same,  and  that  they 
cannot  be  separated  from  each  other. 

It  is  only  in  governments  in  which  the  people 
possess  the  sovereignty  that  the  two  powers  can 
be  placed  in  distinct  bodies ;  nor  can  they  in  them 
otherwise  than  by  the  institution  of  a  government 
by  compact,  to  which  all  the  people  are  parties,  and 
in  which  those  who  fill  its  various  departments  and 
offices  are  made  their  representatives  and  servants. 
In  those  instances  the  sovereignty  is  distinct  from 
the  government,  because  the  people  who  hold  the 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  33 

one  are  distinct  from  their  representatives  who 
hold  and  perform  tlie  duties  of  the  other.  One 
is  the  power  which  creates ;  the  other  is  the  subject 
which  is  created.  One  is  always  the  same ;  the 
other  may  be  modified  at  the  will  of  those  who 
made  it.  Thus  the  Constitution  becomes  the  para- 
mount law,  and  every  act  of  the  government,  and 
of  every  department  in  it,  repugnant  thereto,  void. 
It  is  proper  to  notice  another  distinction,  not 
less  important,  between  governments  founded  on 
this  principle  and  all  others,  even  those  which 
approach  nearest  to  it.  It  is  only  in  these  govern- 
ments that  defects,  which  are  pointed  out  by  the 
light  of  experience,  and  are  sensibly  felt,  can  be 
amended  voluntarily,  and  with  strict  regard  to 
principle.  When  the  sovereignty  is  vested  in  an 
individual,  or  a  few,  no  change  can  be  made  with- 
out a  struggle,  nor  can  any  amelioration  of  the 
condition  of  the  people  be  sought  otherwise  than 
by  petition,  nor  be  granted  otherwise  than  by  favor. 
The  sovereign  cannot  negotiate  for  a  transfer  of 
his  powers  to  another  body.  The  admission  of  the 
right  in  the  people  to  negotiate,  would  be  to  admit 
an  equality  between  the  parties,  which  is  incom- 
patible with  the  principles  of  the  government,  and 
would  be  sure  to  subvert  it.  A  change  can  be 
wrought  only  by  compulsion,  and  the  necessity  of 
it  must  be  apparent  before  it  will  be  yielded  to. 


84  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

The  power  must,  in  fact,  be  in  the  hands  of  those 
who  seek  the  change,  and  he  or  they  who  hold  it 
be  reduced  to  nothing,  before  any  change  can  be 
made.  The  government  will  then  take  such  form 
as  those  who  possess  the  power  may  choose  to  give 
it;  and  its  late  proprietors  will  likewise  experi- 
ence the  fate  w^hich  the  people  or  their  leaders  may 
dictate.  The  same  view  is  applicable  to  mixed 
governments,  at  least  to  a  certain  extent.  The 
power  held  by  the  privileged  orders,  as  has  already 
been  remarked,  was  never  granted  to  them  by  the 
people  as  equal  j)arties.  It  took  its  origin  in  a 
different  source,  and  assumed  its  shape  in  any  and 
every  stage,  as  acted  on  by  other  causes.  To 
bring  the  rights  of  the  parties  respectively  into  ne- 
gotiation, for  the  purpose  of  extending  the  powers 
of  the  people,  would  place  them  in  that  respect, 
essentially  in  the  same  relation  with  each  other  as 
in  the  instances  adverted  to,  and  would  in  all  proba- 
bility have  the  same  result.  I  speak  here  of  the 
people  moving  in  a  body,  under  an  organization 
formed  specially  for  the  purpose. 

In  governments  of  this  mixed  character,  in 
w^hich  the  sovereignty  and  government  are  united, 
changes  may  be  made  in  the  same  mode  by  which 
those  orders  were  established.  Such  governments 
always  originated  with  the  privileged  orders,  gene- 
rally with  the  prince ;  never  with  the  people ;  and 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  oO 

were  the  result  of  compromises  arising  from  the 
exertions  of  the  people  in  favor  of  their  liberties. 
Changes  thus  produced,  rest  on  the  same  ground 
with  the  government  itself,  and  will  be  equally 
obligatory,  while  the  system  is  acquiesced  in.  They 
must,  however,  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  first 
arrangement,  as  compulsive  on  the  i)eople,  and  not 
as  affecting  the  principles  herein  laid  down. 

In  governments  founded  on  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people,  in  which  the  two  powers  are  separated 
from  each  other,  there  is  a  reciprocal  action  of  the 
government  on  the  people,  and  of  the  people  on 
the  government,  which  is  unceasing.  The  people 
prescribe  the  rule  by  compact  by  which  they  shall 
be  governed,  and  in  so  doing  they  prescribe  the 
functions  and  duties  of  the  governing  power,  which 
acts  on  themselves  individually  and  equally.  They 
prescribe  also,  in  the  same  instrument,  the  manner 
in  which  their  own  power  in  the  capacity  of  sov- 
ereign shall  be  exercised.  Each  party  has  its  du- 
ties to  perform,  on  the  faithful  performance  of 
which  the  success  of  the  system  depends.  Pre- 
cision, therefore,  is  equally  important  in  both  in- 
stances. The  government  must  be  competent  to 
its  objects,  and  enjoy  a  freedom  of  action  in  the 
discharge  of  its  duties,  within  the  sphere  prescribed, 
and  on  the  principles  of  the  compact.  Misconduct 
and  delinquency  in  those  who  administer  it  should 


36  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOYEPEIGNS. 

be  punishable  and  be  punished,  in  the  mode  pro- 
vided for  by  the  system  and  executed  under  it.  As 
the  power  proceeds  from  the  people,  it  must  be 
made  subservient  to  their  purposes,  and  this  can- 
not be  accomplished,  unless  those  who  exercise  it 
feel  their  responsibility  to  their  constituents  in  every 
measure  which  they  adopt,  and  look  to  the  people 
and  not  to  themselves.  The  whole  system,  there- 
fore, in  all  its  operations,  must  turn  on  their  suf- 
frages. They  must  elect  those  who  immediately 
take  their  place,  and  on  whom  the  success  of  the 
government  essentially  depends,  and  provide  for 
the  discharge  of  their  duties.  They  must  elect  all 
whom  they  can  elect,  and  provide  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  all  others,  by  vesting  the  power  in  officers 
who  will  be  responsible  to  them  for  their  conduct 
therein  in  the  same  manner  as  for  other  acts  of 
their  official  duty.  The  precise  extent  to  which 
the  election  by  the  people  should  be  carried  should 
be  marked  with  great  circumspection  and  precision. 
If  carried  too  far,  the  principles  of  free  government 
w^ill  be  violated  and  the  government  be  overthrown. 
If  carried  in  any  instance  beyond  the  checks  of 
their  representatives  in  the  legislative  branch, 
guards  should  be  provided  to  avert  the  danger  in- 
cident to,  and  inseparable  from  it,  for  the  more 
they  are  drawn  beyond  that  limit  the  greater  will 
be  the  danger.     The  election  to  that  branch  should 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEBEIGNS.  37 

be  made  as  frequent  as  Mould  be  necessary  to  pre- 
serve in  full  force  the  powers  of  the  people,  but 
not  more  so.  If  too  often,  the  people  are  always 
in  action  and  the  government  loses  its  force.  If 
too  seldom,  the  people  lose  their  power,  which  the 
government  gains  at  their  expense  and  against 
principle.  In  making  the  election,  enlarged  views 
should  prevail.  The  community  as  well  as  the 
district  should  be  looked  to  by  every  elector. 

In  the  arrangement  of  the  departments  of  the 
government,  and  distribution  of  their  powers, 
great  care  should  be  taken.  It  must  be  divided 
into  three  branches :  legislative,  executive  and 
judicial,  and  each  endowed  with  appropriate  pow- 
ers and  made  independent  of  the  other.  Liberty 
cannot  exist  if  adequate  provision  be  not  made 
for  this  great  object.  The  other  instances  in  which 
the  people  may  exercise  their  sovereign  power  re- 
late to  the  compact  itself  If  defects  are  seen  in 
it,  they  have  a  right  to  amend  it,  and  to  correct 
tliem  according  to  their  best  judgment,  and  at 
pleasure.  The  regular  mode  of  proceeding  is  by 
convention,  and  which  should  be  invariable  in  the 
institution  of  the  government.  If  in  the  case  of 
amendments,  the  agency  of  the  government  is  ad- 
mitted in  any  form,  it  must  be  in  the  mode  pre- 
scribed by  the  existing  Constitution,  and  in  which 
it  will  act  merely  as  the  instrument  of  tlie   people 

4 


38  THE  PEOPLE  THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

in  their  character  as  the  sovereign  power  of  the 
state. 

The  separation,  however,  of  the  sovereignty  from 
the  government,  when  the  people  possess  the  sove- 
reignty, depends  altogether  on  their  will.  They 
may  be  united  in  their  hands,  in  like  manner  as  in 
the  other  classes.  This  is  done  when  the  whole  peo- 
j)le  act  together,  and  exercise  the  powers  of  the  gov- 
ernment themselves,  en  masse.  This  union  in  their 
hands,  although  it  differs  in  certain  respects  from  a 
like  union  in  those  of  an  individual,  or  a  few, 
nevertheless  produces  consequences  which  are  not 
less  important  and  injurious.  It  may  be  shown  by 
an  attentive  view  of  the  subject,  that  many  of  the 
objections  which  apply  on  principle  to  despotism 
itself,  in  its  worst  form,  are  equally  applicable  to 
this  union  of  tlie  two  powers  in  the  people ;  and 
that  in  practice,  by  the  abuses  to  which  it  is  ex- 
posed, and  which  are  inseparable  from  it,  it  is  often 
more  oppressive. 

AVhen  it  is  known  that  the  government  of  an 
individual,  in  which  the  people  have  no  participa- 
tion, is  despotic,  it  might  be  inferred  that  that 
which  passed  to  the  opposite  extreme,  in  which  the 
whole  power  was  vested  in,  and  exercised  by,  the 
j)cople  collectively,  was  the  most  free  and  the  best 
that  human  wisdom  could  devise.  If  men  Avere 
angels,  that  result  would  follow,  but  in  that  case, 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  39 

there  would  be  no  necessity  for  any  government. 
It  is  the  knowledge  that  all  men  have  weaknesses, 
and  that  many  have  vices,  that  makes  government 
necessary;  and  in  adopting  one,  it  is  the  interest  of 
all  that  it  should  be  formed  in  such  manner  as  to 
protect  the  rights  and  promote  the  happiness  of 
the  whole  community.  The  great  object  is  to  pro- 
mote the  celestial  cause  of  liberty  and  humanity; 
and  the  perfection  of  government  must  consist  in 
its  being  formed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  accomplish 
this  object,  by  depriving  the  vicious  of  the  power 
to  do  harm,  and  enlisting  not  the  virtuous  only, 
but  all  who  are  not  abandoned  and  outlawed,  in 
supj)ort  of  the  government  thus  instituted.  If  all 
enjoy  equal  rights,  merit  is  rewarded,  and  punish- 
ment inflicted  on  those  only  who  have  committed 
crimes;  the  number  of  discontented  and  disorderly 
will  be  inconsiderable;  the  great  mass  will  cling  to 
and  cherish  the  government  which  is  strictly  their 
own. 

The  advocates  for  governments  which  recognize 
distinct  orders  contend  that  liberty  cannot  exist 
unless  the  people  are  held  together  by  a  common 
interest,  which  must  be  by  restricting  them  to  a 
limited  share  in  the  government,  and  committing 
the  other  portions  to  distinct  hereditary  orders. 
They  say  that  each  brancli  must  have  a  separate 
interest,  and  that  the  power  held   by  tlie  people, 


40  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

and  in  consequence  their  liberties,  must  be  exposed 
to  great  and  unceasing  danger,  otherwise  they  will 
divide  into  parties,  fall  under  the  control  of  leaders, 
and  become  their  tools  and  instruments,  to  the  ruin 
of  the  cause.  They  admit  that  the  portion  of 
power  held  by  the  people  should  be  in  the  legis- 
lature ;  but  contend  that  even  in  that  branch  there 
should  be  an  hereditary  check;  that  the  executive 
should  be  hereditary,  and  that  the  judiciary  should 
be  placed  beyond  their  control.  In  favor  of  this 
doctrine  they  urge  that  if  the  sovereignty  be 
vested  in  the  people,  under  any  modification  which 
can  be  given  to  the  government,  there  will  be  but 
one  interest,  and  in  consequence,  that  the  three 
powers  will  be  concentrated  in  the  ruling  authority 
of  the  community,  which  will  be  the  predominating 
party,  and  the  leader  of  that  party  by  whom  every 
enormity  will  be  committed  and  the  government 
be  overthrown.  They  urge  particnlarly,  that  the 
chief  executive  officer  should  hold  his  station  by 
hereditary  right,  and  that  the  people  should  have 
no  agency  in  the  election  or  appointment,  since,  if 
they  have,  as  there  will  be  many  candidates,  and 
each  have  his  partisans,  who  will  embark  with 
great  zeal  in  his  support,  they  will  become  by 
excitement,  personal  interest,  and  other  causes,  so 
identified  with  their  favorite,  that  the  person  elected 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  41 

will  be  opposed  on  the  one  side,  and  supported  by 
the  other,  without  regard  to  principle  or  policy. 

It  will  be  easy  to  show  that  this  view  is  not 
only  erroneous,  but  that  the  very  facts,  which  are 
relied  on  in  support  of  it  prove  directly  the 
reverse.  The  view  is  founded  on  the  fate  of  the 
ancient  republics,  all  of  which  failed,  and  on  the 
comparative  duration  of  those  which  were  demo- 
cratical,  with  those  which  recognized  distinct  orders, 
the  latter  of  which  were  more  permanent.  Why 
did  the  democratical  governments  fail,  and  why 
was  their  existence  so  transitory?  It  was  because 
the  government  was  united  with  the  sovereignty 
in  the  people,  and  all  the  poAvers,  in  consequence, 
concentrated  in  one  body.  Why  were  those  of 
distinct  orders  more  permanent?  It  was  because 
the  powers  of  the  government  were  separated  from 
each  other.  In  the  one  class,  their  concentration 
was  inevitable.  It  was  formed  by  the  government 
itself,  and  owing  to  the  then  state  of  the  science, 
and  other  causes  which  will  be  explained  hereafter, 
irremediable.  In  the  other,  they  were  separated 
by  a  cause  equally  powerful,  the  existence  of  he- 
reditary orders,  and  in  consequence,  likewise,  by  the 
government  itself.  Each  order  took  a  portion  of 
the  power  from  the  people,  and  in  the  degree  con- 
fined them  to  one  branch  only,  the  legislative,  that 

which  they  could  best  execute.     If  then  the  sepa- 

4« 


42  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

ration  of  the  powers  of  the  government  by  hered- 
itary orders,  under  all  the  disadvantages  incident 
to  that  class;  of  distinct  rights,  with  the  degradation 
of  the  body  of  the  people  and  discordant  interest, 
could  secure  to  those  governments  a  longer  exist- 
ence, does  it  not  furnish  ample  proof  that  if  sepa- 
rated under  more  favorable  circumstances,  the 
government  would  be  permanent?  Will  it  be 
contended,  that  the  people  cannot  be  kept  together 
by  any  other  interest  than  fear?  That  the  enemy 
must  be  in  the  field,  in  sight,  and  they  be  menaced 
by  the  bayonet,  otherwise,  they  wdll  divide  into 
parties,  yield  to  their  passions,  and  destroy  them- 
selves? If  the  concentration  of  the  powers  of  the 
government,  with  the  sovereignty  in  the  people, 
subverted  the  ancient  Democracies,  as  it  certainly 
did,  and  that  fatal  cause  be  removed,  and  every 
other  precaution  wdiich  experience  has  suggested 
be  adopted,  how  can  the  system  be  overthrown? 
Where  are  the  dangers  which  menace  it?  Liberty 
has  its  charms  and  its  blessings,  in  the  one  case,  as 
-well  as  in  the  other.  The  interest  of  the  w^hole 
people  to  unite  in  its  preservation  is  the  same. 
Can  it  be  believed  if  they  would  contend  for  liberty 
under  the  greatest  disadvantages;  expose  their 
lives,  and  millions  of  them  perish  in  the  contest, 
that,  when  it  was  placed  secure  in  their  own  hands, 
under  the  wisest  organization,  that  human  wisdom, 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  43 

aided  by  experience,  could  devise,  they  would  by 
their  vices  "and  their  follies  break  down  those 
strong  barriers,  and  destroy  it? 

Every  danger,  however,  to  which  a  government 
founded  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  is  ex- 
posed, should  be  looked  at,  and  guarded  against, 
by  all  the  precautions  wliieh  human  wisdom,  aided 
by  experience,  can  suggest.  Man  should  be  viewed 
in  his  true  character ;  his  virtues  and  defects  should 
be  duly  estimated,  and  the  organization  be  such  as 
to  call  into  activity  and  give  full  force  to  the 
former,  and  to  suppress  the  latter. 

These  two  great  principles  must,  therefore,  be 
considered  fundamental  and  invariable,  in  regard 
to  government,  in  which  the  people  hold  the  so- 
vereignty— first,  that  the  government  be  separated 
from  the  sovereignty;  the  second,  that  it  be  divided 
into  three  separate  branches,  legislative,  executive 
and  judicial,  and  that  each  be  endowed  with  its 
appropriate  powers,  and  be  made  independent  of 
the  others.  It  is  by  a  faithful  observance  of  these 
principles,  and  a  wise  execution  of  them,  that 
tyranny  may  be  prevented;  the  government  be 
made  efficient  for  all  its  purposes;  and  the  power 
of  the  people  be  preserved  over  it,  in  all  its  ope- 
rations. Unite  the  government  with  the  sove- 
reignty, although  it  be  in  the  people,  and  every 
species  of  abuse,  with    the  certain    overthrow  of 


44  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

both,  will  follow.  Concentrate  all  power  in  one 
body,  although  it  be  representative,  and  the  result, 
if  not  so  prompt,  will,  nevertheless,  be  equally 
fatal. 

The  duties  of  a  government  designate  the  pow- 
ers necessary  to  execute  them,  and  the  nature  of 
these  powers  points  out  the  departments  in  which 
they  ought  to  be  vested  with  the  organizations  and 
number  of  persons  best  qualified  to  execute  them. 
The  organization  of  every  free  government  must 
be  adaj^ted  to  the  duties  it  has  to  perform;  and  the 
government  will  be  most  free  in  Avhich  the  orga- 
nization is  most  perfect,  and  the  best  security  pro- 
vided for  the  strict  observance  of  the  rules  pre- 
scribed. The  prominent  duties  of  a  government 
consist  in  the  enactment  of  laws,  in  pronouncing 
judgment  on  those  laws,  and  in  the  execution  of 
them.  There  are  other  duties  of  the  highest  im- 
portance which  require  the  unceasing  attention  of 
the  government,  such  as  the  appointment  to  office 
under  the  government,  the  intercourse  and  trans- 
actions with  foreign  powers,  in  peace  and  war;  the 
supervision  and  control  of  the  administration  in  all 
its  departments,  civil  and  military,  in  every  situ- 
ation in  which  the  country  can  be  placed.  Those 
of  the  first  two  classes  belong  to  the  legislature 
and  judiciary.  The  others  fall  within  the  scope 
of  the  executive,  for  it  is  by  it  alone,  under  cer- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  45 

tain  guards,  which  will   have  a  good  effect,  that 
they  can  be  executed  with  advantage. 

The  legislature  forms  the  basis  of  the  system. 
It  is  the  branch  to  which  it  belongs  to  give  the 
best  prop  to  the  government,  and  the  greatest 
support  to  the  liberties  of  the  people,  or  which  by 
its  failure  in  these  respects  becomes  the  principal 
cause  of  their  overthrow.  Its  duties  connect  it,  in 
all  its  measures,  immediately  with  the  whole  popu- 
lation of  the  state,  and  with  the  whole  territory. 
The  objects  of  legislation,  in  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  persons  and  property,  in  the  imposition 
of  burdens,  to  promote  the  welfare  and  sustain  the 
character  of  the  state  in  its  foreign  and  domestic 
concerns,  require  enlarged  views,  as  well  as  an  up- 
right and  liberal  policy.  The  legislature  of  every 
free  state  should  be  divided  into  two  branches, 
and  the  number  placed  in  each  be  regulated  by 
principle,  so  as  to  enable  it  most  effectually  to 
accomplish  the  object  intended  by  it.  One  should 
be  more -numerous  than  the  other,  to  carry  the 
representation  more  completely  home  to  the  body 
of  the  people.  The  other  should  be  so  formed  as 
to  be  able,  by  a  more  calm  deliberation,  to  correct 
any  error  arising  from  a  hasty  decision  of  the 
popular  branch.  To  both  there  is  an  obvious 
limit.  I  am  satisfied  that  an  assembly  consisting 
of  four  or  five  hundred  members,  in  its  most  jJopu- 


46  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

lar  branch,  would  be  sufficiently  numerous  for  the 
Avise  management  of  the  aifairs  of  any  community, 
however  great  its  population  or  extensive  its  terri- 
tory ;  and  that  the  augmentation  of  it  beyond  tliat 
number  could  not  fail  to  produce  an  ill  effect.  It 
follows,  that  the  greater  the  augmentation  the 
worse  the  effect,  by  weakening  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  representative  and  impairing  the 
power  of  the  peojile  until  the  government  be  sub- 
verted. The  other  branch  should  consist  of  a 
sufficient  number  to  inspire  confidence,  but  com- 
paratively of  a  few,  and  be  composed  of  persons 
more  advanced  in  years  and  of  greater  experience. 
The  duties  of  the  other  branches  being;  altogether 
different,  the  numljer  placed  in  each  must  corre- 
spond therewith.  As  the  judiciary  is  restricted  to 
an  exposition  of  the  constitution  and  the  laws,  in 
cases  brought  before  it,  it  is  manifest  that  the  corps 
should  consist  of  a  few  members  only.  Extend  it 
beyond  that  number,  and  it  becomes  a  multitude, 
incapable  of  calm  deliberation  and  pronouncing  a 
wise  decision.  A  still  greater  limitation  is  neces- 
sary for  the  executive,  and  for  a  like  reason,  a  due 
regard  to  its  duties.  It  is  equally  the  dictate  of 
reason  and  experience,  according  to  my  judgment, 
that  it  be  committed  to  one. 

The  reasons  in  fixvor  of  committing  the  execu- 
tive department   to   an    individual    appear   to   be 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  47 

conclusive.  Increase  the  number  to  five,  or  even 
to  three,  and  the  corps  will  be  less  efficient  in  the 
discharge  of  its  duties,  and  less  responsible  to  the 
people.  If  there  be  more  than  one,  experience 
shows  that  there  will  be  a  rivalship  between  them, 
and  intrigues  carried  on  by  each,  with  the  members 
of  the  legislature,  and  through  them,  with  the 
people,  which  will  produce  the  worst  effect.  The 
same  practice  will  be  extended  to  the  departments 
under  the  government,  which  \\i\\  weaken  the 
administration.  The  responsibility  will  also  be 
impaired,  because  as  the  numbers  would  make 
parties  in  their  favor,  throughout  the  nation,  the 
people  would  take  sides  with  their  respective  favor- 
ites, and  thus  the  necessary  inquiries  into  miscon- 
duct would  be  checked,  and  punishment  for  it 
often  prevented.  The  members  Avould  likewise  be 
elected  from  different  parts  of  the  community,  on 
the  representative  principle,  whereby  that  tendency 
would  be  much  promoted,  as  each  section  would 
take  an  interest  in  favor  of  the  member  sent  from 
that  quarter.  By  committing  the  power  to  a  single 
individual,  these  evils  may  be  averted,  and  as  is 
believed,  Avithout  any  increased  danger  to  the 
country.  Standing  alone,  his  decision  would  in 
all  cases  be  conclusive,  and  the  ministers  under 
him  be  compelled  promptly  to  obey  his  orders. 
There  would,  therefore,   be   more    energy    in    the 


48  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

governraent.  His  responsibility  would  also  be 
increased,  since  the  sectional  feeling,  even  in  liis 
own  quarter,  would  be  diminished,  and  there  would 
be  none  elsewhere.  By  standing  alone  also,  the 
suspicion  of  his  abuse  of  power  would  be  much 
increased,  and  in  consequence  his  conduct  more 
closely  watched,  whereby  it  might  be  prevented, 
and  if  committed,  be  more  easily  detected  and  pun- 
ished. 

As  to  the  mode  of  securing  complete  responsi- 
bility in  this  officer  to  the  people,  and  the  faithful 
discharge  of  his  duties,  none  can  be  devised  so 
effectual  as  by  committing  the  right  of  impeach- 
ment to  the  popular  branch  of  the  legislature,  and 
of  trial  to  the  other.  The  legislature  is  by  far 
the  most  numerous;  the  election  of  its  members  is 
more  frequent;  they  come  from  every  part  of  the 
country,  and  are  absent  from  their  constituents  a 
short  term  only.  It  is  the  branch  which  stands 
nearest  to  the  people,  and  is  more  immediately 
iflentified  with  them;  their  duties  are  also  of  a 
nature  corresponding  more  with  those  which  the 
people  could  perform,  if  they  exercised  the  gov- 
ernment themselves  en  masse.  It  is  that  branch,  a 
misconduct  in  any  of  whose  members  should  be 
punishable  by  the  loss  of  confidence  and  non- 
election  only.  In  every  view,  therefore,  it  is  the 
branch  on  which  the  people  must  depend,  princi- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  49 

})a]ly,  for  their  safety,  and  to  which  they  must 
commit  all  those  powers  in  regard  to  the  supervi- 
sion of  the  conduct  of  those  in  the  other  depart- 
ments which  they  cannot  execute,  as  the  sovereign 
power,  directly  themselves.  To  suffer  the  punish- 
ment for  misconduct  in  the  chief  executive  ma- 
gistrate to  rest  on  the  loss  of  confidence,  and 
non-election  by  the  people  only,  would  neither  suit 
the  nature  of  the  office,  nor  a  violation  of  many  of 
its  important  powers.  The  force  of  the  country 
being  in  his  hands;  the  intercourse  with  foreign 
powers;  the  supervision  and  control  of  the  admin- 
istration, in  all  its  departments,  in  peace  and  war; 
with  the  appointment  to  office,  and  the  patronage 
incident  to  it;  misconduct  in  many  ways  might 
endanger  the  system,  and  would  evince  a  perfidy, 
which  would  require  the  severest  punishment. 
Even  neglect  or  idleness,  distinctly  proved,  to  the 
public  injury,  should  not  escape  notice  or  censure. 
The  legislature  is  the  only  branch  within  the  pale 
of  the  system  which  can  exercise  this  power  with 
effect.  Being  present,  and  a  party  in  the  govern- 
ment, and  in  some  views,  a  rival  one,  the  deposit 
of  the  power  with  it  will  in  itself  form  a  great 
check  on  misconduct  in  the  other.  In  this  mode, 
the  machine  will  be  kept  in  motion  by  its  own 
powers,  and  on  a  proper  balance.  If  the  power 
should  be  taken   from  the  legislature,  and  vested 


50  THE  PEOPLE   TEE  SOVEREIGNS. 

elsewhere,  a  new  feature  Avoiild  be  introduced  into 
the  government  wliich  would  weaken  it  in  all  its 
parts,  and  might  disorganize  it.  It  could  not  be 
committed,  with  propriety,  to  the  judiciary,  for 
that  would  connect  it  with  the  political  movement, 
and  the  parties  which  may  occasionally  be  formed 
by  it,  which  would  be  imcomi)atible  with  its  duties. 
A  new  branch  could  not  be  instituted  for  the  pur- 
pose, without  making  the  system  more  complicated, 
and  exposing  it  to  a  like  danger.  The  right  of 
impeachment  and  of  trial  by  the  legislature  is  the 
main  spring  of  the  great  machine  of  government. 
It  is  the  pivot  on  which  it  turns.  If  preserved  in 
full  vigor,  and  exercised  with  perfect  integrity, 
every  branch  will  perform  its  duty,  and  the  people 
be  left  to  the  performance  of  theirs,  in  the  most 
simple  form,  and  with  complete  effect,  as  the  sov- 
ereign power  of  the  state.  It  is  not  believed  that 
this  right  could  be  abused  by  the  legislature.  An 
attack  on  the  executive  would  draw  the  public 
attention  to  it,  and  if  unfounded,  rather  benefit, 
than  injure  the  individual.  The  whole  proceeding 
would  be  before  the  public,  in  the  case  of  trial,  and 
if  innocent,  the  sympathies  of  the  people  would  be 
excited  in  his  favor. 

It  is  indispensable  that  the  three  branches  be 
made  independent  of,  and  a  check  on  each  other. 
By  vesting  in  the  legislature  the  right  to  impeach 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  51 

and  try  tlie  chief  executive  officer  and  the  mem- 
bers of  the  judiciary  for  misconduct,  this  object 
will  be  fully  accomplislied,  as  to  that  branch. 
Even  without  this  resource,  the  legislature  is  less 
exposed  to  encroachments  from  the  other  branches, 
than  they  from  it.  If  the  executive  should  tran- 
scend its  powers,  by  acts  not  authorized  by  the 
Constitution  or  a  law,  the  breach  would  be  so 
palpable,  that  it  would  be  immediately  discovered, 
and  the  incumbent  be  called  to  account  and  pun- 
ished for  it.  For  the  judiciary  to  make  encroach- 
ments on  either  of  the  branches  seems  to  be  impos- 
sible, the  nature  of  its  powers  and  duties  being  so 
different  and  obvious.  The  object  most  difficult  to 
l^e  provided  for,  is  to  arm  these  two  branches  with 
the  means  of  preventing  encroachment  on  them 
by  the  legislature;  and  none  occur,  Avhich  it  is 
thought  are  so  competent,  and  free  from  objection, 
as  to  invest  the  executive  with  the  right  to  nega- 
tive acts  of  the  legislature,  and  the  judiciary  with 
that  to  declare  a  law,  which  it  should  deem  uncon- 
stitutional, void.  By  vesting  these  branches  with 
these  powers  no  injury  could  result,  and  much 
benefit  might,  in  many  ways.  If  the  right  in  the 
executive  to  negative  acts  be  qualified,  as  it  might 
be,  it  Avould  bring  the  subject  again  before  the 
legislature,  with  new  light  thrown  on  it,  and 
secure  to  it  a  more  deliberate  consideration.     The 


52  THE  PEOPLE  ^THE  SOVEREIG-NS. 

division  between  the  two  branches  would  draw  the 
attention  of  the  people  to  the  subject,  and  should 
the  act  pass,  and  be  exposed  to  the  objections  made 
to  it  by  the  executive,  the  judiciary,  if  repugnant 
to  the  Constitution,  might  declare  it  void;  or  if 
consistent  with  the  Constitution,  and  the  power  in 
itself  be  objectionable,  the  people  might  correct  the 
evil,  by  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution.  If 
objectionable  on  other  ground,  the  people  might 
furnish  a  remedy,  by  the  declaration  of  their  senti- 
ments respecting  it,  which  might  be  done  in  differ- 
ent ways,  and  with  effect.  Instances  might  occur 
in  the  progress  of  affairs,  of  a  political  nature,  in 
which  the  better  opj)ortunity  enjoyed  by  the  execu- 
tive to  acquire  full  information,  might  enable  it 
to  negative  a  bill  with  advantage  to  the  country. 
The  exercise  of  the  proposed  power  by  the  judi- 
ciary, could  never  involve  the  question  of  conflict- 
ing rights  between  it  and  the  legislature,  in  the 
character  of  encroachment  on  those  of  the  latter. 
In  exercising  that  power,  the  judiciary  could  be 
viewed  only  as  a  tribunal  of  the  people,  invested 
with  it,  to  prevent  encroachments,  tending  to  sub- 
vert the  Constitution,  and  with  it,  their  rights  and 
liberties. 

The  legislature  and  the  executive  are  the 
branches  from  which  the  greatest  danger  to  free 
government  may  be  apprehended.     The  union  of 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  53 

the  government  Avitli  the  sovereignty,  and  the 
eoncentration  of  all  power  in  one  body,  is  that  to 
which  such  governments  are  exposed  by  the 
former,  and  usurpation  by  the  latter.  Against 
usurpation  and  the  monopoly  of  all  power  by  the 
legislature,  a  sufficient  guard  is  provided  by  the 
jiower  vested  in  the  executive  and  judiciary.  The 
danger  arises  from  other  causes — the  possibility  of 
a  tendency  to  the  opposite  extreme.  If  the  mem- 
bers of  the  legislature  lose  sight  of  the  nation, 
and  Iqok  to  their  sections  only,  the  system  is  in  the 
utmost  danger.  Combinations  will  be  formed  in 
support  of  local  interests  by  means  whereof  those 
of  a  general  character  will  be  sacrificed,  to  the 
injury  of  every  part,  including  those  who  com- 
menced the  opposition.  At  the  head  of  each  com- 
bination will  be  found  a  leader,  who  will  push  its 
cause  to  an  extreme,  for  his  own  advancement,  at 
the  expense  of  the  public  good.  A  national  policy 
must  be  cherished  and  prevail.  If  the  people 
possess  virtue,  intelligence,  and  are  devoted  to 
self-government,  this  danger  can  never  assume  a 
serious  form. 

In  governments  in  which  the  sovereignty  is 
vested  in  the  people,  and  the  government  is  sepa- 
rated from  it,  a  very  extraordinary  effect  is  pro- 
duced.    The  government  which  is  the  instrument, 

and  inferior,  operates  on  those  who  hold  the  sove- 

5  * 


54  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

reignty,  and  in  consequence,  on  the  superior.  But 
it  operates  on  the  people  individually,  and  not 
collectively,  and  as  citizens,  not  as  subjects.  The 
government  is  the  agent  "which  executes  the  com- 
pact between  the  citizens.  In  governments  in 
which  the  sovereignty  is  in  an  individual,  he  stands 
above  the  law,  and  cannot  be  aiFected  by  it.  His 
will  forms  the  law  by  which  all  others  are  gov- 
erned. The  government  is  his  instrument,  and  for 
others,  not  for  him.  In  mixed  governments,  in 
which  there  is  an  hereditary  chief  holding  a  por- 
tion of  the  sovereign  power,  he  likewise  is  above 
the  law,  and  is  not  amenable  to  it.  He  can  do 
no  wrong. 

When  the  government  is  thus  separated  from 
the  sovereignty,  the  people  can  exercise  the  sove- 
reign power  in  the  two  modes  above  specified 
only.  One  by  the  election,  in  the  mode  and  in  the 
extent  prescribed  by  the  Constitution;  the  other  by 
the  election  of  representatives,  to  serve  them  hi 
convention  for  special  purposes.  In  each  instance 
the  object  is  different.  In  the  one,  it  is  to  give 
effect  to  the  government  and  preserve  it,  in  its 
course,  according  to  the  compact.  In  the  other,  it 
is  to  act  on  the  government  itself,  by  amendment 
or  otherwise.  The  people  cannot  go  beyond  that 
limit,  in  either  instance,  without  taking;  the  gov- 
ernment  into  their  own  hands,  and  overthrowing 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  55 

the  existing  one.  If  they  act  directly  on  those  in 
office,  to  punish  them,  for  example,  for  offenses, 
whether  it  be  by  popular  movement,  or  in  conven- 
tion, the  government  is  at  an  end.  To  make  the 
government  competent  to  its  objects,  its  powers 
must  be  commensurate,  under  proper  guards,  with 
those  of  the  sovereignty,  and  to  preserve  the  sove- 
reignty in  the  people,  the  means  of  restraining 
each  department  within  the  limits  prescribed  to 
it  by  the  Constitution;  of  enforcing  a  faithful 
execution  of  the  duties  enjoined  on  it,  and  punish- 
ing a  violation  of  them  by  those  in  office,  must  be 
vested  in,  and  be  performed  by  the  government 
itself.  The  whole  system,  as  heretofore  observed, 
must  turn  on  the  suffrage  of  the  people,  and  the 
government  so  formed,  that  those  in  office  may 
find  that  they  can  obtain  nothing  independent  of 
the  people,  nor  from  them,  nor  even  escape  punish- 
ment, otherwise  than  by  a  faithful  discharge  of 
their  duties.  If  the  government  be  thus  formed, 
it  cannot  fail  to  accomplish  all  the  objects  intended 
by  it;  to  fulfil  its  own  duties,  and  to  give  complete 
effect  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  within  the 
mild  and  lenient  scale  specified.  The  spirit  of  the 
government  itself  will  always  produce  the  happiest 
effect.  Men  selected  by  their  fellow-citizens  for 
their  virtue  and  talents  will  not  forget  the  obli- 
gations thereby  imposed  on  them.     High  and  hon- 


56  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  ■ 

orable  sentiments  will  prevail  and  be  felt  in  every 
department  and  trust  under  it;  and  be  infused 
among  the  great  body  of  the  people. 

It  has  been  my  object  in  this  sketch  of  the 
organization  and  endowment  of  governments  in 
which  the  people  hold  exclusively  the  sovereignty, 
to  give  an  outline  only,  but  so  far  as  I  have  been 
able,  a  distinct  one.  As  I  shall  have  to  treat  of 
the  subject,  when  I  proceed  to  make  the  proposed 
comparison  between  our  government  and  those 
which  have  been  mentioned,  and  must  then  do  it 
in  detail,  I  will  postpone  any  further  remarks  on  it, 
until  I  reach  that  stage. 

When  the  character  of  each  of  these  three  classes 
of  government  is  duly  considered,  it  cannot  fail  to 
excite  surprise,  that  more  than  one,  that  of  the 
people,  in  its  best  form,  should  ever  have  existed ; 
that  the  government  of  an  individual,  or  a  few, 
should  ever  have  been  established.  Nor  can  it  fail 
to  excite  surprise,  that  a  government  should  have 
been  formed  by  compromise  between  the  opposite 
principles,  for  if  the  one  be  radically  wrong,  how 
is  it  possible  that  anything  should  be-taken  from 
it  to  improve  that  which  is  radically  right?  How 
does  the  fact  correspond  with  this  view?  What 
has  been  the  condition  of  our  olobe,  as  to  the  o-ov- 
ernments  which  have  existed  in  its  various  parts, 
from  the  earliest  record  of  time?     First  of  Asia? 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  57 

Was  any  free  government  ever  heard  of  in  that 
quarter?  Extend  the  inquiry  to  Africa,  and  what 
the  reply?  Carthage  exhibits  the  only  example, 
and  that  for  a  short  period.  I  come  next  to 
Europe,  the  third  quarter,  and  what  has  been  its 
fate?  The  Republics  of  Greece  and  Rome  arrest 
our  attention  with  deep  interest.  They  adorned 
the  ancient  world,  but  have  long  since  passed  away. 
They  live  only  in  history,  through  which  medium, 
compared  with  other  governments,  they  are  the 
objects  of  our  highest  respect  and  admiration. 
View  Euroj^e  in  modern  times,  and  what  the 
result?  Of  the  attempts  which  have  been  made  in 
diiferent  countries  to  establish  governments  of  the 
kind  in  question,  and  of  their  fate,  I  shall  only 
remark  here,  that  they  have  all  failed. 

Of  democratic  governments,  by  representation  in 
its  best  form,  we  have  no  example  in  ancient  or 
modern  times  prior  to  our  revolution.  The  gov- 
ernment of  the  people,  wherever  it  has  existed,  has 
been  of  the  people  collectively,  or  en  masse,  in  its 
worst  form,  and  in  consequence  its  existence  has 
been  transitory.  Mixed  governments  have  been 
more  durable,  but  their  reign  has  been  short,  com- 
jDared  with  that  in  which  the  people  have  had  no 
participation ;  in  which  they  have  been  slaves. 
Despotism  has  been  the  prevailing  government  in 
all  ages  throughout  the  globe,  including  even  that 


58  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

portion  of  time  during  M-liicli  the  Republic  of 
Rome  held  an  extensive  sway,  for  her  government 
in  the  conquered  provinces  which  composed  more 
than  four-fifths  of  her  territory  was  likewise  per- 
fectly despotic.  The  tendency  has  been  invariably 
to  despotism,  and  in  it  all  the  ancient  republics 
terminated.  To  what  cause  has  it  been  owing 
that  the  best  government  has  heretofore  never 
been  established  anywhere?  That  so  large  a  por- 
tion of  mankind  have  abandoned  their  rights,  and 
sunk  down  voluntarily,  or  at  least,  without  any 
manifestation  of  a  desire  to  prevent  it,  under  the 
dominion  of  an  individual?  Many  causes  have 
undoubtedly  combined  to  produce  this  result.  I 
will  point  out  those  which  appear  to  me  to  have 
had  most  weight.  To  do  this,  we  must  go  to  the 
origin  of  society,  for  to  it  we  must  trace  that  of  all 
government.  They  commence  together.  Society 
cannot  exist  without  government,  and  the  nature 
of  the  government  must  depend  on  the  state  of  the 
society. 

In  entering  on  this,  the  second  branch  of  the 
subject,  I  might  pursue  the  course  of  naturalists, 
and  examine  man,  as  a  class  of  animals,  from  the 
highest  northern  to  the  highest  southern  habitable 
regions;  from  the  Arctic  to  the  Antarctic  circle,  in 
every  latitude,  climate  and  country,  in  both  hemi- 
spheres, and  note  all  those  circumstances,  proceed- 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  59 

ing  from  cither  cause,  wliich  are  presumed  to  have 
any  influence  on  his  intellect  and  on  the  manners 
and  state  of  society  in  each  community.  All 
naturalists  agree  in  one  sentiment,  that  whatever 
differences  there  may  now  be  found  between  men 
in  intellect,  size,  form,  color  or  otherwise,  there  was 
but  one  race;*  that  they  had  a  common  origin. 
This  analysis,  therefore,  however  correctly  it  might 
be  formed,  would  furnish  us  no  consolation ;  nothing 
to  exalt  our  ideas  of  the  human  race;  and  in  regard 
to  the  object  which  I  have  in  view,  leave  me 
essentially  in  the  state  in  which  I  now  am.  The 
decision  does  not  turn  on  the  point,  whether  a  Lap- 
lander, a  Samoide,  a  Tartar,  a  Mogul,  an  Arabian, 
Chinese,  Turk  or  Persian  is  capable  of  self-govern- 
ment. It  is  admitted  that  the  capacity  for  it 
depends  on  the  state  of  society,  and  as  those  soci- 
eties never  had  such  government  among  them,  or 
made  an  attempt  to  establish  one,  or  showed  any 
disposition  to  do  so,  it  may  fairly  be  conceded,  that, 
be  the  cause  what  it  may,  they  are  incapable  of 
such  government.  The  scale,  therefore,  within 
which  the  inquiry  must  be  confined,  is  a  very 
limited  one.  Among  the  ancients  it  includes  the 
Republics  of  Greece,  Carthage  and  Rome;  and 
among  the  moderns,  the  Government  of  Great  Brit- 
ain furnislies  the  most  striking  example. 

«  Buflbn. 


60  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

Such  is  the  nature  of  man,  of  the  best  class  of 
the  human  race,  that  so  soon  as  a  society  is  formed, 
a  government  must  be  established  over  it.  Such 
are  his  wants,  his  passions,  his  principles,  and  his 
faculties,  and  such  the  elevation  and  depression  of 
which  he  is  susceptible,  that  without  such  govern- 
ment there  can  be  no  order  or  safety  in  society. 
So  well  known  is  this  fact,  that  if  two  men  were 
to  meet  in  a  wilderness,  beyond  the  reach  of  law, 
and  the  protection  of  any  government,  who  were 
strangers  to  each  other,  whether  rude  and  savage, 
or  civilized,  they  would  each,  instinctively,  be  ap- 
prehensive of  danger,  having  no  security  for  his 
safety  but  in  his  own  strength,  and  doubtful  of  the 
character  and  views  of  the  other.  If  they  should 
remain  together,  and  find  from  experience,  that 
their  apprehension  was  unfounded,  confidence  would 
grow  up  between  them,  and  a  friendly  co-operation 
in  their  pursuits  ensue.  If  these  two  should  meet 
others,  the  apprehension  would  revive  on  their 
part,  and  be  reciprocated,  nor  would  it  be  removed 
on  either  side  without  like  experience.  Even 
while  the  number  should  be  limited  to  a  few  per- 
sons, and  their  pursuits  be  equally  limited,  to  that 
of  game  for  example,  a  leader  of  the  band  M"ould 
be  necessary  to  preserve  order  within  it,  and  to 
take  the  command  in  case  they  should  meet  otlier 
collections  of  a  like  kind,  the  encounter  with  which 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  61 

might  be  either  hostile^  or  otherwise,  according  to 
circumstances. 

Governments  being  then  necessary  for  every 
society,  however  small  the  number  of  which  it 
may  consist,  and  in  whatever  state  it  may  be,  tlie 
question  is,  how  does  it  originate?  whence  does  it 
derive  its  authority?  These  propositions  must  be 
examined  and  decided  on  principle,  and  with  refer- 
ence to  man  and  to  society  in  the  lights  wdiich 
\ve  are  taught  by  reason  and  experience  to  view 
them. 

The  origin  of  government  has  been  traced  by 
different  writers  to  four  sources;  divine  riffht, 
l^aternal  authority,  election  and  force.  I  trace  it 
to  two  only,  election  and  force,  and  believe  that  it 
has  originated,  sometimes  in  the  one  and  sometimes 
in  the  other,  according  to  the  state  of  the  society 
at  the  time,  and  the  number  of  which  it  was  com- 
posed. I  think  that  this  proposition  admits  of  a 
clear  and  satisfactory  demonstration.  Before,  how- 
ever, I  attempt  it,  it  will  be  useful  to  take  a  brief 
notice  of  the  other  sources,  especially  as  it  is  to 
them,  that  the  advocates  for  despotism  and  here- 
ditary right  have  traced  it.  By  confining  the 
attention  then  to  these  two  sources,  the  subject 
will  be  simplified,  and  it  ma):  then  be  more  easily 
shown  to  which  source,  and  to  what  cause  or  causes, 
it  is  imputable  in  any  and  every  instance. . 


62  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

Divine  and  paternal  right  appear  to  me  to  rest 
upon  the  same  basis,  ahhough  they  have  not  been 
so   understood    by   the   writers   who    have   traced 
government  to  these  sources.     If  divine,  the  claim- 
ant or    pretender   must   prove  his  title    by  some 
miracle,  or  other  incontestable  evidence,  or  it  must 
commence   with    the   parent,   and    beginning  with 
him   be  subject  to  all  the  views  applicable  to  that 
title.     They  must  either  accord,  or  be  in  opposition 
to  each  other.     No  advocate  of  either  places  them 
in  opposition,  and  if  they  accord,  it  must  be,  by 
meaning    the   same  thing,  under  different   names. 
So  absurd  are  both  pretensions,  that  I  should  not 
even  notice  them,   if   they  had    not  gained    such 
weight,  in  one  of  the  communities,  of  whose  gov- 
ernment I  propose  to  treat,  and  at  a  marked  epoch, 
as  to  form  an  important  feature,  in  the  works  of 
two  distinguished  and  able  writers,  on  the  subject 
of  government,  and  if  I  did  not  wish  also,  in  this 
elementary  sketch,  to  simplify  the  subject  by  getting 
rid  of  all   such   absurd  doctrines.     Those  writers 
have  refuted   them,  more  by  reference  to  sacred 
history,  in  reply  to  the  author  by  whom  they  were 
advanced,   than    as    evinced   by  his    faculties,   his 
passions,  and  career  through  all  ages  to  the  will  of 
the  Creator,  as   marked  on  the  character  of  man. 
I  shall  confine  my  remarks  to  the  latter,  and  be 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  63 

very  concise  in  the  view  I  take  within  that 
limit. 

In  tracing  regal  power  to  the  paternal  source,  we 
trace  it  to  a  single  pair,  from  whom  the  whole 
community  must  have  descended,  for  otherwise  the 
origin  could  not  have  been  paternal.  If  this  be 
the  source  of  power,  it  must  have  commenced  with 
the  human  race,  and  admitting  the  authenticity  of 
the  Mosaic  account,  with  our  first  parents,  and  to 
preserve  the  succession,  have  descended  in  the  right 
line,  to  the  oldest  son,  from  generation  to  genera- 
tion, to  the  present  day.  If  the  right  ever  existed, 
it  must  have  commenced  at  that  epoch,  and  still 
exist,  without  limitation  as  to  time,  generation, 
population,  or  its  dispersion  over  the  earth.  A 
limitation  of  the  right,  in  either  of  those  respects, 
would  be  subversive  of  it.  To  what  term  confine 
it?  Tlu'ough  how  many  generations  should  it 
pass?  To  what  number  of  persons,  or  extent  of 
territory,  carry  it?  How  dispose  of  it  after  those 
conditions  should  have  been  fulfilled?  The  mere 
admission  that  such  limitations  were  prescribed, 
would  be  to  admit  that  the  right  never  existed; 
and  if  not  limited,  it  would  follow,  that  one  man 
would  now  be  the  sovereign  or  lord  of  all  the 
inhabitants  of  our  globe,  than  which  nothing  can 
be  more  absurd. 

The  objection  is  equally  strong  to  this  source  of 


64  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

power,  rejecting  the  Mosaic  account  of  our  origin, 
in  a  single  pair,  had  there  been  a  hundred  or  a 
thousand  pair,  and  each  been  placed  at  a  distance 
from  the  others,  in  different  parts  of  the  earth,  to 
form  by  their  descendants,  different  communities, 
to  give  a  like  origin  to  the  governments  established 
everywhere.  The  right  must  have  descended,  in 
like  manner,  to  their  lineal  successors,  and  their 
governments  extended  over  the  other  branches  of 
their  offsj^ring,  from  generation  to  generation,  and 
still  exist,  wherever  they  might  be.  The  only 
difference  in  the  two  modes  would  consist  in  the 
number  of  sovereigns  first  created,  and'  still  exist- 
ing, for  there  could  be  no  more.  In  all  other 
circumstances,  the  cases  would  correspond  with 
each  other,  and  the  objections  applicable  to  the  one, 
would  be  equally  so  to  the  other,  and  equally 
strong.  For  the  government  to  be  paternal,  the 
origin  must  be  in  a  single  pair,  descend  in  the 
right  line,  comprise  within  it  the  whole  offspring 
in  every  branch,  and  through  all  time. 

If  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Creator  that  the 
government  of  this  globe  should  rest  on  paternal 
authority,  it  must  have  been,  either  by  confining 
it  to  the  descendants  of  a  single  pair,  and  to  subject 
the  whole  human  race  to  one  ruler,  or  to  have  cre- 
ated as  many  pairs  as  he  intended  that  there  should 
be  monarchs,  and  to  have  dispersed  them,  at  the 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  65 

time  of  their  creation,  over  the  earth.  And  to 
give  effect  to  this  plan,  either  all  intermixture  of 
the  one  with  the  other  must  have  been  prohibited, 
or  the  earth  have  been  divided  by  special  limits 
between  the  several  pairs  and  their  descendants,  so 
that  there  might  be  no  dispute  respecting  the  title. 
In  either  case  it  Avould  follow,  that  the  human  race 
was  not  created  for  the  benefit  and  common  happi- 
ness of  the  whole,  but  of  one  only,  in  case  there 
was  but  one  pair,  and  of  a  few,  if  more  than  one. 
It  would  follow  also,  that  it  was  not  intended  that 
the  first  parents  should  be  monarehs,  since  they 
would  have  no  subjects  except  their  immediate 
offspring,  and  a  few  of  their  descendants,  but  Avere 
created  as  instruments  for  the  aggrandizement  of 
their  lineal  descendants,  some  hundreds  of  years 
afterwards,  when  the  societies  should  have  increased, 
and  governments  become  indispensable. 

How  does  this  doctrine  correspond  with  Divine 
authority,  as  marked  by  the  character  of  man,  or 
by  any  other  indications  by  which  it  may  be 
traced?  Cain  murdered  his  brother  Abel.  Would 
the  commission  of  that  crime  have  deprived  him 
of  the  succession?  By  what  authority  could  this 
have  been  done?  Could  Adam  have  disinherited 
him?  There  existed  then  no  tribunal  to  decide 
the  question,  and  had  there  been  such  the  existence 
of  the  power,  either   in   Adam,  or  such   tribunal, 


QS  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

Avould  liave  been  subversive  of  the  right.  Sup- 
posing the  government  to  have  descended  to  Cain, 
what  a  strange  spectacle  would  thus  have  been 
exhibited,  that  of  a  murderer  of  his  own,  and  then, 
only  brother,  inheriting  the  government,  and  trans- 
mitting it  to  his  descendants?  How  inconsistent 
with  the  character,  as  well  as  the  history  of  that 
epoch?  Adam  inflicted  no  punishment  on  Cain, 
nor  did  he  claim  the  right  to  do  it.  The  punish- 
ment which  he  suffered  was  inflicted,  according  to 
the  JNIosaic  account,  by  divine  authority.  A  curse 
was  pronounced  against  liim,  and  a  mark  set  on 
him,  whereby  he  was  degraded  below,  and  sepa- 
rated from  the  rest  of  the  human  race.  These 
facts  are  not  calculated  to  prove  that  it  was  intended 
by  the  Divine  Author  of  our  existence  that  Adam 
should  be  a  monarch,  or  that  the  right  of  govern- 
ing the  human  race,  or  any  portion  of  it,  should 
descend  to  his  oldest  son. 

Do  any  of  the  sovereigns  of  the  present  day 
trace  their  title  to  Adam,  or  to  any  other  first 
parent,  or  would  they  be  willing  to  rest  it  on  that 
ground?  We  know  that  they  would  not,  and  if 
they  did,  that  it  Avould  fail,  since  the  commence- 
ment of  all  the  existing  dynasties  may  be  traced  to 
other  sources;  to  causes,  such  as  operated  at  the 
moment  of  their  elevation,  and  varied  in  different 
countries.      Does   any   community   of   Europe,  or 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  67 

elsewhere,  trace  its  origin  to  a  single  pair,  unless 
it  be  to  our  first  parents,  and  which  is  common  to 
the  human  race?  We  know  that  except  in  their 
instance,  and  at  the  creation  of  mankind,  societies 
have  never  commenced  in  that  form,  and  that  such 
have  been  the  revolutions  in  every  part  of  the* 
globe,  that  no  existing  race  or  community  can 
trace  its  connection  in  a  direct  line  with  Adam, 
Noah,  or  others  of  that  early  epoch.  In  the  infant 
state  of  every  society  individuals  seek  each  other 
for  safety  and  comfort.  Those  who  are  born  to- 
gether, no  matter  from  whence  their  parents  came, 
live  together,  and  thus  increase  and  multiply,  until 
the  means  of  subsistence  become  scanty.  A  portion 
then  withdraws  to  some  other  quarter  wdiere  those 
means  can  be  procured,  and  thus  new  societies  have 
been  formed,  and  the  human  race  spread  over  the 
earth,  through  all  its  habitable  regions. 

Paternal  authority  has  its  rights  and  duties,  and 
is  common  to  every  class  of  animals.  It  is  derived 
from  nature,  and  has  its  extents  and  limits.  It  is 
seen  in  the  lion,  the  tiger,  the  fish  and  the  bird,  as 
well  as  in  man.  It  is  parental,  common  to  the 
mother  as  well  as  to  the  father,  and  binding  for  a 
certain  term  only.  As  soon  as  the  infant  attains 
maturity,  it  ceases.  It  does  not  extend  in  any 
form  to  the  second  race,  because  their  parents  inter- 
vene, and  occupy  the  ground  in  regard    to   them 


68  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

M'hich  was  held  by  the  first  over  their  offspring. 
If  the  whole  population  of  any  tribe  consisted  of 
the  descendants  of  one  male  and  female,  all  would 
be  equally  free  in  succession,  after  attaining  matu- 
rity. No  one  individual  among  them  would  have 
a  right  to  govern  the  other.  If  the  parental 
authority  extended  in  the  right  line,  for  example, 
to  the  male  descendants  of  one  ancestor,  it  would 
extend  on  the  same  principle,  to  those  of  every 
other,  and  thus  there  would  be  formed  by  it  as 
many  governments  within  the  same  limits,  and  over 
the  same  territory,  as  there  were  parties  to  the  first 
association,  or  rather,  there  would  be  no  govern- 
ment at  all. 

From  every  view  that  can  be  taken  of  the  sub- 
ject, reasoning  on  principle,  the  doctrine  of  divine 
or  paternal  right,  as  the  foundation  of  a  claim,  in 
any  one,  to  the  sovereign  power  of  the  state,  or  to 
any  power  in  it,  is  utterly  absurd.  It  belonged  to 
the  dark  ages,  and  was  characteristic  of  the  super- 
stition and  idolatry  w'hicli  prevailed  in  them.  All 
men  are  by  nature  equally  free.  Their  Creator 
made  them  so,  and  the  inequalities  which  have 
grown  up  among  them,  and  the  governments  which 
have  been  established  over  them,  founded  on  other 
principles,  have  proceeded  from  other  causes,  by 
which  their  natural  rights  have  been  subverted. 
We  must  trace  government,  then,  to  other  sources, 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  69 

and  in  doing  this,  view  things  as  they  are,  and  not 
indulge  in  superstitious,  visionary  and  fanciful 
speculations. 

The  remaining  sources  from  which  the  power 
may  be  derived  are  election  and  force,  and  it  is 
from  one  or  other  of  these,  that  it  always  has  been, 
and  always  will  be,  derived,  for  there  is  none  other. 
The  nature  of  the  government,  and  the  manner  of 
its  origin,  whether  attributable  to  the  one  or  the 
other  cause,  must  depend  on  the  state  of  the  society 
at  the  time  it  originated,  and  of  which  there  are 
two  in  direct  opposition  to  each  other ;  the  one  un- 
lettered, rude  and  savage,  the  other  civilized;  and 
the  distance  between  them,  from  the  most  rude  to 
the  point  to  which  civilization  may  be  carried,  is 
immense.  In  the  first  state,  man  approaches  nearly 
to  the  brute  creation.  He  lives,  like  other  animals, 
on  the  natural  fruits  of  the  earth,  and  being  carni- 
vorous, kills  and  feeds  on  them.  In  the  second,  he 
is  capable  of  a  very  high  degree  of  elevation.  Agri- 
culture, commerce,  navigation  and  the  arts  engage 
his  attention  and  give  him  support.  A  vast  range 
of  science  is  opened  to  and  explained  by  him.  His 
mind  embraces  objects,  and  receives  an  expansion, 
unknown  to  the  other  state.  Government  is  indis- 
pensable in  every  stage,  and  becomes  more  impe- 
riously so  in  the  progress  from  the  one  to  the  other, 


70  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

from  the  rude  to  the  civilized,  according  to  the  de- 
gree to  which  civilization  is  carried. 

I  will  examine  the  institution  of  government  in 
both  these  states,  with  the  incidents  attending  it, 
in  each.  When  formed  in  a  rude  state,  the  remarks 
which  are  applicable  to  one  community  are  in  a 
general  view  ecjually  so  to  all.  In  such  a  state 
there  is  little  variety  between  different  communi- 
ties in  reference  to  the  object  in  question.  All 
unlettered  and  savage  societies  resemble  each  other, 
and  the  causes  which  produce  government  in  each, 
and  the  manner  of  its  creation  and  its  form  are  like- 
wise similar.  When  formed  in  a  state  of  civiliza- 
tion, difference  may  take  place  between  them  re- 
garding the  advance  therein  made,  and  other  causes 
incident  thereto,  which  will  produce  a  corresponding 
effect.  In  this  state  they  must  be  formed,  either  by 
a  change  of  the  existing  government  (there  having 
been  one  from  the  origin  of  the  society),  or  by  the 
formation  of  a  new  and  distinct  society,  by  emigra- 
tion of  a  portion  of  the  numbers  thereof  to  a  new 
position,  and  the  institution  of  a  new  government 
over  them  at  that  position.  As  all  original  socie- 
ties with  whose  origin  we  have  any  knowledge, 
both  of  the  ancient  and  modern  world,  commenced 
in  the  rude  state  in  which  state  governments  were 
formed  over  them,  and  as  all  the  changes  in  those 
governments  arose  from  the  changes  in  those  socie- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE   SOVEREIGNS.  71 

ties  by  their  progress  from  the  one  to  the  other 
state,  I  will  begin  with  the  rude  state,  and  describe 
according  to  my  best  judgment,  the  government  of 
which  it  is  susceptible,  and  of  necessity  adopts.  I 
will  then  proceed  to  notice  the  progress  of  such 
societies  in  civilization,  with  their  capacity  to  insti- 
tute a  new  government  better  adapted  to  the  state  in 
which  they  may  be,  and  to  maintain  such  govern- 
ment of  these  societies,  which  are  formed  by  migra- 
tion from  civilized  communities,  and  of  the  govern- 
ments of  which  they  are  capable,  I  shall  take  a 
distinct  view  in  the  proper  place. 

When  we  speak  of  man  in  a  state  of  nature,  we 
contemplate  him  as  rude,  unlettered,  and  unre- 
strained. In  this  state  he  is  free  and  at  liberty  to 
do  what  he  pleases.  In  that  state  few  are  seen. 
Man  is  by  nature  a  sociable  being,  and  pursuing  the 
impulse  derived  from  nature,  clings  to  his  fellow- 
man.  As  soon  as  such  numbers  are  collected,  no 
matter  from  whence  they  come,  or  how  thrown 
together,  as  to  merit  the  name,  a  society  is  formed, 
and  over  it  such  government  as  they  are  capable  of 
forming.  In  this  state  the  government  must  be  of 
the  most  simple  form,  and  with  very  limited  powers ; 
it  must  be  that  of  an  individual,  or  of  a  few,  rather 
than  of  laws ;  and  its  powers  must  be  confined  to 
the  causes  which  produced  it,  and  principally  to  the 
protection  of  the  virtuous  against  the  vicious,  of  the 


72  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

weak  against  the  strong.  When  the  government  is 
formed  as  it  were,  by  nature,  unaided  by  science  or 
experience  of  any  kind,  it  would  be  impossible  for 
the  parties  to  look  profoundly  into  principles,  or  to 
devise  the  means  of  preserving  them.  The  provi- 
sions of  such  governments  can  extend  to  nothing 
which  those  who  form  them  do  not  understand. 
All  societies  in  this  state  must  stand  on  the  same 
ground.  It  may  be  shown  that  this  influence  is 
not  only  justified  by  experience  and  reason,  but  is 
confirmed  by  the  authority  of  the  most  enlightened 
authors  who  have  treated  of  the  subject. 

AVe  have  examples  in  our  neighborhood  of  gov- 
ernments instituted  by  a  people  in  the  rude  state, 
the  aborigines  of  the  country,  which  correspond  with 
those  above  described.  In  many  instances  the  power 
in  those  tribes  is  committed  to  an  individual,  and 
in  others  to  a  few,  who  are  called  elders,  and  who 
exercise  it  in  the  sj)irit  and  extent  above  stated. 
Unlettered,  they  have  no  written  laws,  and  holding 
their  lands  in  common,  and  living  principally  on 
game,  those  which  they  have  are  confined  to  a  few 
objects,  such  as  nature  dictates,  and  are  traditional. 
The  cabins  which  they  inhabit,  the  fruits  of  their 
industry,  raised  on  the  lands  contiguous  thereto,  and 
the  game  which  they  kill,  are  their  own ;  and  their 
laws  in  relation  to  property  extend  no  further.  In 
resjicct  to  wrongs,  the  code  is  equally  simple.     Xo 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  73 

man  is  allowed  to  kill  another,  because  murder  is  a 
crime  Mdiich  revolts  the  feeling  of  the  whole  com- 
munity, and  in  an  exemplary  punishment  for  which 
they  all  agree.  No  reasoning  or  refinement  is  ne- 
cessary to  prove  it.  As  these  people  are  free  and 
high-minded,  the  governments  instituted  by  them 
may  be  considered  as  fair  specimens  of  all  govern- 
ments which  have  been  or  may  be  instituted  by  a 
people  in  a  like  state. 

The  progress  of  these  tribes  in  civilization  has 
been  slow,  and  is  yet  inconsiderable,  even  with 
those  most  advanced.  It  is  believed  that  the  esta- 
blishment of  schools  among  them  for  the  education 
of  the  youth  of  both  sexes,  is  the  most  practicable 
mode  that  can  be  adopted  for  their  civilization;  and 
that  by  the  continuance  of  such  schools,  through 
several  successive  generations,  the  object  might  be 
accomplished.  It  is  by  acting  on  the  infant  state 
only,  that  civilization  can  be  introduced  among 
them.  The  aged  are  beyond  its  reach.  This  object 
it  is  presumed,  might  be  aided  by  the  institution  of 
a  government  for  them,  to  be  committed  in  part  to 
our  citizens,  and  in  part  to  their  people,  by  means 
whereof  they  might  be  instructed,  gradually,  in  the 
science  of  government,  and  trained  to  the  exercise 
of  its  powers  on  a  more  enlarged  scale,  and  on  just 
principles.  This,  it  is  presumed,  by  the  influence 
which  we  enjoy  over  all  the  tribes  near  us,  might 

7 


74  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

be  clone,  ^vith  their  consent.  Whether  they  will 
ever  be  civilized  without  some  such  effort  on  our 
part  is  uncertain.  Many  tribes  known  to  the  first 
emigrants  have  become  extinct,  and  there  is  good 
cause  to  apprehend,  if  they  remain  in  their  present 
savage  state,  that  all  of  them  will  be.  Whether  it 
is  our  interest  to  civilize  them,  or  we  are  bound  by 
the  obligations  of  humanity  to  do  it,  are  questions 
which  merit  the  most  serious  consideration.  lu 
their  present  state  they  are  utterly  incompetent  to 
the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  a  well  organized,  free, 
representative  government.  Establish  such  an  one 
over  them,  and  leave  the  execution  of  its  duties  to 
themselves,  and  it  will  soon  fail.  This  remark  is 
applicable  to  all  people  in  the  same  state. 

If  we  trace  the  origin  of  government  to  election 
in  this  early  stage,  it  must  be  understood  that  the 
persons  collected  together  finding  a  government 
necessary,  consented  that  its  powers  should  be  ex- 
ercised by  such  a  person  or  persons,  rather  than  that 
the  election  was  made  in  any  regular  form,  or  by 
the  limitation  of  power,  or  of  the  term  of  service,  in 
the  sense  in  which  it  is  now  practiced.  If  we  trace 
it  to  force,  it  may  be  inferred  that  crimes  being 
committed  or  apiirehended,  and  the  safety  of  the 
society  requiring  that  provision  should  be  made 
against  them  by  the  punisliment  of  the  oftenders,* 

*  Diodorus  Siculus,  Vol.  I.  page  19. 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  75 

resistance  being  made  by  the  worst  class,  a  contest 
ensued,  which  terminated  in  favor  of  the  best, 
whereby  the  power  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  one 
or  more,  who  took  the  lead  on  the  right  side.  By 
this  view  of  the  origin  of  power  or  government 
over  society  in  such  a  state,  election  and  force 
mean  essentially  the  same  thing.  None  would  be 
instituted,  if  the  necessity  was  not  imperative,  and 
in  such  a  state  none  could  be  instituted  in  any 
reo-ular  form,  or  other  than  of  the  most  imperfect 
kind. 

Governments  thus  instituted,  however  defective 
in  form,  or  great  the  power  committed  to  those 
placed  in  them,  must  be  free  in  their  origin.  The 
natives  being  in  all  other  respects  equally  rude,  un- 
lettered, and  without  property  by  accumulation,  so 
as  to  form  distinctions  between  them,  as  is  done  in 
the  progress  of  civilization,  the  ruler,  if  there  be 
one,  is  rather  the  instrument  of  the  society,  than 
that  the  members  of  it  are  his  slaves.  They  hunt 
together,  prince  and  subject,  if  the  distinction  is  ad- 
missible ;  live  alike  in  cabins ;  and  feed  on  the  same 
fare.  Those  in  power  are  generally  persons  of  ad- 
vanced age,  and  chosen  for  their  good  qualities  and 
merit.  If  one,  he  is  called  father,  and  respected  as 
such;  and  to  this  source,  it  is  presumed  that  the 
doctrine  of  paternal  power  is  to  be  traced.  When 
crimes  are  committed  which  require  punishment. 


76  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

and  the  cries  of  the  injured  and  their  connections 
are  heard,  the  eyes  of  all  are  fixed  on  him,  and  in 
consequence  he  takes  the  seat  of  justice,  which  is 
that  of  distinction,  and  performs  the  duties  of  the 
station.  The  decision  which  he  pronounces  accords 
with  that  of  all  the  good  members  of  the  society, 
who  constitute  always  the  great  majority,  and  is 
supported  by  them.  From  that  seat  he  then  retires 
to  the  same  simple  state  of  equality  with  the  other 
members  which  he  held  before. 

It  is  in  the  progress  of  societies  that  the  relation 
between  the  parties  changes.  The  persons  thus 
chosen,  generally  hold  their  power  through  life, 
and  often  transmit  it  to  their  descendants.  The 
election  having  had  no  limitation  as  to  time,  and 
the  necessity  for  the  office  increasing  with  the  popu- 
lation, to  dismiss  the  aged  incumbent  and  put 
another  in  his  place,  especially  if  he  had  given 
satisfaction,  would  be  an  act  of  injustice  which  all 
would  disapprove.  The  possession  of  the  power  by 
the  first  incumbent  for  many  years,  if  he  had  dis- 
charged its  duties  with  fidelity,  would  naturally 
excite  in  his  favor,  and  in  that  of  his  family,  the 
feeling  of  the  whole  community,  or  at  least,  of  the 
best  portion  of  it,  and  hence  on  his  demise,  his  oldest 
son  would  be  a  fair  competitor  for  the  vacant  station. 
Should  he  succeed,  the  claim  to  hereditary  right 
would   grow   up,  which  would   be    sure  to   beget 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  11 

opposition  to  it.  From  this  period  the  ranks  in 
society  would  be  divided.  A  struggle  would  com- 
mence between  those  who  were  friends  of  self- 
government  and  of  liberty,  and  those  who  preferred 
a  government  founded  on  opposite  principles.  Some- 
times one  party  might  prevail,  and  sometimes  the 
other.  The  success  of  either  would  take  all  power 
Avith  it.  If  the  hereditary  claimant  succeeded  (there 
having  been  no  division  of  power  into  legislative, 
executive  and  judicial),  the  whole  would  centre  in 
him.  If  the  people  succeeded,  the  whole  would 
vest  in  them  collectively,  or  en  masse.  In  this  state 
there  could  be  no  improvement  of  the  government 
by  the  institution  of  the  representative  system,  or 
by  the  delegation  of  power  in  any  form.  The  state 
of  the  science  would  not  permit  it,  and  besides,  the 
people  would  always  be  in  a  state  of  alarm,  and 
on  the  watch,  afraid  of  every  one  and  of  every 
thing.  The  struggle  would  thus  go  on,  and  under 
circumstances  the  most  unfavorable  to  the  cause  of 
libertyr 

The  progress  of  societies  in  the  rude  unlettered 
state  has  a  strong  tendency  to  augment  the  power 
of  the  chief,  and  to  lessen  that  of  the  people.  As 
the  poj^ulation  increases,  the  pursuits  of  the  mem- 
bers become  more  diversified.  Some  take  to  auri- 
culture,  others  to  navigation,  commerce,  and  the 
arts,  while  many  still  hunt  the  game.     The  duties 


78  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

of  the  diief  become  proportion  ably  more  extended 
and  various.  The  people  are  also  put  at  a  gi'eater 
distance  from  him,  and  each  party  is  less  acquainted 
Avith  the  otlier.  His  agenc}"  would  in  consequence, 
in  the  cases  in  which  he  might  be  called  on  to  act, 
proceed  more  directly  from  himself,  and  thus  he 
would  gradually  imbibe  the  doctrine,  especially  a 
chief  of  the  second  race,  that  the  power  belonged  to 
him,  and  not  to  them.  If  contests  should  take 
place,  and  the  people  succeed,  the  effect  would  only 
be  to  transfer  the  government  from  one  chief  to 
another.  Their  incompetency  to  govern  themselves, 
en  masse,  would  be  increased  with  the  increase  of 
population,  the  diversity  of  their  pursuits,  and  more 
dispersed  situation.  The  same  causes  would  call  for 
a  more  efficient  government,  which  they  would  be 
equally  incomj)etent  to  organize,  even  should  the 
power  be  in  their  hands,  in  any  well-digested  form, 
such  as  should  preserve  order  in  society,  and  secure 
to  themselves  the  enjoyment  of  their  liberties.  With 
the  piu'suits  of  industry  a  corresponding  change 
would  likewise  take  place  in  the  habits  and  manners 
of  the  people.  The  two  great  classes  of  rich  and 
poor  would  grow  up  in  each  society,  which  would 
move  in  separate  bodies,  and  in  oiDposition  to  each 
other.  As  the  latter  would  form  the  great  majority, 
it  would  follow,  should  the  government  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  people,  that  that  class  would  have  the 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  79 

complete  control.  Hence  the  rich,  dreading  its  con- 
sequences, would  be  apt  to  incline  to  the  side  of  the 
chief  or  prince. 

In  such  a  state  of  society  it  would  be  hardly  pos- 
sible, even  should  the  prince  be  entirely  put  aside, 
for  the  other  parties  to  institute  any  regular  govern- 
ment for  themselves.  The  state  of  the  science  then 
existing  in  the  world,  would,  in  all  probaljility,  still 
render  such  an  institution  impracticable,  for  the 
wisest  heads  among  them.  For  an  unlettered  com- 
munity, divided  into  parties  different  in  their  cir- 
cumstances, and  in  a  state  of  variance  and  hostility 
with  each  other,  to  accomplish  it  would  be  alto- 
gether impossible.  Should  a  government  be  insti- 
tuted for  them  by  any  virtuous  and  enlightened 
member  of  the  commuuity  to  whom  they  might 
appeal,  organize  it  as  he  might,  its  fate  might  easily 
be  anticipated.  If  he  should  vest  the  power  in  the 
hands  of  the  rich  only,  it  would  soon  be  overset. 
If  in  the  hands  of  the  people,  en  masse,  under  any 
modification  which  he  might  give  to  it,  it  might 
sustain  itself  longer,  but  could  not  be  permanent. 

The  period  now  adverted  to  is  a  very  marked 
one  in  the  history  of  societies  and  of  man.  It  is 
one  in  which  the  rude  state  is  essentially  abandoned, 
and  considerable  progress  made  in  civilization,  and 
in  the  arts  of  civilized  life.  The  mass  in  each 
society  is  devoted  to  liberty,  but  unable  to  maintain 


80  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEPEIGNS. 

it.  Distinct  interests  have  arisen,  by  which  sepa- 
rate classes  have  been  formed  in  each  community, 
which  are  often  at  variance  with  each  other,  While 
tyrants  rule  in  some,  the  rich  have  gained  the 
ascendancy  in  others,  and  the  numerous  class  of 
poor  retain  it  in  others.  Under  such  circumstances 
changes  would  be  frequent.  Tyrants  \YOuld  occa- 
sionally be  deposed,  and  again  recover  their  power. 
Contests  between  the  rich  and  the  poor  would  be 
unceasing,  and  whenever  the  latter  wrested  the 
government  completely  from  the  hands  of  the 
former,  the  power  would  be  sure  to  pass  to  leaders 
who  would  be  apt  to  quarrel  with,  and  to  cut  each 
other  off,  and  thus  it  would  be  lost.  In  this  state 
of  civil  discord  compromises  would  be  apt  to  take 
place  between  the  contending  parties,  which  although 
not  formed  by  regular  compact,  would  have  like 
effect  by  the  acquiescence  of  the  parties.  Some- 
times the  arrangement  would  come  from  the  prince, 
who,  seeking  to  retain  his  power,  and  knowing  that 
it  could  not  be  done  unless  he  tranquillized  the 
state  by  admitting  both  the  other  classes  to  a  parti- 
cipation in  the  government,  he  Mould  make  an 
arrangement  to  that  effect.  Sometimes  it  might  be 
the  result  of  conflicts  which  the  exhausted  parties 
could  not  renew.  Such  an  arrangement  could  never 
proceed  from  the  people  by  accord,  as  equal  parties. 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  81 

In  this  manner  distinct  orders  would  be  introduced 
into  the  government. 

In  such  a  state  of  society,  in  which  each  extreme, 
the  government  of  an  individual  and  of  the  people, 
under  any  modification  which  they  could  form, 
being  found  to  be  impracticable,  and  the  rich  having 
acquired  a  force  not  to  be  disregarded,  it  would  be 
natural  that  experiments  should  be  made  of  govern- 
ments of  this  mixed  class,  through  the  whole  range 
between  perfect  democracy  and  despotism,  that  the 
power  of  the  people  should  prevail  in  one,  that  of 
the  prince  in  another,  and  of  the  aristocracy  in 
others.  Although  these  governments  of  the  mixed 
character  would  originate  in  strife,  and  take  the 
form  which  casual  events  might  give  them ;  and 
although  the  princijile  of  discord  is  deeply  engrafted 
in  them,  and  unceasingly  felt  in  their  operation,  yet 
they  have  been  more  durable  than  any  of  the  ancient 
democracies.  The  tendency  however  of  all  govern- 
ments of  this  mixed  character  has  been  to  despot- 
ism. When  the  power  of  the  prince  is  sustained, 
if  wars  ensue  with  neighboring  nations,  conquests 
are  made,  and  new  dominions  acquired,  such  result 
becomes  almost  inevitable.  The  people  remaining 
in  the  same  unlettered  state,  reduced  to  subordina- 
tion and  submission,  their  minds  are  broken.  The 
government  of  the  conquered  territories  is  by  pro- 
vinces, and  each  province  by  creatures  of  the  crown. 


f 

82  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

The  people  can  have  no  general  meeting,  nor  in  any 
other  mode,  in  their  unlettered  state,  act  in  concert. 
The  pursuits  of  industry,  in  the  great  mass,  tie  them 
to  the  soil.  If  any  change  in  favor  of  liberty  is 
made,  it  must  proceed  from  a  new  state  of  things, 
and  from  other  causes.  The  society  must  be  raised 
from  the  depressed  and  degraded  state  into  which  it 
has  fallen  ;  knowledge  must  be  diffused  among  the 
people,  commencing  with  a  few,  and  extending  by 
degrees  to  the  whole  community,  and  this  can  be 
done  only  by  making  those  pursuits  of  industry 
which  contribute  to  the  depression  instrumental  to 
their  elevation.  Property  must  be  acquired  by 
agriculture,  commerce  and  the  arts,  and  knowledge 
with  it.  The  success  of  a  few  will  excite  emulation 
with  others,  and  inspire  the  Avhole  community  Avith 
hope.  By  degrees  the  society  may  thus  be  raised  to 
the  grade  to  ^vhich  it  is  entitled  by  nature,  and  act- 
ing with  moderation  and  wisdom,  may  maintain  it. 
This  view  of  societies,  in  their  origin  and  pro- 
gress, may  be  considered  as  applicable  to  all  the 
ancient  republics.  It  may  fairly  be  inferred,  there- 
fore, if  the  view  be  correct,  that  the  cause  of  the 
people  never  had  a  fair  experiment  in  those  repub- 
lics, either  from  the  state  of  society,  or  under  a 
government  by  which  such  experiment  could  be 
made.  The  governments  which  they  were  able  to 
institute,  or  which  the  science  then  permitted,  fail- 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  83 

ing,  the  power  passed  over  directly  to  the  opposite 
extreme.  Fortunate  were  they  when  they  could 
escape  abject  slavery,  even  for  a  time,  under  those 
of  a  mixed  character.  How  far  it  might  have 
been  practicable  for  the  people  who  composed  those 
republics  to  liave  improved  their  system,  and  to 
have  preserved  their  liberties,  had  they  been  left 
to  the  operation  of  internal  causes  only,  is  uncer- 
tain. It  is  known  that  while  the  issue  was  de- 
j)ending,  they  were  all  overwhelmed  by  the  warlike 
spirit,  the  gigantic  growth,  and  overweening  ambi- 
tion of  Rome. 

I  have  so  far  treated  of  governments  established 
over  societies,  in  the  rude  and  unlettered  state,  and 
of  the  incidents  to  such  governments,  while  the 
mass  of  the  people  remained  in  that  state.  I  will 
now  notice  such  as  may  be  instituted  by  societies, 
in  a  state  of  civilization,  and  which  may  be  done 
either  by  old  and  populous  communities,  or  by 
emigration  of  a  portion  of  the  inhabitants  of 
such  communities  to  a  new  position,  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  new  government  over  them,  at  such 
position.  I  will  commence  with  the  effort  by  an 
old  and  populous  commnnity,  to  institute  a  new 
government  over  it,  and  proceed  afterwards  to  take 
a  view  of  such  government  as  may  be  established 
by  emigrants  from  such  conimunity. 

In  contemplating  the  institution  of  a  government 


84  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

by  an  old  and  populons  community,  the  change  of 
the  existing  government,  and  the  adoption  of 
another  more  favorable  to  liberty,  is  that  which  I 
have  in  view.  We  will  suppose  that  the  society 
had  passed  through  a  process  something  like  that 
which  has  been  described;  that  it  had  its  origin  in 
the  rude  state,  at  which  period  the  people  were 
equal  and  free,  but  had  submitted  to  such  a  gov- 
ernment as  they  were,  in  that  state,  competent  to; 
that  they  had  had,  in  their  progress,  struggles  for 
liberty,  and  experienced  changes  of  various  kinds, 
until,  by  the  increase  of  population,  and  other 
causes  adverted  to,  they  had  finally  been  reduced 
under  despotism.  "We  will  suppose  also,  that  they 
had  remained  for  centuries  in  that  state,  until  by 
the  extension  of  commerce,  improvement  in  agri- 
culture, and  in  the  arts  and  sciences,  a  new  era  had 
arrived ;  that  the  mass  of  the  people  had  become 
more  intelligent;  that  many  among  them  had  ac- 
quired great  wealth  and  consideration  by  their 
manners,  talents  and  services,  which  had  exalted 
them  by  the  just  standard  of  merit  above  any  in 
the  privileged  orders.  A  change  in  this  state,  by 
the  overthrow  of  the  existing  despotism,  and  the 
establishment  of  a  free  government,  could  be 
accomplished  only  by  a  revolution  and  by  force. 
Are  a  people  thus  circumstanced  competent  to 
such  a  change?     Are  they  capable  of  surmounting 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  85 

the  difficulties  wliicli  they  would  have  to  encounter 
in  the  effort,  and  to  maintain  the  government 
should  they  succeed,  after  its  establishment?  These 
questions  involve  considerations  of  high  importance 
to  the  whole  human  race.  They  bear,  however,  in 
the  first  instance,  more  especially  on  Europe. 

That  a  government  founded  on  the  sovereignty 
of  the  people  with  a  wise  organization  and  distri- 
bution of  its  powers,  is  practicable  over  very  exten- 
sive dominions  and  very  populous  communities,  is 
certain,  provided  the  state  of  society  throws  no 
impediment  in  its  way.  AVhat  that  state  must  be, 
to  give  effect  to  such  a  government,  has  already 
been  fully  explained.  All  that  is  necessary  is  that 
the  inhabitants  generally  be  intelligent,  that  they 
possess  some  property,  be  independent  and  moral, 
and  that  they  organize  a  government  by  represen- 
tation into  three  branches,  a  legislative,  executive 
and  judiciary,  under  a  wise  arrangement,  and  vest 
in  each  the  powers  competent  to  its  objects.  If 
such  a  people  were  possessed  of  the  sovereignty, 
and  were  left  free  under  such  a  government  to  the 
operation  of  internal  causes  only,  having  the  whole 
force  in  their  hands,  if  united  and  competent,  how 
is  it  possible  that  they  should  fail?  It  liappens, 
however,  that  all  the  most  distinguished  commu- 
nities of  modern  Europe,  those  which  are  most 
advanced  in  civilization  and  improvement  of  every 


86  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

kind,  are  placed  under  governments  of  the  monar- 
chic cliaracter,  many  of  which  are  despotic.     The 
institution  of  free  governments  in  those  countries 
could  not  be  wrought  without  a  struggle.     Those 
in  power  would  not  voluntarily  submit,  nor  could 
the  government  be  maintained  afterwards,  without 
encountering  serious  difficulties,  arising  from  for- 
eign, as  well  as  internal  causes.     I  think  proper  to 
remark  here,  that  the  people  of  many  of  the  coun- 
tries  of  Europe  adverted  to,  occupy,  according  to 
my  judgment,  much  more    advantageous   ground 
than    was    held   by  those  of  any  of  the   ancient 
republics.       The  class  called   the  people    is  more 
intelligent,  more  independent  in  its  circumstances, 
and   respectable   in   its   character.     Skilled   in   the 
arts,  and  intelligent  in  other  respects,  as  many  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  ancient  republics  were,  still 
there  was  a  limit  within  which  their  knowledge 
was  confined,  and  beyond  which  the  light  of  modern 
times  has  passed.     Science  in  all  its  branches  has 
been   more  extensively  explored,  and   more  gene- 
rally spread  among  the  people.     The  discovery  of 
the  compass  has  opened  all  parts  of  the  habitable 
globe  to  the  enterprising  and  curious.     Commerce 
has  taken  a  much  more  extensive  range,  by  means 
whereof   those  engaged   in   it    have  in   successive 
ages  acquired  a  degree  of  wealth   which  has  placed 
them,  with  their  merit  in  other  respects,  in  elevated 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  87 

stations  in  every  community.  The  discovery  of 
the  art  of  printing  has  had  an  effect  still  more  ex- 
tensive and  important.  It  has  diffused  knowledge 
among  the  mass  of  the  people,  and  thereby  ren- 
dered them  better  acquainted  with  their  rights,  and 
more  able  to  support  them.  The  different  classes 
of  society  have  been  brought  into  greater  inter- 
course and  harmony  witli  each  other.  The  spirit 
of  equality  is  more  sensibly  felt,  and  there  are  in 
all  those  countries  many  of  their  most  enlightened 
citizens,  in  the  highest  ranks  in  society,  who  are 
devoted  to  free  principles.  The  light  of  ages  has 
been  shed  on  the  subject  of  government,  and  im- 
provements made,  especially  by  representation, 
which  were  unknown  to  the  ancient  world.  Such 
has  been  the  effect  produced  by  these  causes,  that 
it  is  obvious  that  several  of  these  governments 
which  are  held  by  monarchs  have  changed  their 
policy,  if  not  their  principles,  by  accommodating 
their  measures  to  the  popular  opinion  and  feeling. 
What  further  changes  may  be  made  in  any  of  them 
time  will  develope.  Nothing  that  has  occurred 
can  be  considered  as  decisive  against  them,  or 
ought  to  be  discouraging,  provided  that  those  who 
take  the  lead,  act  Avith  moderation  and  humanity. 
Violence  and  cruelty  will  be  sure  to  defeat  any 
attempt  that  may  be  made. 

Two  instances  have  occurred  in  modern  Europe, 


So  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

of  efforts  made  by  the  people  of  old  and  populous 
communities  to  wrest  the  government  from  the 
privileged  orders,  and  to  establish  one  founded  on 
equal  rights.  The  first  took  place  in  England 
during  the  reign  of  the  family  of  Stuart,  and  com- 
menced in  that  of  Charles  the  First.  The  second 
in  France,  and  commenced  near  the  end  of  the  last 
century.  As  it  is  my  intention  if  in  my  power  to 
extend  the  comparison  of  our  governments  with 
that  of  England,  and  in  making  wliich  it  will  be 
necessary  to  notice  that  effort  in  some  detail,  as  an 
example  of  the  governments  and  of  the  state  of 
society  of  this  epoch,  I  shall  postpone  what  I  have 
to  say  on  it  until  I  reach  that  stage.  Of  the 
second,  of  recent  date,  I  was  present  and  an  atten- 
tive observer  of  its  most  difficult  conjunctions.  As 
this  epoch  forms  one  of  the  most  interesting  events 
of  the  modern  world,  some  attention  is  thought  to 
be  due  to  it  in  this  sketch. 

I  arrived  in  Paris  on  the  2d  of  August,  1794,  a 
few  days  after  the  fall  and  executiou  of  Robespierre, 
and  I  saw  the  revolutionary  government  in  opera- 
tion in  its  subsequent  stages ;  under  the  convention ; 
under  the  directory  and  the  two  councils;  under 
the  consuls;  and  I  was  present  when  it  finally 
terminated  under  the  Emperor.  I  was  anxious  to 
trace  to  their  sources  the  causes  which  produced 
the  very  extraordinary  occurrences  which  marked 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  89 

that  great  struggle.  I  was  a  friend  of  tlie  French 
Revokition,  not  as  an  enemy  of  the  Bourbons,  for 
as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  I  Avas  always 
grateful  to  them  for  their  services  in  our  Kevolu- 
tion,  and  lamented  the  extremity  to  which  the 
cause  had  been  pushed  by  their  execution.  I  was 
the  friend  of  that  Revolution  as  the  friend  of 
liberty,  in  which  avowed  character  I  was  sent  to 
France  as  the  representative  of  my  government 
and  country.  I  was  therefore  an  interested  spectator 
as  to  the  cause  to  which  I  wished  success,  but 
respecting  those  on  the  theatre,  who  acted  in  its 
support,  and  of  whose  merit  I  could  judge  only  by 
the  view  which  I  took  of  their  conduct,  I  was  alto- 
gether impartial. 

It  was  a  movement  instructive  to  mankind  in 
regard  to  the  dangers  incident  to  an  effort,  by  an 
old  and  populous  community,  which  had  been  long 
ruled  by  despotism,  to  subvert  that  government 
and  establish  a  free  one.  The  movement  was  in 
truth  revolutionary,  and  under  circumstances  which 
put  all  the  passions  in  motion  under  the  strongest 
excitement,  without  any  balance  in  the  system,  es- 
pecially in  the  early  stages,  which  could  give  it  a 
proper  direction.  It  was  impossible  that  such  an 
effort  should  be  made  without  encountering  the 
most  serious  difficulties  arising  from  internal  as 
well  as  foreign  causes.     A  monarchy  so  long  estab- 


90  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

Hslied  and  deeply  rooted,  could  not  be  overthrown 
without  the  concurrence  of  a  large  majority  of  the 
people,  and  the  collection  of  such  a  force  as  would 
crush  all  opposition.  Kor  could  its  overthrow  fail 
to  leave  in  full  activity  the  most  conflicting  ele- 
ments of  which  a  society  can  be  composed.  If 
civil  war  in  its  most  formidable  shape  did  not 
ensue;  discontent,  which  would  pervade  all  the  ad- 
herents of  the  former  government  would  still  exist 
and  show  itself  in  a  variety  of  ways  in  the  progress 
of  the  revolution.  Foreign  wars  would  be  in- 
evitable, for  as  the  governments  of  all  the  other  great 
powers  were  monarchical,  it  would  be  natural  for 
those  at  their  head  to  conclude  that  if  the  monarchy 
of  France  should  be  overthrown,  a  like  fate  would 
befal  them.  Some  time  would  also  elapse  before  a 
regular  government  could  be  established,  and  in  the 
interim,  the  popular  movement  would  control  every- 
thing. All  these  difficulties  occurred,  and  under 
circumstances  which  called  into  activity,  and  put  to 
the  severest  trial,  all  the  faculties  and  resources, 
mental  and  physical,  of  the  nation.  The  whole 
people  moved,  as  it  were,  in  a  body,  and  gave  proofs 
of  a  devotion  to  liberty,  of  patriotism  and  gallantry 
in  the  field,  ^vhieh  were  never  surpassed  by  any 
other  nation.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  enter  into 
the  details  of  this  great  struggle.  I  shall  simply 
make  those  comments  on  it,  founded  on  occurrences 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  91 

which  passed  under  my  own  view ;  and  others  that 
are  well  authenticated,  which  belong  to  the  subject 
on  which  I  treat. 

Each  government  formed  an  epoch  peculiar  to 
itself,  and  characteristic  of  the  crisis  which  had  oc- 
curred. Extraordinary  agitation  marked  its  early 
stages,  of  which  the  government  under  the  Conven- 
tion gave  the  most  signal  proofs.  That  body  formed 
the  government,  because,  by  its  acts,  the  public 
actions  were  sanctioned ;  but  it  was  rather  as  the 
organ  and  the  instrument  of  the  popular  feeling  and 
will  under  the  excitement  which  prevailed,  than  a 
calm  and  deliberative  assembly,  acting  according  to 
its  own  judgment.  The  people  might  be  said,  and 
especially  until  the  fall  of  Robespierre,  to  rule,  en 
masse,  and  under  the  greatest  possible  disadvantages. 
The  ffovernraent  was  in  effect  united  with  the  sove- 
reign ty  in  the  people,  and  all  power,  legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial,  concentrated  in  them.  The 
popular  sentiment  was  ascertained,  not  from  a 
meeting  of  the  whole  people  of  France  in  one  body, 
for  that  was  impossible,  but  from  movements  in 
different  quarters:  Paris,  Marseilles,  Bordeaux, 
Lyons,  and  elsewhere,  under  local  excitements,  and 
without  deliberation.  Of  this  sentiment,  thus  pro- 
claimed, the  Convention  was  the  instrument,  and  at 
its  head  was  a  leader  who  yielded  to  the  worst  pas- 
sions which  could  animate  the  breast  of  an  ambitious 


92  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

competitor  for  power.  Two  parties  were  formed  in 
it,  at  an  early  period,  one  of  which  was  called  the 
Mountain,  and  the  other  the  Plane.  The  former 
was  distinguished  for  its  violence  and  cruelty,  the 
latter  for  its  moderation  and  humanity.  Both  were 
friends  to  liberty  and  the  Revolution,  but  they  dif- 
fered as  to  the  means  of  accomplishing  it ;  and  it 
was  that  difference,  combined  with  other  causes, 
which  gave  to  each  the  character  it  held.  Jacobin 
societies  were  established  from  the  commencement 
of  the  Revolution,  through  France,  at  the  head  of 
which  stood  that  in  Paris,  and  by  which  the  im- 
pulse was  given  to  the  others.  In  the  early  stages 
those  societies  promoted  with  just  views  the  success 
of  the  Revolution,  but  they  afterwards  became  in- 
strumental to  the  greatest  enormities.  Between  the 
Mountain  party  and  this  society  in  Paris  the  most 
perfect  harmony  and  concert  existed,  and  which  ex- 
tended in  consequence  to  all  the  other  societies.  Ro- 
bespierre became  the  leader  of  the  jMountain  party, 
and  likewise  of  the  Jacobin  society  in  Paris,  and  by 
him,  or  by  his  instrumentality,  the  distinguished 
members  of  the  party  of  the  Plane,  and  other  illustri- 
ous friends  of  the  Revolution,  were  cut  off.  The  ex- 
tent to  ^\■llich 'those  enormities  were  carried,  by  cut- 
ting off  innocent  persons  who  took  no  part  in  the 
contest,  women  as  well  as  men,  sapped  the  foundation 
of  the  Revolution,  and  will  always  be  viewed  with 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  93 

horror.  This  atrocious  individual  was  at  length 
overwhelmed,  and  led  to  the  guillotine,  by  which 
he  suffered  the  fate  he  merited. 

On  my  arrival  at  Paris  at  this  awful  moment,  I 
beheld  a  state  of  affairs  of  which  I  had  before  seen 
no  example,  nor  anything  which  in  the  slightest 
degree  resembled  it.  Our  Revolution  exhibited  a 
very  different  spectacle.  The  movement  of  the 
people  with  ns,  in  every  stage,  was  tranquil,  and 
their  confidence  in  their  representatives  unlimited. 
No  animosity  or  rivalry  was  seen  among  them.  If 
any  had  previously  existed,  it  ceased  at  that  great 
crisis.  We  had  no  distinct  hereditary  order  in  the 
community;  no  hierarchy.  We  had  but  one  order, 
that  of  the  people;  nor  had  we  any  citizen  among 
us  who  did  not  rest  on  his  merits  and  the  oj)inion 
entertained  of  it  by  his  fellow-citizens  at  large.  The 
whole  body,  therefore,  clung  together  on  the  jjurcst 
principles,  and  in  the  most  simple  and  perfect  form. 
But  on  the  theatre  then  before  me,  all  the  conflict- 
ing elements  to  which  I  have  referred  w^ere  in  full 
activity,  the  effect  of  which  was  visible  on  every 
object  which  presented  itself  to  view.  The  adhe- 
rents of  the  monarchical  government  were  anxious 
to  overthrow  the  existing  one,  and  active  in  pro- 
moting that  result.  The  nobility,  who  had  re- 
mained behind,  were  generally  of  that  class,  all  of 
whom  were  degraded,  and  most  of  whom  had  suf- 


94  TUE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

ferecl  by  the  Revolution.  The  hierarchy  formed  a 
corps  equally  numerous  and  active.  Their  lands 
had  been  wrested  from  them  and  sold,  or  were  at 
market.  All  these  classes  acted  in  concert,  but 
being  overwhelmed,  moved  as  it  were  under  the 
mask.  The  people  contributed  their  part  to  this 
disorderly  and  frightful  spectacle.  The  Convention 
was,  for  the  moment,  comparatively  calm,  as  was 
the  city,  but  the  tranquillity  was  of  a  character  to 
show  that  the  passions  which  had  produced  the  late 
storm  were  rather  smothered  than  extinguished. 
Other  explosions  were  dreaded,  and  confidence,  even 
among  those  who  had  been  most  active  on  each  side, 
seemed  to  be,  in  a  great  measure,  withdrawn.  The 
Mountain  party  still  held  the  majority  in  the  com- 
mittee which  were  charged  with  the  executive 
government,  and  that  party  was  not  entirely  crushed 
in  the  Convention. 

My  own  situation  was  the  most  difficult  and 
painful  that  I  had  ever  experienced.  Our  treaty 
of  commerce  of  1778  had  been  set  aside,  and  many 
of  our  vessels  seized  and  condemned,  with  their 
cargoes,  in  violation  of  it.  Some  hundreds  of  our 
citizens  were  then  in  Paris,  and  the  seaports  of 
France,  many  of  them  imprisoned,  and  all  of  them 
treated  more  like  the  subjects  of  their  enemies, 
than  the  citizens  of  a  friendly  and  allied  power. 
An  hostile  attitude  was  assumed  tow^ard  our  gov- 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  95 

ernment  and  country,  and  war  seriously  menaced. 
Of  this  disposition  I  felt,  personally,  the  most  morti- 
fying effect,  my  recognition  being  delayed  and 
likely  to  be  refused.  I  saw  distinctly  that  no 
impression  could  be  made  on  the  Committee  of 
Public  Safety,  and  Avas  fearful  if  I  should  acqui- 
esce in  the  delay  of  my  recognition,  the  ill  will 
toward  us  which  pervaded  that  body  would  be 
extended  generally  to  the  Convention,  and  through- 
out the  nation.  On  full  consideration  I  was  satis- 
fied that  the  injuries  already  received  would  not 
be  redressed,  nor  greater  averted,  without  making 
an  appeal  as  it  were  to  the  real  government,  the 
people,  through  the  nominal  one,  the  Convention, 
and  by  means  thereof  to  bring  the  cause  fairly 
before  the  nation.  I  knew  their  object  was  liberty, 
and  that  they  had  caught  the  spirit  in  our  struggle, 
by  the  part  they  had  taken  in  it,  many  of  whom 
had  carried  it  home,  and  infused  it  into  the  great 
body  of  the  people.  Our  eyes  are  naturally  turned 
to  an  illustrious  individual  who  lately  visited  us, 
who  fought  and  bled  in  our  cause,  and  whose 
services  in  its  support  can  never  be  too  highly 
appreciated  or  liberally  rewarded.  I  knew  that 
there  stood  at  the  head  of  our  government  one, 
who  by  his  devotion  to  that  cause,  and  the  services 
he  had  rendered  to  it,  was  entitled  to,  and  held  in 
the  highest  veneration  by  the  French  people;  and 


96  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

was  persuaded,  if  I  brought  before  them  couvincing 
proofs  of  his  good  wishes  for  their  success,  sup- 
ported by  that  of  the  other  branches  of  our  govern- 
ment, that  the  hostile  spirit  which  had  been  mani- 
fested towards  us  by  the  French  Government, 
woukl  be  subdued,  and  ray  recognition  immediately 
follow.  It  was  on  this  principle  that  I  addressed 
the  convention,  and  with  the  desired  effect,  having 
been  received  by  that  body  itself  on  the  next. day. 
That  such  should  have  been  the  state  of  affairs,  as 
to  compel  me  to  resort  to  such  an  expedient,  is  in 
itself  a  sufficient  proof  of  the  disorder  in  which 
the  Government  of  France  then  was,  and  of  the 
difference  between  it  and  all  settled  governments, 
whatever  be  their  form. 

From  this  period  the  power  was  transferred  to 
the  party  of  the  Plane,  who  held  it  the  residue  of 
the  term  of  the  government  by  the  convention. 
The  conduct  of  this  party  corresponded  with  its 
well-known  principles.  It  looked  to  the  cause, 
and  pushed  it  forward  with  zeal  and  perseverance, 
and  as  I  thought  with  perfect  integrity.  It  sus- 
tained a|so  its  character  for  moderation  and  human- 
ity, for  I  saw  in  its  progress,  in  the  trial  of  some 
of  the  leading  members  of  the  INIountain  party 
who  had  survived,  and  were  denounced  before  it, 
a  disposition  rather  to  forgive,  than  avenge  the 
injuries  it  had  received  from  that  party.     Several 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  97 

attacks  were  made  on  the  convention  during  the 
rule  of  this  party,  by  popuLar  movements  in  Paris, 
particularly  by  those  of  Germinal,  Prarial,  and 
Vendemiare,  which  were  met  with  firmness,  and 
repulsed  by  the  force  arrayed  on  its  side.  These 
movements  were  either  excited  by  foreign  powers 
or  by  members  of  the  Mountain  party.  Among 
the  important  objects  which  now  engaged  the  at- 
tention of  the  convention,  was  the  formation  of  a 
constitution,  in  which  it  succeeded  by  the  institu- 
tion of  the  government  of  the  Directory,  and  the 
two  Councils,  to  which  the  power  was  transferred 
on  the  31st  of  October,  1795.  The  proceedings 
under  this  government  assumed  a  different  char- 
acter from  that  which  had  been  acquired  by  those 
under  the  convention.  They  were  more  tranquil 
and  orderly,  and  the  government  itself,  in  all  its 
departments,  more  operative  and  efficient.  The 
people  confined  themselves  more  within  the  limit 
of  their  appropriate  duties,  as  the  sovereign  power 
of  the  state,  and  left  the  government  more  free  to 
perform  those  which  belonged  to  it,  as  their  repre- 
sentative and  responsible  organ.  The  government 
of  the  Consuls  was  a  step  toward  monarchy,  in 
which  it  terminated  in  the  imperial  form. 

In  the  progress  of  this  Eevolution  I  beheld, 
with  great  interest  and  satisfaction,  the  wonderful 
effect   which    it   had,  from   year   to   year,  by  the 


98  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEPEIGNS. 

agency  of  the  people  in  the  government  on  their 
inteUigence  and  capacity  for  self-government.  I 
noticed  this  in  my  first  mission,  during  my  resi- 
dence in  Paris,  from  1794  till  1797;  and  I  was 
more  sensibly  struck  with  it  on  my  return  to 
France  in  1803.  It  was  by  the  patriotic  zeal  and 
devotion  to  liberty  of  the  whole  French  people, 
that  the  most  gallant  exploits  were  })erformed  that 
the  modern  world  had  witnessed:  that  all  the  sur- 
rounding nations  had  been  repulsed,  and  many 
subdued,  so  that  in  truth  the  Revolution  was  accom- 
plished when  the  last  change  took  effect.  Satisfied 
I  am,  had  those  who  had  gained  great  popularity, 
by  the  eminent  services  which  they  had  rendered, 
looked  to  the  cause  a  few  years  longer,  and  not  to 
themselves,  the  Republic  might  have  been  saved. 
The  people  had  much  improved  in  their  capacity 
for  self-government,  yet  their  emancipation  from 
the  opposite  extreme  had  been  too  sudden,  and  the 
interval  too  short  for  them  to  have  become,  in  all 
respects,  competent  to  it.  They  were  devoted  to 
the  Revolution,  and  were  grateful  to  those  who  had 
signalized  themselves  in  its  support,  especially  by 
gallant  exploits  in  the  field,  and  by  victories  over 
the  poAverful  armies  which  assailed  them.  The 
names  of  those  commanders  became  identified  with 
the  cause,  and  in  their  elevation  without  making 
the  proper  discrimination,  they  looked  to  its  sup- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  99 

port,  rather  than  to  its  overthrow,  aud  thus  their 
best  propensities,  as  well   as  their  frailties,  were 
practiced  on  and  made  instrumental  to  that  result. 
In  making  this  remark,  I  indulge  no  feeling  of 
personal  hostility  to  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  in  whose 
favor  the  change  was  wrought,  and  who  was  the 
principal  actor  in  it.     No  one  thought  more  highly 
than  I  did  of  his  gallantry  in  the  field,  and  of  his 
talents  as  the  commander  of  his  army,  and  person- 
ally I  had  no  cause  of  complaint  against  him,  for 
in  ray  second  mission  to  France,  when  he  was  at 
the  head  of  the  Consular  Government,  I  was  treated 
by  him  with  kindness  and  attention.     I  look  only 
to  the  change,  and  to  the  causes  which  produced  it. 
An  enlightened  and  virtuous   people,  who  are 
blessed   with  liberty,  should    look  with  profound 
attention  to  every  occurrence  which  furnishes  proof 
of  the  dangers   to  Avhich   that  cause  is  exposed. 
The  example  to  which  I  have  referred  is  of  that 
character,  and  should  be  constantly  held  in  view. 
The  effort  was   made  by  a   great  nation,  distin- 
guished for  its  improvement  in  civilization  and  in 
all  the  arts  of  civilized  life;  advanced  to  the  utmost 
height  in  every  branch  of  science  that  the  human 
intellect  has  attained,  and  respected  for  every  useful 
as  well  as  polished   acquirement   throughout  the 
civilized  world.     Having  witnessed  personally  that 
effort,  in   the  extent  that  I   have  stated,  I   have 


100  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

thought  that  a  brief  notice  in  this  place  of  its 
progress  and  fate  might  have  a  good  effect,  and 
have,  therefore,  given  it. 

I  will  now  proceed  to  notice  such  societies  as 
may  be  formed  by  emigration  of  a  portion  of  the 
inhabitants  from  civilized  communities  into  another 
country,  with  the  establishment  of  new  govern- 
ments over  them  in  such  country.  I  shall  note 
some  prominent  distinctions  between  governments 
established  by  societies  in  this  and  the  other  state, 
to  show  the  eminent  advantages  which  the  latter 
have  over  the  former,  as  well  in  the  capacity  to 
institute  free  governments,  as  to  preserve  them. 

Of  this  class,  that  is  by  emigration,  there  may  be 
two  of  different  character.  The  emigrants  may  take 
possession  of  a  new  territory,  and  institute  an  inde- 
pendent government  of  their  own,  such  as  they  pre- 
fer, or  they  may  emigrate  under  the  protection  and 
authority  of  the  parent  country.  Of  the  first  kind, 
the  state  of  imj^rovement  to  which  the  science  has 
been  carried  is  the  natural  limit  of  any  human  in- 
stitution. Prudent  men  will  be  more  disposed  to 
adopt  institutions  under  which  they  have  lived,  if 
of  the  free  class,  than  to  make  experiments  of  un- 
tried projects,  which  are  suggested  by  conjecture 
and  fancy  only.  Governments  thus  instituted  cor- 
responding in  their  form  with  those  of  the  parent 
countries,  and  the  state  of  society  being  the  same, 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  101 

would  be  apt  to  experience  a  like  fate.     If  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  colony  is  formed  by  the  parent 
country  by  charter,  its  fate  will  depend  on  a  variety 
of  circumstances,  and  particularly  on  the  interest 
which  the  parent  country  takes  in  the  emigration, 
and  the  connection  which  it  intends  to  preserve  with 
the  colony ;  on  the  spirit  in  which  the  emigration 
is  made  and  the  causes  which  produced  it ;  and  on 
the  character  of  the  emigrants.     If  the  institution  is 
made  in  its  great  features  popular,  and  the  power 
of  that  branch  of  the  government  falls  into  the 
hands  of  enlightened  and  virtuous  emigrants,  the 
control  of  the  colony,  during  its  infant  state  by  the 
parent  country,  will  form  a  nursery  of  the  best  kind 
for  free  principles.     Civilized  men  will  take  pos- 
session of  the  woods,  and  the  freedom  of  the  hunt- 
ing state  be  preserved,  without  the  barbarism  inci- 
dent to  that  state.     The  widely  separated  parties  of 
extreme  wealth  and  poverty  will    not  be  known 
among  them.    The  pressure  from  the  parent  country, 
however  slight,  will  unite  them  at  home,  and  thus 
form  but  one  class  among  them,  the  whole  of  which 
will  be    united,  when  the  emergency  requires    it, 
against  oppression  and  in  favor  of  liberty.     The 
intelligence  and  correct  principles  of  the  parents 
will  descend  to  their  offspring,  and  thus  the  society 
will  grow  up  from  its  infant  state  to  maturity,  in- 
structed in  the  knowledge,  and  trained  to  the  sup- 


UNIVERSITY  0T7  C.ATJFORNIA 
SANTA  BARBAitA 


102  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

port  of  popular  rights  and  dismemberment,  find 
them  in  the  best  state  to  preserve  them.  An  en- 
lightened community,  perfectly  free,  having  the 
Avhole  power  in  their  hands,  with  no  opposing 
interest  to  contend  with,  may  organize  the  best 
government  that  human  wisdom  can  devise,  and  be 
sure  to  preserve  it. 


CHAPTER  II. 

A  COMPARATIVE  HISTORICAL  VIEW  OF  THE  GOVERK- 
MENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  REPUBLICS 
OF  ATHENS,  LACEDEMON  AND  CARTHAGE. 

The  elementary  view  above  presented  of  govern- 
ment in  its  principles,  and  the  incidents  to  those 
principles  in  the  different  classes  of  government,  and 
of  society  in  the  different  states  of  which  it  is  sus- 
ceptible, and  of  its  capacity  for  self-government, 
regarding  the  state  in  which  it  may  be,  will  aid  me 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  work  in  which  I  am 
engaged.  There  is  no  part  of  the  subject  in  either 
branch  to  which  this  view  will  not  apply,  or  in 
which  it  is  not  supported,  as  is  believed,  by  the  well 
attested  history  of  the  human  race  in  all  ages, 
throughout  the  globe. 

The  comparison  which  I  propose  to  make  of  our 
government  with  those  of  other  countries,  will  be 
confined,  as  has  already  been  observed,  to  those  of 
Greece,  Carthage  and  Rome,  among  the  ancients, 
and  if  my  health  permits,  of  Great  Britain  among 
the  modern.     With  those  of  Greece,  I  shall  confine 

103 


104  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

it  to  those  of  Athens  and  Lacedemon.  The  first  of 
these  was  a  simple  democracy,  organized  and  exer- 
cised in  the  manner  known  to  the  ancients.  The 
second  was  a  mixed  government  with  distinct 
orders.  In  regard  to  the  first,  the  principle  being 
the  same  with  thaib  on  which  our  governments  are 
founded,  the  example  of  a  single  government  will 
be  sufficient.  In  the  view  taken  of  it  the  defects 
of  all  governments  of  that  class  applicable  to  our 
own  system,  must  proceed  from  other  causes  than 
the  principle ;  and  in  treating  of  the  defects  of  our 
government,  those  of  all  others  of  the  same  class 
may  be  noticed.  When  the  principle  is  different, 
several  examples  may  be  necessary,  and  with  that 
view  I  shall  extend  the  comparison  to  the  other 
governments  mentioned,  which  differed  from  each 
other  in  the  number  of  orders  and  division  of 
power  between  them.  In  examining  the  Govern- 
ment of  Athens,  I  shall  have  in  view  that  which 
was  instituted  by  Solon,  it  being  admitted  by  all 
to  have  been  the  best  they  ever  had,  and  in  effect 
the  best  of  that  class  that  was  known  to  the  ancients. 
Considering  the  society  and  the  government  con- 
nected and  identified  with  each  other,  as  I  do,  and 
having  an  influence  each  on  the  other,  I  shall  com- 
mence with  the  origin  of  both,  and  trace  them,  with 
the  great  events  which  marked  their  career,  to  the 
adoption  of  that  institution,  and  during  its  exist- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  105 

ence.  In  examining  the  Government  of  Lacede- 
mon,  I  shall  have  in  view  the  Constitution  of 
Lycurgus,  and  pursue  the  same  course  in  tracing 
the  origin  of  the  society  and  government  of  that 
people  with  their  progress,  that  I  propose  to  do 
with  those  of  Athens.  I  shall  likewise  endeavor  to 
do  equal  justice  to  those  of  Carthage  and  Rome, 
noting  their  best  epochs,  with  the  causes  of  their 
decline  and  fall. 

In  regard  to  the  modern  world,  the  government 
of  Great  Britain  furnishes  the  most  interestinfr  ex- 
ample.  In  treating  of  it,  tlie  distinctions  between 
it  and  governments  of  a  like  kind  among  the 
ancients,  and  likewise  between  the  societies  of  those 
two  great  and  distant  epochs,  may  be  noticed. 

In  a  development  of  the  organization  and  endow- 
ment of  the  Democratical  Government  of  Athens, 
and  of  its  defects,  with  the  proper  remedies  for  them, 
a  wide  range  will  be  opened  for  the  practical  illus- 
tration of  the  great  principles  of  the  science.  There 
was  nothing  sound  in  that  government  but  the 
principle  on  which  it  was  founded.  A  full  develop- 
ment therefore  of  its  defects,  with  the  remedies  for 
them,  will  in  those  respects,  if  well  executed,  leave 
nothing  untouched  in  relation  to  governments  of 
that  class,  and  include  much  which  is  applicable  to 
the  other.  It  will  be  found  that  the  principles 
which  apply  to  the  organization   and  endowment 


106  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

of  a  government  founded  on  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people,  Avill  embrace  all  the  considerations  that  are 
applicable  to  this  class,  and  many  that  are  equally 
so  to  the  other ;  will  apply  to  those  which  recog- 
nize distinct  orders,  and  to  all  governments  in 
which  the  people  participate,  or  that  have  any  pre- 
tension to  liberty.  In  governments  in  which  the 
people  possess,  exclusively,  the  sovereignty,  the 
people  must  be  protected  against  themselves,  other- 
wise, such  is  the  nature  of  man,  that  oppression, 
with  the  overthrow  of  the  government,  will  be  in- 
evitable. The  rule  of  a  single  body,  and  of  a  single 
man,  must  be  prevented.  Contests  for  power  be- 
tween individuals,  if  they  cannot  be  controlled, 
must  terminate  there,  and  guards  must  be  provided 
for  the  purpose  adequate  to  the  end.  The  door 
must  be  closed  against  ambition,  and  against  selfish 
views  of  every  kind  which,  by  being  yielded  to, 
may  operate  to  the  injury  of  the  cause.  A  fair 
compensation  should  be  allowed  for  service,  and 
honorable  distinction  for  exalted  merit;  but  such 
should  be  the  organization  and  endowment,  as  to 
make  the  government  by  the  operation  of  selfish  as 
well  as  more  lofty  motives  in  those  in  office  the 
instrument  of  its  own  preservation,  rather  than  of 
its  subversion.  The  guards  which  are  deemed  ne- 
cessary for  the  accomplishment  of  these  objects,  have 
been  noticed  in  the  preceding  part  of  this  sketch. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  107 

In  the  view  which  I  propose  to  take  of  the  defects 
of  the  Athenian  Government  I  shall  treat  the  sub- 
ject more  in  detail.  ^ 

In  governments  which  recognize  distinct  orders, 
be  the  state  of  society  what  it  may,  the  people  must 
likewise  form  the  basis  of  the  system.  The  legis- 
lative power  must  be  essentially  in  their  hands,  and 
it  must  be  well  organized,  or  they  will  soon  have 
none.  Place  it  in  an  hereditary  branch,  and  there 
can  be  no  liberty.  Give  to  a  prince  a  larger  por- 
tion than  is  prescribed  by  principle,  and  strictly 
executive,  and  he  will  soon  absorb  the  whole,  or  be 
overthrown.  The  same  remark  is  applicable  to  the 
aristocratic  branch,  or  that  of  the  nobles.  Its 
powers  must  be  limited,  and  the  possibility  of  en- 
croachment by  it  on  the  other  branches  be  prevented, 
or  a  like  result  will  follow.  The  nearer  therefore 
such  governments  approach  to  well  established 
principles,  both  in  the  organization  and  endowment 
of  their  branches,  the  more  tranquil  will  their 
movement  be,  and.  the  longer  their  duration.  A 
defect  in  those  respects  will  operate  differently  in 
the  different  classes,  arising  from  the  difference  of 
principle  in  the  government,  and  of  interest  in  the 
parties,  but  an  irregular  and  disorderly  movement, 
with  the  final  overthrow  of  the  government,  will 
be  certain  in  l)oth.  I  shall  endeavor,  therefore,  in 
treatino;  of  the  Government  of  Athens,  to  illustrate 


108  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

and  establish  those  principles,  and  in  a  manner  to 
admit  their  application,  so  far  as  it  may  be  practi- 
cable to  both  classes  of  government,  with  a  view  to 
abridge  what  I  should  otherwise  have  to  say, 
when  I  treat  of  the  governments  of  the  other  class, 
and  on  the  presumption  that  the  illustration  thus 
given  will  throw  light  on  the  subject  generally  as 
I  advance  in  the  execution  of  the  work. 

The  same  view  is  applicable  to  governments 
which  recognize  distinct  orders  Avith  opposite  in- 
terests contending  against  each  other.  The  hold 
which  each  order  has  in  such  governments,  the 
people  on  their  part,  and  the  other  order  or  orders, 
when  there  be  more  than  one  in  theirs,  with  its 
nature  and  extent,  the  manner  in  which  it  has  been 
exerted  and  the  effect  produced  by  it  will  claim  a 
like  attention.  The  power  which  the  people  or 
either  of  the  other  orders  held  in  any  given  in- 
stance, when  contending  with  another,  having  an 
opposite  interest,  would,  it  is  presumed,  be  exerted 
in  like  manner,  and  produce  the  same  effect  in 
every  other  instance  that  it  had  on  that,  the  circum- 
stances being  in  all  respects  equal.  When  a  prin- 
ciple is  established  as  to  either  class,  it  will  be 
conclusive  as  to  all  like  cases  of  that  class,  and  of 
the  other,  so  far  as  it  is  strictly  applicable.  The 
same  view  will  be  taken,  and  of  course  pursued,  in 
regard  to  the  societies  of  the  several  communities, 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  109 

of  whose  governments  I  shall  treat.  Where  the 
^state  is  the  same,  corresponding  effects,  under  like 
causes,  may  be  expected  in  every  instance.  I 
shall  say  nothing  more  of  any  government  or  peo- 
ple than  is  indispensable  to  the  object  I  have  in 
view.  In  this  mode  I  shall  abridge  essentially  the 
work,  as  I  shall  the  labor,  which  I  should  other- 
wise be  forced  to  bestow  on  it. 

When  a  principle  is  supported  by  the  example 
of  a  single  government,  and  that  example  is  strictly 
applicable  in  all  its  circumstances  to  other  govern- 
ments and  people  of  which  I  shall  treat,  I  shall 
make  the  application  without  a  further  illustration 
of  the  principle.  Principles  in  government,  where 
the  circumstances  are  in  all  respects  similar,  as  to 
order,  distribution  of  its  powers,  and  the  state  of 
society,  are  as  invariable  and  eternal,  as  in  any 
other  science,  mathematics,  or  any  branch  of  experi- 
mental philosophy. 

In  taking  a  view  of  the  origin  and  progress  of 
the  Athenian  and  Lacedemonian  Governments  and 
communities,  for  the  purposes  contemplated,  I  must 
look  in  a  certain  extent  to  those  of  all  Greece. 
Those  Republics  formed,  from  the  earliest  jjeriod 
of  which  we  have  any  knowledge,  two  of  the  prin- 
cipal states  of  Greece.  They  took  a  distinguished 
part  in  all  the  concerns  of  that  people  internally, 
as  they  likewise  did  in  those  which  bore  on  foreign 

10 


110  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

nations.  The  misfortunes  of  Greece,  as  well  as  her 
glory,  were  in  an  eminent  degree  attributable  to 
them.  Their  progress,  therefore,  was  jponnected 
with  that  of  the  other  states,  as  was  their  fate, 
for  they  were  all  involved  in  one  common  ruin. 
This  view  is  necessary  in  making  the  proposed 
comparison  with  the  state  governments,  but  in 
extending  it  to  that  of  the  general  government  it 
is  indispensable. 

Of  the  confederated  system,  other  people,  and 
particularly  those  of  Greece,  have  also  given  us 
examples,  of  which,  so  far  as  they  may  merit  atten- 
tion, I  shall  take  notice  at  the  proper  time.  All 
such  bonds  rest  on  the  elements  of  which  they  are 
composed,  and  in  consequence  of  which  the  states 
and  people,  thus  held  together,  are  composed.  It 
is  necessary,  therefore,  to  form  a  just  idea,  in  the 
first  instance,  of  those  elements  in  all  their  parts. 

There  are  diiferent  modes  by  which  the  object 
I  have  in  view  may  be  accomplished.  One  by  a 
preliminary  digest  of  a  government,  in  its  principle, 
organization  and  endowment,  which  I  should  con- 
sider the  most  perfect,  and  to  test  all  the  govern- 
ments above  enumerated,  including  our  own,  by 
that  standard.  Another  to  make  the  comparison 
with  the  democratical  government  of  Athens,  sepa- 
rately, showing  its  defects,  with  the  remedies  for 
them,  and  then  to  show  that  we  have  avoided  those 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  Ill 

defects,  and  attained  by  our  organization  and  en- 
dowment the  utmost  degree  of  perfection  of  which 
any  government  is  susceptible.  This  being  done, 
to  compare  our  governments  with  those  of  a  mixed 
character,  with  a  view  to  decide  the  relative  merit 
of  the  two  classes.  A  third  is,  to  make  the  analysis 
of  all  the  governments  above  enumerated,  in  the 
manner  stated,  and  to  give  a  sketch  of  the  career 
and  fate  of  each  in  succession ;  and  then  to  make 
the  comparison  between  our  governments  and  each 
of  the  others  in  all  the  points  which  they  respect- 
ively involve,  commencing  with  that  of  Athens. 
To  the  first  it  might  be  objected,  that  the  sketch 
which  would  be  given  of  the  most  perfect  govern- 
ment would  be  theoretical  only,  and  that  the  refer- 
ences which  might  be  made  to  other  governments 
might  be  regarded  as  forced  constructions,  for  the 
purpose  of  supporting  such  theoretical  dogma.  To 
this  it  may  be  added,  that  the  elementary  view 
above  presented  goes  as  far  in  the  establishment 
of  the  standard  suggested,  as  we  can  go,  without 
the  aid  of  example,  supported  by  the  career  and 
fortune  of  the  governments  referred  to.  If  this 
view  be  correct,  the  organization  and  endowment 
of  a  government  corresjjonding  with  it  are  so 
obvious  that  they  will  occur  to  all  who  are  con- 
versant with  the  subject.  To  the  second  it  might 
be  objected,  that   the   view   presented    would   be 


112  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

equally  limited  and  unsatisfactory.  The  example 
of  the  Athenian  Gov^ernment,  which  had  failed, 
however  great  and  numerous  its  defects,  and  well- 
established  by  reason  and  argument,  and  supported 
by  its  career  and  fate,  might  not  be  deemed  suffi- 
cient to  prove  that  that  was  the  best  class,  or  that 
we  had  attained  by  the  organization  and  endow- 
ments of  our  governments  that  standard  of  per- 
fection to  which  we  aspire.  To  do  justice  to  the 
subject,  and  make  a  fair  comparison  between  our 
governments,  which  are  founded  on  the  sovereignty 
of  the  people,  and  those  which  recognize  distinct 
orders,  we  must  place  each  class  on  the  best  ground 
on  which  it  can  stand,  and  give  to  it,  also,  by  the 
most  incontrovertible  evidence,  all  the  support 
which  can  be  adduced  in  its  favor. 

On  full  consideration,  I  am  satisfied  that  the 
third  mode  ought  to  be  preferred.  It  secures  all 
the  advantages  which  may  be  derived  from  either 
of  the  others,  with  many  peculiar  to  itself,  and  is  at 
the  same  time  free  from  the  objections  applicable  to 
each.  The  comparison  must  be  practical,  founded 
on  the  experience  of  each  government,  and  extend 
to  principle,  as  well  as  the  organization  and  endow- 
ment of  each,  and  likewise  to  the  state  of  society  in 
each  community;  and  this  can  be  better  done  by 
having  the  whole  subject  before  us  at  the  same  time 
than    in   detached   parts.      The   ancient   republics 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  113 

formed  a  system  peculiar  to  themselves.  Their 
governments  varied  from  each  other,  not  in  prin- 
ciple alone,  but  in  many  other  important  circum- 
stances; still  there  were  analogies  between  them, 
even  when  the  principle  was  diiferent,  which  were 
peculiar  to  that  epoch.  Our  governments  differ 
from  them  all;  from  the  Athenian,  not  in  principle, 
but  in  other  circumstances  of  vital  importance. 
The  Government  of  Athens  was  founded  on  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people,  but  the  power  was  exer- 
cised in  a  manner  to  defeat  its  purposes.  The 
accord  in  principle  was  in  fact,  as  will  be  shown, 
nominal  only,  for  such  were  the  organization  and 
endowment  of  that  government  that  it  could  not 
fail  to  be  oppressive.  The  other  governments 
enumerated  were  of  a  mixed  character,  founded 
partly  on  one  principle,  and  partly  on  the  other. 
Their  defects,  so  far  as  the  sovereignty  of  the  people 
was  recognized  in  them,  being  of  a  like  character 
with  those  of  Athens,  would  of  course  produce,  in 
what  related  to  the  power  of  the  people,  a  corre- 
sponding effect  in  those  governments  with  that 
which  they  pi^oduced  in  the  Government  of  Athens. 
It  follows,  therefore,  that  by  keeping  them  together, 
and" taking  a  minute  view  of  each,  and  a  combined 
view  of  the  whole,  the  defects  of  each,  and  of  the 
ancient  system  generally,  may  be  more  distinctly 
shown,  than  by  detaching  them  from  each  other. 

10* 


114  THE   PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

The  connection  is  such  even  between  those  which 
are  simple,  or  founded  exclusively  on  the  sove- 
reignty of  the  people,  and  those  which  are  mixed  or 
compounded  of  the  two  principles,  that  the  illustra- 
tion of  either  cannot  fall  to  throw  light  on  the 
others.  The  British  Government,  although  it  varies 
essentially  from  the  ancient  republics  in  the  modes 
in  which  the  power  of  the  people  is  exercised  in  it, 
yet  as  it  recognizes  distinct  orders,  all  the  objections 
which  apply  to  them  on  that  ground,  apply  with 
equal  force  to  it.  It  must  therefore  be  placed  in 
that  class,  noticing  with  impartiality  and  candor 
the  distinctions  to  be  taken  between  them.  I  shall 
therefore  proceed,  in  the  execution  of  this  work,  in 
the  manner  stated,  commencing  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Athens,  proceeding  next  to  that  of  Lace- 
demon,  and  afterwards  to  the  others,  in  the  order  in 
which  I  have  placed  them. 

The  view  which  will  thus  be  presented  of  the 
governments  of  the  ancient  republics  and  that  of 
Great  Britain,  and  likewise  of  the  state  of  society  in 
each  community,  Avill  be  practical.  The  cause  of 
the  failure  of  each  of  those  republics  may  be  dis- 
tinctly seen.  There  is  no  material  fact  relative  to 
the  government  of  either  as  to  its  principle,  its  or- 
ganization, or  the  endowment  of  its  branches,  with 
the  effect  produced  thereby,  or  as  to  the  society  of 
each,  involving  its  capacity  for  self-government,  but 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  Ho 

what  may  be  clearly  proved.  The  same  remark  is 
clearly  applicable  to  the  British  Government  from 
its  origin  to  the  present  time.  In  this  mode  it  is 
presumed  that  a  correct  standard,  tested  by  expe- 
rience, may  be  formed  of  the  best  government  in 
principle,  organization,  and  endowment,  which 
human  wisdom  can  devise;  of  that  which  is  most 
free,  and  best  calculated  to  preserve  liberty ;  and  to 
maintain  order,  as  it  may  likewise  be  of  the  state  of 
society  necessary  to  give  eifect  to  such  government. 
With  this  standard  our  system  may  be  compared, 
and  a  correct  judgment  be  thereby  formed,  whether 
it  has  attained  the  utmost  degree  of  perfection  of 
wdiich  government  is  susceptible,  or  is  defective  in 
any  branch,  and  if  in  any,  in  what  particular  cir- 
cumstance, and  w^hat  the  proper  remedy  is  for  such 
defect.  The  latter  is  a  great  object  of  the  present 
inquiry.  All  the  moral  as  well  as  the  physical 
sciences  admit  of  demonstration,  but  none  with 
greater  certainty  than  that  of  government.  When 
the  cause  and  eifect  are  distinctly  seen,  as  may  be 
done  in  that  science  by  the  examples  which  history 
furnishes,  no  mistake  can  be  made  by  those  who 
are  unprejudiced  and  seek  the  truth.  The  demon- 
stration may  be  considered  as  complete.  In  this 
mode  I  shall  pursue  this  inquiry,  and  with  that 
sole  object  in  view. 

There  are  three  great  epochs  in  the  history  of  the 


116  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

human  race,  or  rather  of  that  portion  of  it,  whose 
manners  and  institutions  form  tlie  object  of  this 
inquiry.  The  first  commenced  with  the  origin  of 
the  ancient  republics,  and  terminated  with  them. 
The  second  commenced  with  the  governments  which 
were  erected  on  the  ruins  of  the  Roman  Empire, 
and  comjirises  their  career  to  the  present  time.  The 
third  was  formed  by  tlie  discovery  of  this  hemi- 
sphere, and  the  revolution  into  which  it  led,  with 
the  governments  which  have  been  founded  on  its 
principles  in  these  states.  Each  of  these  epochs  is 
marked  by  characteristics  which  are  peculiar  to 
itself.  Government  in  each  took  its  origin  under 
the  influence  of  special  causes  applicable  to  the 
epoch.  In  the  first  the  race  of  man  was  limited. 
The  collections  were  small,  and  each  band  or  tribe 
adopted  the  government  which  suited  it  best,  or 
submitted  to  that  which  the  exigency  required  and 
nature  dictated.  The  changes  which  occurred  in  the 
jjrogress  of  those  societies,  especially  in  the  early 
stages,  were  attributable  more  to  internal  than  to 
external  causes.  These  primeval  institutions  were 
cherished  and  maintained  by  each  society,  so  far  as 
it  was  able,  until  they  were  all  subdued  and  reduced 
vuider  one  which  happened  to  be  the  most  powerful. 
In  the  second  epoch  the  earth  had  become  crowded 
with  inhabitants,  and  that  republic  Avhicli  had  risen 
to  the  greatest  height,  which  had  conquered  all  the 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  Ill 

others,  and  a  great  part  of  the  other  known  regions 
of  the  globe,  was  now  destined  to  experience  the 
ill  fortune  which  it  had  inflicted  on  other  states. 
This  nation,  which  owed  its  elevation  and  grandeur 
to  free  principles,  had  abandoned  those  principles, 
and  by  the  indulgence  of  every  species  of  debauchery 
and  vice,  sunk  down  under  despotism  into  a  state 
of  the  most  miserable  decrepitude  and  imbecility. 
At  this  period  many  barbarous  nations,  incensed  at 
the  usurpation  and  tyranny  which  had  been  exer- 
cised over  them,  distant  from  each  other,  and  with- 
out concert,  fell  on  different  parts  of  that  vast 
empire,  and  overcame  it.  These  nations  established 
in  the  parts  which  they  respectively  conquered,  such 
governments  as  they  thought  best  calculated  to  pre- 
serve their  conquests,  and  to  keep  the  people  whom 
they  had  subdued  in  subjection.  These  govern- 
ments were  essentially  military,  a  chief  at  the  head 
of  each,  with  inferior  and  subaltern  officers  under 
him,  of  different  grades,  the  same,  as  is  presumed, 
in  the  first  instance,  leader  and  others,  who  had 
commanded  the  invading  force  and  made  the  con- 
quests. Under  such  circumstances  it  would  be  long 
before  the  conquerors  and  the  conquered  could  be 
completely  incorporated  and  become  one  people ; 
and  hence  the  order  which  was  established  in  the 
commencement  would  be  preserved.  In  this  man- 
ner the  governments  of  modern  Europe  originated. 


118  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

the  strong  features  of  which  are  still  marked  on  all 
of  them,  and  especially  those  most  free.  The  third 
epoch  commenced  in  a  form  different  from  either  of 
the  others.  The  parties  to  it  were  of  the  same 
European  race,  but  they  commenced  their  career  by 
emigration  to  the  new  world.  The  state  of  civili- 
zation and  improvement  to  which  the  emigrants 
had  arrived,  the  causes  which  produced  the  emigra- 
tion, and  the  spirit  with  which  it  was  made,  with 
the  institutions  under  which  they  settled,  placed 
them  in  their  origin  on  more  favorable  ground  than 
was  ever  held  by  any  other  people.  It  is  to  the  gov- 
ernments which  have  been  instituted  by  the  de- 
scendants of  these  emigrants,  that  we  owe  the 
felicity  which  we  now  enjoy,  and  that  the  present 
epoch  owes  its  imj^ortance. 

The  writers  on  the  subject  of  government,  an- 
cient and  modern,  composed  their  works  under  the 
influence  of  the  examples  before  them,  and  of  the 
state  of  society  existing  at  the  time.  Their  works 
are  characteristic  of  the  epochs  at  which  they  lived. 
In  the  first  there  were  two  dangers,  that  of  despot- 
ism, and  the  government  of  the  multitude,  both  of 
M-hich  were  equally  menacing,  and  both  of  which 
they  viewed  with  equal  horror.  In  that  age  society 
was  comparatively  in  its  infant  state,  -  and  in 
the  governments  that  were  mixed,  the  orders  were 
not  distinctly  marked   by  any  well-digested  prin- 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  119 

ciple.  In  guarding  against  one  extreme,  they  were 
apt  to  run  into  the  other.  It  was  owing  to  these 
causes,  that  we  find  the  definition  given  of  the 
several  classes  of  government  at  that  epoch,  so 
vague  and  indeterminate,  so  little  accordant  with 
principle.  In  reasoning  on  man,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  different  classes  of  government,  with 
the  modifications  then  knoAvn,  and  on  all  abstract 
subjects  connected  with  his  principles  and  jsassions 
their  works  are  profound,  but  they  are  nevertheless 
confined  within  that  scale.  The  same  remark  is 
applicable  to  those  who  lived  in  the  second  epoch, 
which  was  threatened  with  a  single  danger  only, 
that  of  despotism.  It  was  natural  that  those 
writers  who  lived  under  governments  which  ex- 
tended to  the  people  a  portion  of  liberty  only, 
and  which  were  menaced  with  desjiotism,  should 
look  to  that  danger  alone,  and  exert  all  their  facul- 
ties to  prevent  it.  It  could  not  be  expected  that 
they  would  look  to  the  abuses  and  dangers  of  a 
system  which  they  put  in  contrast  with  that  which 
they  dreaded  and  wished  to  avoid. 

When  we  are  informed  that  Aristotle  had  col- 
lected the  constitutions  of  one  hundred  and  fifty- 
eight  people,  from  which  he  digested  his  work 
called  Politics  or  the  Science  of  Government,  we 
are  enabled  to  form  a  tolerably  correct  idea  of  the 
number  of  inhabitants  and  extent  of  territorv  of 


120  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

each  state,  and  likewise  of  the  causes  to  which  the 
form  of  those  governments  was  attributable.  We 
see  at  once  that  each  community  must  have  con- 
sisted of  the  inhabitants  of  a  village,  and  that  its 
territory  could  not  have  extended  much  beyond  it. 
He  treated  of  free  governments,  or  of  such  as  were 
so  considered  by  him,  and  in  consequence,  of  those 
in  which  the  people  held  either  the  entire  sover- 
eignty, or  a  portion  of  it.  His  object  was,  in  mak- 
ing tliis  collection,  to  show  the  good  features  and 
defects  of  each,  and  to  give  his  opinion  in  favor  of 
that  which  appeared  to  him  the  best,  with  a  view 
to  promote  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  mankind. 
There  were  then  few  free  governments  beyond  the 
limits  of  Greece.  The  Carthagenian  was  one,  and 
of  which  he  spoke  in  very  favorable  terms.  Of 
the  Government  of  Rome  he  said  nothing,  which 
proves  that  the  collection  consisted  almost  alto- 
gether of  the  Governments  of  Greece.  That  work 
was  lost.  His  essay  on  the  Science  of  Government 
has  been  preserved.  If  one-tenth  of  the  number 
of  constitutions  said  to  have  been  collected  by  him 
consisted  of  those  of  Grecian  states,  it  would  fol- 
low that  they  were  of  the  character  above  men- 
tioned. 

Among  the  writers  of  the  second  epoch,  Locke 
and  Sidney  of  England,  and  Montesquieu  and 
Rousseau    of   France,    hold    a    very    distinguished 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  121 

rank.  The  essays  of  the  two  former  correspond 
with  the  remark  ah'eady  made.  They  lived  at  a 
very  unsettled  period,  and  looked  at  one  danger 
only.  Those  of  the  two  latter  are  more  elemen- 
tary and  general,  more  in  accord  and  spirit  with 
those  of  the  first  epoch,  arising  as  is  presumed 
from  the  government  under  which  they  lived,  and 
the  fear  of  giving  offense  to  those  in  power.  The 
works  of  all  these  writers  are  very  able,  and  exalt 
the  fame  of  the  authors.  They  nevertheless  do 
not  point  out  either  the  advantages  or  the  special 
dangers  of  our  system,  for  they  did  not  contemplate 
it.  I  may  take,  further  notice  of  them  hereafter. 
My  object  is  to  look  at  the  dangers  as  well  as  the 
advantages  of  our  system,  and  to  point  out  its 
dangers,  so  far  as  I  may  be  able,  with  the  means  of 
averting  them.  With  us  there  is  at  present  no 
existing  disease.  We  are  on  the  contrary  blessed 
with  perfect  health.  Our  object  is  to  preserve  that 
state,  and  prevent  a  disease.  It  is,  therefore,  our 
duty  to  look  to  the  dangers  which  threaten  liberty, 
from  any  and  every  direction,  and  to  guard  against 
them. 

Considering  government  and  society  as  identified, 
each  depending  on  the  other,  it  has  been  my  object 
in  this  elementary  sketch,  after  fixing  the  principles 
of  government  witli  their  incidents  and  a  brief 
outline  of   the  best  organization  and  endowment 


122  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

that  can  be  adopted  for  free  governments  of  every 
kind,  to  present  the  most  correct  view  of  both 
branches  of  the  subject  that  I  have  been  able,  as 
they  have  existed  in  the  two  preceding  epochs. 
There  are  two  sources  from  Avhich  the  most  correct 
information  may  be  obtained  of  the  best  organiza- 
tion and  endowment  of  free  goverments  that  can  be 
adopted,  authentic  history  and  scientific  essays  on 
the  subject  of  government  itself,  compared  in  both 
instances  by  enlightened  men.  From  history  we 
derive  a  knowledge  of  wants,  from  the  origin  of 
the  communities  of  which  the  authors  respectively 
treat,  to  the  period  at  which  their  narrative  termi- 
nates. The  state  of  society  and  of  government, 
with  the  changes  which  occur  in  each,  in  the  pro- 
gress of  such  communities,  fall  within  the  scope  of 
this  class  of  writers,  but  rather  as  descriptive  of 
the  actual  state  in  every  stage,  than  a  profound 
analysis  of  the  subject,  in  either  of  its  branches,  so 
as  to  meet  the  precise  objects  of  this  inquiry.  It 
is  more  the  duty  of  an  historian  to  narrate  the 
transactions  of  a  government  in  its  internal  con- 
cerns, and  those  with  foreign  nations,  than  to  ana- 
lyze with  vigor  its  parts,  and  to  compare  its  merits 
with  the  governments  of  other  people.  It  belongs 
to  a  writer  on  government  to  take  a  more  compre- 
hensive and  minute  view  of  flie  subject  on  prin- 
ciple, its  organization,  endowment,  and  every  other 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  123 

circumstance  connected  with  it.  If  the  essay  be 
of  that  character,  and  the  writer  be  blessed  with 
great  talents,  nothing  that  belongs  to  it,  which  was 
then  known,  would  escape  his  attention.  If  he 
does  not  treat  of  the  state  of  society,  especially  if  a 
writer  of  the  second  epoch,  it  must  be  because  the 
condition  of  the  people  was  such  that  the  share  in 
the  government  for  which  he  contended  in  their 
favor,  was  so  limited,  as  to  preclude  all  discussion 
on  the  subject,  without  an  acknowledgment  that 
they  were  incompetent  to  the  discharge  of  any  of 
the  duties  of  any  regular  free  government  what- 
ever. 

I  have  stated  that  there  are  three  great  epochs  in 
the  history  of  the  human  race,  and  that  each  was 
marked  by  characters  as  to  government  and  society 
peculiar  to  itself.  I  have  stated  also,  that  the 
third,  to  which  w^e  belong,  has  placed  us  on  differ- 
ent and  more  advantageous  ground,  in  both  re- 
spects, and  as  to  the  means  of  supporting  free 
government,  than  was  ever  held  by  any  other 
people.  To  prove  this  beyond  all  doubt,  it  is 
necessary  to  place  the  governments  and  societies  of 
each  epoch  in  their  true  character,  and  to  show  the 
difference  between  them  in  every  material  circum- 
stance. In  the  view  which  has  already  been  pre- 
sented, I  have  derived  all  the  aid  from  both  the 
sources  alluded  to,  as  to  the  first  two,  that  I  have 


124  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

been  able.  There  is  not  a  fact  stated,  which  is  not 
supported  by  the  best  authorities  in  each,  and 
where  they  apply,  in  both.  As  how^ever  the  writers 
on  the  subject  of  government  draw  more  distinctly 
the  line  between  governments  of  different  classes, 
and  in  consequence  between  those  of  the  different 
epochs,  and  likewise  between  the  epochs  them- 
selves, I  have  thought  that  a  summary  but  correct 
view  of  the  contents  of  the  works  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished writers  of  the  two  preceding  epochs, 
would  give  a  more  satisfactory  confirmation  of  the 
government  and  state  of  society  in  each,  and  thus 
enable  me  to  show  the  difference  between  ours  and 
both,  than  could  otherwise  have  been  done,  and 
have  therefore  drawn  it.  The  authors  of  whose 
works  I  shall  give  such  sketch,  are  considered  the 
ablest  that  have  written  on  the  subject  of  govern- 
ment. They  are  so  regarded  in  our  schools  of 
instruction,  in  our  literary  institutions,  and  by  sci- 
entific men  generally  in  the  United  States  and  in 
all  free  countries.  As  they  do  not  embrace  our 
system,  they  could  not  show  its  advantages  over 
those  which  preceded  it.  On  the  contrary,  the 
writers  of  the  second  epoch,  M'hose  works  are  most 
read  and  relied  on,  have  preferred  and  recommended 
governments  of  a  different  kind.  Had  our  govern- 
ments been  before  them  in  successful  experiment, 
as   they   have    been    since    their   institution,  they 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  125 

would,  I  have  no  doubt,  have  recommended  them 

in  preference  to  all  others.     Having  their  own,  or 

rather  those  for  which   they  contended,  for  there 

was  then  nothing  settled,  and  the  ancient  system 

only  before  them,  it  may  fairly  be  inferred    that 

they  concluded    that  the  alternative  was  between 

thV)se  two;  and  preferring  their  own,  for  their  own 

country,  and    for  obvious   reasons,  have  declared 

that  sentiment  in  the  matter  stated.     In  the  study 

of  the   science   of  government,  especially  by  our 

youth,  it  is  proper  that  their  attention  should  be 

drawn  to  this  feature    in  those  works,  with  the 

probable  cause  of  it.     It   is  improjier   that   they 

should  adopt  an  opinion  unfavorable  to  our  system, 

on  the  sentiment  expressed  by  those  writers,  which 

it  may  fairly  be  presumed,  had  they  been  acquainted 

with  it,  they  w^ould  not  have  entertained.     I  have 

therefore  found   in  this  circumstance  an  additional 

motive  for  giving  a  sketch  of  their  contents. 

Among  the  writers  of  the  first  epoch,  Aristotle  is 

the  most  distinguished.     Plato  composed  a  work  on 

the  subject  of  government.     He  drew  two  projects, 

but  they  are  so  theoretical  and  objectionable  in  every 

view;  so  little  applicable  to  us,  and  even  to  the  age 

in  which  they  were  written,  that  they  need  not  be 

noticed.     Plutarch,  in  his  Lives  of  Distinguished 

Men,  gives  sketches  of  the  governments  which  were 

formed   in   the  progress  of  different  communities, 
11  * 


126  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

from  their  earliest  ages  to  this  time,  by  the  princes 
or  chiefs  at  the  head  of  each,  vokmtarily,  or  by 
persons  to  whom  the  power  was  committed  by  the 
contending  parties,  which  are  instructive  in  that 
view,  as  well  as  for  the  piu'poses  of  general  history. 
Diogenes  Laertius  may  be  })laced  in  the  same  class, 
but  in  a  very  limited  degree.  Polybius  was  an  author 
of  great  talents.  His  works  are  principally  histo- 
rical, great  part  of  which  have  been  lost,  but  in 
some  of  the  extracts  which  have  been  preserved  we 
find  essays  on  government  which  are  very  inter- 
esting. He  lived  at  the  times  of  Scipio  Africanus, 
and  although  a  Greek,  resided  at  Rome,  at  a  period 
when  the  character  of  the  Roman  Government  was 
fully  unfolded,  and  by  whose  example  he  was 
enabled  to  present  some  features  distinct  from  those 
which  are  to  be  found  in  Aristotle.  His  work, 
however,  is  strictly  characteristic  of  that  epoch. 
Considering  the  work  of  Aristotle  as  the  most  com- 
prehensive, systematic,  and  truly  descriptive  of  the 
governments  of  that  epoch;  of  the  state  of  the 
science,  and  of  the  manners  of  the  people,  I  shall 
take  from  it  the  sketches  which  I  deem  material  for 
the  object  Avhicli  I  have  in  view. 

The  work  of  this  author,  to  which  I  allude,  is 
called,  as  has  been  observed,  his  Essay  on  Politics 
or  the  Science  of  Government. 

He  commences  this  work  in  the  elementary  form. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  127 

which  was  adopted  by  Plato  in  his  two  projects, 
with  the  origin  of  society,  and  in  the  smallest  num- 
ber of  which  it  can  consist.  Man  and  wife  form 
the  first  stage,*  father  and  children  the  second, f 
master  and  slave  the  third.J  In  the  first  the  power 
is  marital ;  in  the  second  paternal ;  but  in  both 
limited.  In  the  third  it  is  absolute.  He  asserts 
that  in  each  it  is  founded  in  nature.  He  then 
traces  the  origin  of  a  city  with  equal  minuteness. 
Into  these  details  I  shall  not  enter,  because  the 
opinion  with  us  is  too  well  formed  in  each  instance 
to  require  it,  and  because,  likewise,  whether  his 
doctrine  be  w^ell  founded  or  otherwise,  no  light  can 
be  derived  from  that  incipient  stage,  either  as  to  the 
organization  or  the  endowment  of  a  government 
W'hich  is  necessary  to  protect  liberty  and  maintain 
order  over  the  very  populous  communities  of  the 
present  day.  I  think  proper  to  notice  only  that 
feature  in  it  w^hich  relates  to  slavery,  as  it  was 
known  to  and  practiced  in  the  ancient  republics. 
As  slavery  exists  in  many  of  the  states  of  our 
Union,  and  involves  political  considerations  of  very 
high  importance  to  those  states,  and  in  consequence 
to  the  whole  Union,  I  may,  in  the  prosecution  of 
this  work,  deem  it  proper  to  notice  it,  and  it  is  on 
that  presumption  that  I  make  the  exception. 

»  Diogenes  Laertius,  Vol.  I.  Book  III.  ehaj:).  iv. 
f  Ibid.  Book  I.  chap.  iii.     %  Ibid,  cliap.  iv.  p.  1S8. 


128  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

It  has  already  been  observed  that  Aristotle  made 
four  species  of  Democracy,  four  of  Aristocracy,  four 
of  Oligarchy,  and  five  of  Monarchy.  It  is  proper  to 
add  that  he  made  a  fifth  class  of  government,  which 
he  called  a  Republic,  and  separated  it  by  certain 
shades  of  difference  from  the  others.  Of  his  defini- 
tion of  each  species  of  these  several  classes  of 
government,  I  will  endeavor  to  convey  a  just  idea, 
beginning  with  Democracy. 

The  first  species  of  this  class,  he  says,  consists  of 
a  government  in  which  there  is  an  equality  between 
the  rich  and  the  poor,  so  that  neither  governs.* 

The  second,  where  the  qualification  for  office  in 
point  of  revenue  is  very  moderate,  and  that  all  who 
have  it  are  eligible. f 

The  third,  where  every  citizen  is  eligible  to  office, 
under  the  condition  that  the  law,  and  not  the  mul- 
titude, shall  govern. I- 

The  fourth,  is  that  in  which  the  multitude  is  the 
sovereign,  and  not  the  law;  where  the  decrees  of 
the  multitude  at  every  meeting  give  the  rule,  and 
there  is  no  fixed  government  or  jiermanent  law.§ 

The  first  species  of  Aristocracy,  he  says,  is  a  gov- 
ernment which  is  founded  on  absolute, and  not 
relative  virtue,  and  vested  in  persons  of  property. 
This  government,  he  observes,  is  the  only  one  in 

•■■  Aristotle,  Book  IV.  cli.  iv.  Vol.  I.  page  270. 
t  Ibid,  page  271.     J  Ibid,     g  Ibid. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  129 

which  the  virtue  of  a  man  of  wealth  is  strictly  that 
of  a  good  citizen.     Virtue,  in  every  other  instance, 
he  adds,  is  relative  to  the  kind  of  government.* 
,  His  second  species  is  founded  on  a  combination 
of  riches,  virtue  and  liberty. 

His  third  consists  of  a  government  which  is 
founded  on  virtue  and  liberty  without  regard  to 
wealth. 

The  fourth  comprehends  all  the  shades  of  the 
republic  inclining  to  oligarchy. 

His  first  species  of  oligarchy  is  a  government 
which  excludes  the  majority  of  citizens  from  office 
by  making  the  qualification  of  property  so  high 
that  few  can  attain  it,  but  wliich  leaves  the  door 
open  to  all  who  do.f 

The  second,  when  the  revenue  required  is  small, 
but  the  appointment  to  office  committed  to  the 
magistrates,  and  in  consequence,  to  those  already  in 
office. 

The  third,  when  the  sons  succeed  to  the  offices 
held  by  their  fathers. 

The  fourth,  when  the  magistrate  is  supreme  di- 
rector, without  law.  J 

His  first  species  of  monarchy  consists  of  a  gov- 
ernment in  which  the  power  of  the  chief  is  limited 

*  Aristotle,  Book  IV.  cli.  7,  gives  his  idea  of  the  second  species 
of  aristocracy,  page  280. 

f  Aristotle,  vol.  I.  Book  4,  ch.  5,  page  174.     J  PAd.  page  274. 


130  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

to  the  perpetual  command  of  the  armies,  and  which 
may  be  either  elective  or  hereditary.* 

The  second  approaches  to  tyranny,  and  is  that 
which  is  adopted  by  a  certain  class  of  barbarians. 
It  is  nevertheless  legal,  although  its  forms  are 
tyrannical,  because  it  is  adopted  by  the  consent  of 
the  people,  is  supported  by  law,  and  accords  with 
their  manners.  Of  this  class  he  gives  the  govern- 
ments and  people  of  Asia  as  examples.  Legitimate 
monarchy,  he  says,  is  that  in  which  the  submission 
is  voluntary  and  tyrannical  when  it  is  forced.  In 
the  one  instance  the  guard,  who  protects  the  sover- 
eign, is  composed  of  his  subjects,  in  the  others,  of 
foreigners. 

His  third  species  is  that  which  was  known  in  the 
remote  ages  of  Greece,  and  called  Asymnetia.  It 
was  tyrannical  in  its  powers,  but  constituted  by  the 
suffrage  of  the  people,  and  to  meet  extraordinary 
emergencies.  In  some  cities  it  was  for  life;  in 
others  it  terminated  with  the  cause  which  pro- 
duced it. 

The  fourth  was  that  of  the  Jewish  ages.  It  was 
formed  by  law  and  accorded  with  the  manners  and 
will  of  the  people.  The  chiefs  of  that  age  were  the 
benefactors  of  the  people ;  they  led  them  to  victory, 
instructed  them  in  the  arts,  and  united  them  in 
society.     Gratitude  made  them  kings,  and  the  con- 

*  Aristotle,  Vol.  I.  Book  III.  ch.  10,  page  227. 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  131 

sent  of  the  people  transmitted  the  tlirone  to  their 
descendants.  They  had  the  sujireme  direction  of 
every  concern  relative  to  war;  were  chiefs  of  reli- 
gion, and  judges  of  the  people.  By  degrees,  in  the 
progress  of  time,  some  of  these  relinquished  a  por- 
tion of  their  power;  others  were  deprived  of  it  by 
the  people.* 

The  fifth  species  was  that  of  absolute  jjower  in  an 
individual,  or  of  despotism. f 

On  a  view  of  these  several  classes  of  governmentj 
and  of  the  different  species  of  each,  the  shades  of 
difference  between  the  classes  themselves  and  be- 
tween the  species  of  each  class,  and  in  some  instances, 
between  the  species  of  one  class  and  those  of  another, 
are  so  slight,  and  little  regulated  by  principle,  that 
it  is  scarcely  possible  to  discriminate  between  them, 
or  to  form  a  correct  idea  of  his  meaning. 

Of  the  first  class,  that  of  Democracy,  there  is 
less  difficulty  in  comprehending  his  meaning  in 
each  instance  than  in  either  of  the  others.  The 
sovereignty,  being  admitted  to  be  in  the  people 
and  the  government  united  with  it,  and  exercised 
by  them  en  masse,  there  is  no  distinction  between 
the  several  species,  as  to  princijile,  and  little  as  to 
the  organization.  He  graduates  the  several  species 
from    that    which    he  considers   the   best,  to    the 

*  The  four  species  of  monarchy  are  found  in  Book  III.  chap.  10. 
t  Book  III.  chap.  11. 


132  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

worst,  making  the  condition  of  the  citizens  in 
j)oint  of  property  the  basis  in  each  species.  The 
first  contemplates  such  an  equality  in  that  respect, 
that  neither  the  rich  nor  poor  will  govern;  that 
such  distinct  and  conflicting  classes  will  not  exist; 
that  the  whole  society  will  have  a  common  interest. 
The  second  forms  a  slight  restraint  on  the  poorer 
class,  by  excluding  from  office  those  in  the  most 
wretched  state  only,  the  government  being  still 
vested  in  the  whole  body  of  the  citizens,  and 
wielded  by  a  majority.  The  third  rejects  the  dis- 
tinction by  property,  and  requires  simply,  that  the 
law  shall  govern,  by  which  is  understood  some 
fixed  rule  applicable  to  the  Avhole  community, 
which  should  be  executed  with  uniformity  by  the 
proper  tribunals.  The  fourth  places  the  govern- 
ment exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  multitude,  in 
which  state,  he  says,  that  the  law  is  nothing,  and 
their  decrees  everything.  On  this  last  species  he 
descants  at  large.  He  represents  it  as  forming  a 
state  of  anarchy,  the  most  oppressive  that  can  be 
conceived.  The  people,  he  says,  are  the  sovereign, 
not  individually,  but  in  a  body ;  a  monarch  with  a 
thousand  heads. 

Of  Aristocracy,  it  is  more  difficult  to  comprehend 
his  meaning,  either  as  to  the  principle  on  which  the 
government  is  founded  or  the  different  species  of 
which  it  is  composed.     His  first  species  consists  of 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  133 

a  government  comj^osed  of  persons  of  wealth,  and 
of  absolute,  not  relative,  virtue.  He  does  not  state 
how  they  become  possessed  of  it,  whether  by  he- 
reditary right  or  election,  nor  the  extent  of  its 
powers,  nor  diu'ation  in  office,  if  by  election.  Pie 
supposes  these  men  to  be  as  pure  as  angels,  and  to 
look  to  no  object  but  the  public  good,  and  with 
consummate  wisdom.  By  relative  virtue,  it  is  pre- 
sumed that  he  meant  governments  of  the  other 
species  and  of  the  other  classes,  in  which  those 
who  fill  them  are  ruled  by  the  principles  and  pas- 
sions incident  to  man.  It  is  evident  that  this 
species  contemplates  a  government  which  is  alto- 
gether theoretical  and  imaginary,  not  founded  in 
nature  or  fact.  It  cannot  therefore  be  reasoned  on, 
as  the  principle  of  any  class,  or  any  species  of 
either.  Virtue,  whether  it  be  of  an  individual,  or 
of  several,  can  be  ascertained  by  the  conduct  of  the 
party  only.  It  is  not  hereditary.  A  virtuous 
father  often  has  a  vicious  son.  If  dependent  on 
good  conduct,  there  must  be  some  tribunal  to  judge 
of  it,  and  the  result  must  depend  on  the  judgment 
of  such  tribunal.  To  reason  on  a  government  we 
must  know  the  principle  on  which  it  is  founded; 
how  those  in  office  came  there,  and  by  what  title 
they  hold  it,  and  likewise  how  it  is  formed  and  en- 
dowed. As  he  has  not  given  the  necessary  infor- 
mation on  these  points,  we  cannot  view  it  in  any 

12 


134  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEBEIGNS. 

other  light  than  that  stated.  The  same  remarks 
are  essentially  applicable  to  his  second  and  third 
species,  the  first  of  which  he  founds  on  riches, 
virtue  and  liberty ;  the  other  on  virtue  and  liberty 
only.  Of  wealth  as  a  basis,  a  distinct  idea  may  be 
formed,  and  by  liberty,  it  is  understood  that  he 
meant  the  rights  of  the  whole  people.  If  virtue  is 
a  visionary  basis  in  one  instance,  it  must  be  in  all 
others.  In  founding  his  fourth  species  on  all  the 
shades  of  the  republic  with  an  inclination  to  Oli- 
garchy, we  must  ascertain  his  meaning  by  the  defi- 
nition which  he  gives  of  those  classes,  which  as  to 
the  republic  is  vague,  and  as  to  Oligarchy,  explicit 
in  one  feature  only :  that  it  is  a  government  of  the 
few,  and  of  the  rich,  in  opposition  to  that  of  the 
multitude,  and  tlie  poor. 

The  view  which  he  presents  of  the  several 
sjjecies  of  Oligarchy,  confirms  the  remark  which 
has  just  been  made  respecting  it.  He  makes  the 
rich  and  the  few  the  basis  of  the  class.  The  qual- 
ification for  office  in  the  first  species  is  raised  so 
high,  that  few  can  attain  it.  The  sum  required  in 
the  second  is  diminished,  and  may  be  in  the  third, 
but  as  the  right  is  given  to  those  in  power  in  the 
one  to  appoint  their  successors,  and  as  the  sons 
succeeded  their  fathers  in  the  offices  held  by  them, 
in  the  other,  the  same  result  might  follow.  His 
fourth  and  last  species,  consisted  of  a  government 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  135 

in  which  there  was  no  hiw  other  than  the  will  of 
the  magistrate. 

From  a  view  of  every  species  of  these  two  classes, 
of  Aristocracy  and  Oligarchy,  it  may  fairly  be  in- 
ferred, that  he  did  not  consider  either  as  hereditary, 
as  holding  the  government  in  its  own  right,  and 
the  people  as  its  slaves.  If  such  was  the  fact,  the 
declaration  of  it  would  fix  the  grade  and  character 
of  the  government,  and  there  could  be  but  one 
species.  In  making  the  shades  of  difference  between 
the  several  species  of  each  class  he  shows  that  there 
was  nothing  settled  in  either,  and  that  in  the  con- 
tentions for  power  between  ancient  families  and  the 
body  of  the  people,  between  the  rich  and  the  poor, 
some  of  those  governments  in  which  the  former 
had  gained  the  ascendancy  were  better  than  others. 
In  every  instance  in  which  the  right  of  the  class 
depended  on  the  qualification  by  property,  or  on 
any  contingency,  it  may  be  presumed  that  the  de- 
cision rested  with  the  opposite  class,  the  people, 
and,  in  consequence,  that  the  government,  if  not 
elective,  was  not  strictly  hereditary. 

The  same  difficulty  occurs  in  discriminating 
between  his  different  species  of  Monarchy.  •  The 
power  in  the  first  was  confined  to  the  command  of 
the  armies,  and  might  be  elective  or  hereditary. 
In  this  species,  the  chief  had  no  share  in  the 
government.     His   second,   although    al^solute,   he 


136  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

deemed  legal,  being  adopted  by  the  consent  of  the 
people,  and  accordant  with  their  manners.  He 
illustrates  his  idea  of  this  species  by  the  example 
of  the  govej>nment  and  people  of  Asia.  By  the 
term  legal,  it  is  presumed  that  he  meant  that  they 
were  made  so,  by  the  voluntary  submission  of  the 
people;  that  he  did  not  mean  to  convey  the  idea, 
that  such  governments  were  free,  or  any  idea  re- 
sjDecting  the  principles  of  government,  or  the 
character  of  the  people  themselves.  Voluntary 
submission  to  such  a  government  is  a  proof  only 
that  the  people  were  competent  to  none  other;  that 
they  were  fitted  only  to  be  slaves.  His  third 
species  was  that  which  existed  in  the  earliest  ages 
of  Greece.  It  was  elective,  and  in  some  instances 
for  life;  in  others  for  special  emergencies  with 
which  it  terminated.  This  government,  he  says, 
was  legal,  although  tyrannical,  because  it  was  the 
only  one  to  which  the  people  of  that  age  were 
competent.  The  same  remark  is  applicable  to  this 
species  as  to  the  preceding  one,  with  this  difference, 
that  it  was  in  all  instances  elective,  and  the  people 
in  consequence  not  slaves;  the  species  being  attri- 
butable to  the  early  and  rude  age  in  which  it  was 
known.  His  fourth  species  applied  to  the  Jewish 
ages,  and  had  its  origin  in  like  manner  with  those 
of  the  third,  in  the  good  will  and  choice  of  the 
people.     At    this    period    the   population   of   the 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  137 

states  had  increased,  and  the  manners  of  the  people 
undergone  some  change.  The  call  for  a  more  stable 
and  efficient  government  became,  in  consequence, 
proportionally  more  urgent,  while  the  science  had 
not  experienced  a  corresponding  improvement.  His 
fifth  spedes  is  that  of  Absolute  Monarchy,  and 
which  he  delineates  at  great  length,  reviewing  the 
diiferent  species,  and  explaining  the  distinctions 
between  them.  On  the  examples  which  he  gives 
of  this  class,  I  shall  remark  only,  that  it  cannot 
fail  to  excite-  surprise  that  he  should  place  in  it 
governments  that  were  elective,  as  those  of  the 
first,  third  and  fourth  species  were,  and  more  es- 
pecially those  in  which  the  term  of  service  of  the 
incumbent  might  be,  for  a  very  short  period,  a 
year  or  less,  dependent  on  the  emergency  which 
gave  birth  to  it.  The  surprise  must  be  equally 
great  to  find  that  he  considered  the  despotism  of 
Asia  legal,  and  for  the  sole  reason,  that  the  people 
were  incompetent  to  any  other. 

The  view  above  presented,  taken  from  the  work 
of  Aristotle,  gives  in  my  estimation,  a  just  repre- 
sentation of  the  origin  of  the  governments  and  of 
the  changes  which  took  place  in  them;  of  the 
causes  which  produced  those  changes;  of  the  state 
of  society,  and  likewise  of  the  science  of  govern- 
ment, during  the  first  epoch.  All  the  governments 
oriirinated  then  in  monarchv,  and  were  of  a  limited 

12  « 


138  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

character,  called  for  by  the  exigencies  of  the  society, 
and  not  claimed  by  any  right  in  the  incumbents. 
The  people  were  free,  and  their  rulers  their  instru- 
ments, rather  than  their  masters.  The  descendants 
of  those  first  advanced  to  power  set  up  higher 
claims,  which  in  the  progress  of  time,  produced 
contentions  and  changes  in  the  government  of 
every  state.  Of  nobility,  as  a  distinct  hereditary 
order,  entitled  to  a  share  in  the  sovereignty  by 
hereditary  right,  no  clear  and  satisfactory  evidence 
is  seen.  That  such  a  class  existed,  and  often  parti- 
cipated in  the  governments  is  certain,  and  that  it 
might  be  hereditary  in  some,  probable.  This  class, 
in  every  state,  seems  to  have  taken  its  origin  in  the 
families  of  the  princes  of  the  early  ages  who  w^ere 
rich,  and  whose  wealth  descended  to  their  posterity, 
of  which  the  Heraclidre,  Pelopidse,  etc.,  furnish 
examples.  When  the  government  by  princes  was 
overthrown,  the  power  of  the  nobility,  which  was 
an  appendage  to  it,  experienced  essentially  the  same 
fate.  They  were  however  rich,  and  the  mass  of 
the  people  being  poor,  and  government  indispen- 
sable, and  the  people  in  the  states  most  free  having 
never  enjoyed  the  right  to  originate  any  proposition, 
or  any  otlier  right  than  to  decide  on  those  which 
were  presented  to  them  from  the  other  branches, 
and  liaving  no  talent  to  institute  a  free  government 
on  sound    principles,  they  remained    in   the  same 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEBEIGNS.  139 

degraded  state  which  they  had  held  in  all  preced- 
ing ages.  Tlie  communities  were  small,  and  neither 
extreme,  either  of  liberty  or  slavery,  could  be  tole- 
rated, or  was  practicable ;  for  when  the  power  was 
wrested  from  the  princes  ])y  the  people  they  could 
not  exercise  it  en  masse,  the  only  form  then  known 
to  them,  and  hence  every  possible  variety  was 
assumed.  Aristotle,  in  the  collection  which  he 
made  of  the  constitutions  of  one  hundred  and  fifty- 
eight  people,  described  what  he  saw,  or  of  which 
examples  were  given,  and  within  which  scope  he 
confined  his  digest.  His  organization  of  the  dif- 
ferent powers  of  government,  with  the  revolutions 
to  which  they  were  respectively  subject,  and  the 
means  of  averting  them,  extends  to  every  class  of 
free  government,  and  to  every  species  of  each  class 
then  known.  To  these  causes  it  is  to  be  attributed 
that  the  shades  of  difference,  in  point  of  principle, 
between  the  several  classes  of  government  are  so 
slight,  and  in  the  modification  of  the  several  species 
of  each  class,  in  some  instances,  scarcely  perceptible. 
His  work,  however,  according  to  the  limit  within 
which  he  moved,  does  honor  to  his  fame,  and  will, 
in  many  views,  and  in  all  ages,  be  instructive  and 
useful.  He  gave  by  full  illustration,  the  example 
only  of  the  Governments  of  Lacedemon,  Crete, 
Carthage,  and  Athens,  which  he  thought  the  best 
of  their  kind. 


140  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

I  will  now  proceed  to  take  a  like  view  of  the 
works  of  the  writers  of  the  second  epoch,  among 
which  those  of  Locke,  Sydney,  Montesquieu  and 
Rousseau  are  particularly  entitled  to  attention.  A 
long  space  had  intervened  between  the  writers  of 
those  two  epochs,  which  was,  especially  after  the 
overthrow  of  the  Roman  Empire,  an  interval  of 
barbarism  and  darkness.  In  both  epochs  the  con- 
test was  for  liberty  on  the  part  of  the  people.  In 
the  first,  it  was  between  the  two  extremes,  the 
multitude  and  individuals.  AVhat  were  the  rights 
of  kings,  what  of  the  nobility,  what  of  the  people, 
were  the  great  questions  in  both,  and  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  classes,  especially  the  two  latter, 
did  not  apply  so  much  in  the  first  to  hereditary 
right  in  the  nobility,  as  between  the  rich  and  the 
poor.  The  governments  which  were  founded  on 
the  ruins  of  the  Roman  Empire  were  in  their 
origin  comparatively  free,  but  they  soon  terminated, 
especially  ^^•ith  the  princi2)al  jDowers,  in  despotism. 
From  that  state  Europe  began  to  emerge  when 
those  authors  appeared.  The  old  system,  with  all 
its  changes,  was  before  them,  and  to  it  the  new  had 
added  nothing,  by  any  example  it  afforded,  to  the 
improvement  of  the  science  itself.  The  modern 
governments  were  more  simple.  The  territory  of 
each  community  was  of  vast  extent,  as  was  its  pop- 
ulation, compared  with   those  of  Greece,  and  the 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  141 

classes  in  society  were  more  completely  separated 
from  each  other.  The  approach  to  despotism  was 
rapid,  and  its  continuance  of  long  duration,  because 
in  countries  of  such  extent  the  power  of  the  peo- 
ple was  soon  lost,  and  in  their  unlettered  and  igno- 
rant state  they  had  no  means  of  recovering  it. 
The  power  of  the  nobility  was  too  feeble  to  form 
any  check  on  the  career  of  the  prince.  The  rights 
of  that  corps,  however,  were  more  distinct  than  in 
any  of  the  ancient  governments.  Wherever  it 
existed,  whether  it  held  the  government  exclusively 
in  its  hands,  or  belonged  to  absolute  monarchy,  it 
was  hereditary.  In  the  latter  governments  it  was  a 
mere  appendage  to  tlie  prince,  having  no  rights  in 
opposition  to  his,  but  it  supported  his  power  in  con- 
tests with  the  people,  because  in  so  doing,  it  sup- 
ported its  own,  holding  immense  possessions,  and 
the  people,  in  a  state  of  vassalage,  under  them.  The 
people  of  England  were  the  first  who  put  seriously 
to  issue  the  great  principles  on  which  free  govern- 
ments turned ;  and  these  authors  may  be  considered, 
and  especially  those  of  that  country,  the  first  who 
took  the  lead  in  their  illustration  and  support. 

The  works  of  the  two  first  mentioned  writers 
were  composed  at  a  period  very  interesting  to  this 
country,  as  it  likewise  was  to  that  of  their  own. 
It  was  one  of  great  commotion,  produced  by  a  con- 
test for  power  between  the  friends  of  liberty  on 


142  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

the  one  side,  and  of  despotism  on  the  other.  The 
English  nation  had  then  reached  a  stage  when 
in  the  progress  of  society,  some  fixed  and  perma- 
nent form  to  its  government  had  become  indispen- 
sable, and  which  must  terminate  in  a  complete 
revolution  in  favor  of  the  one  or  other  party,  or 
in  a  compromise  between  them.  To  produce  either 
result,  great  contention  violence  and  civil  war  were 
inevitable.  These  conflicts  were  connected  with 
the  emigration  and  settlement  of  our  ancestors  in 
these  states,  and  with  the  great  events  which  have 
since  followed  in  them.  The  works  of  these 
writers,  therefore,  are  interesting  to  us  in  two 
views.  They  are  so  in  reference  to  the  nature  of 
the  governments  which  then  existed  throughout 
Europe,  and  of  the  state  of  society,  and  of  the 
science  at  the  time.  They  are  so  likewise,  from 
the  influence  which  that  state  and  the  convulsions 
w^hicli  followed  in  tlicir  own  country  had  on  the 
emigration  of  a  portion  of  its  inhabitants  to  this 
territory,  and  on  the  career  and  fortune  of  their 
descendants.  The  general  characteristics  of  this 
epoch  have  been  described.  All  the  ancient  re- 
2>ublics  had  been  overthrown,  and  a  new  state  of 
affairs  introduced  and  established  throughout  Eu- 
rope, Different  forms  of  government  were  estab- 
lished, and  the  whole  system  changed. 

Locke's  work  occupies   about    150  pages,  folio, 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  143 

and  is  divided  into  two  books,  the  first  of  which 
contains  an  examination  and  refntation  of  a  work 
of  Sir  Robert  Filnicr,  whicli  was  written  in  favor 
of  tlie  divine  right  of  Icings.  The  second  forms  a 
regular  essay  on  civil  government.  In  the  first,  he 
states  the  doctrine  of  Filmer,  in  full  extent,  with 
his  argument  in  support  of  it,  and  refutes  it  by- 
scriptural  authority  and  sound  reasoning.  In  the 
second  he  traces  the  origin  of  government  to  its 
true  soui'ce  the  consent  of  the  people  and  the  equal 
rights  of  all.  He  speaks  of  the  different  classes 
of  government,  Democracy,  Monarchy  and  Oligar- 
chy, omitting  that  of  Aristocracy,  but  which,  it  is 
presumed,  he  comprised  in  Oligarchy.  He  treats 
also  of  mixed  governments. 

Mr.  Locke  contemplates,  as  other  writers  do,  two 
distinct  ages  in  society ;  the  one,  the  early  and  rude 
age;  the  other,  the  more  advanced  and  civilized 
state.  In  the  first,  he  admits  that  government 
originates,  generally,  in  an  individual,  and  may  be 
paternal,  but  contends,  that  in  every  period  of  that 
age  it  is  elective  and  free.  In  both  ages,  he  con- 
siders the  people  as  the  source  of  power,  and  hav- 
ing an  inalienable  right  to  give  to  the  government 
what  form  they  please.  If  they  tolerate  a  bad  one, 
it  is  either  because  they  are  incompetent  to  any 
other,  or  are  prevented  from  making  a  change  by 


144  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

other  causes.*  In  all  that  he  advances  in  favor  of 
the  rights  of  the  people,  his  view  is  unquestionably 
correct,  and  is  supported  with  great  ability;  but  it 
is  confined  to  the  epoch  specified,  and  to  the  gov- 
ernments which  characterized  it.  The  Feudal  sys- 
tem, which  had  been  founded  by  the  nations  who 
had  overthrown  the  Roman  Empire,  and  established 
themselves  on  its  ruins,  precluded,  especially  among 
the  principal  powers,  all  idea  of  self-government. 

In  treating  of  the  organization  of  a  government, 
and  the  manner  in  which  the  people  must  exercise 
their  power,  in  case  of  abuse,  we  see  distinctly  that 
he  had  the  British  Constitution  in  view.  He  con- 
siders the  legislature  as  the  supreme  power  of  the 
state,  comprising  the  House  of  Commons,  the  House 
of  Peers,  and  the  king.  That  it  comprehends  the 
three  branches  is  inferred  from  the  fact,  that  each 
has  a  participation  in  its  powers;  the  king  by  a 
negative  on  the  laws,  and  likewise  by  a  distinction 
which  he  makes  between  an  executive  magistrate 
who  has  that  power,  and  one  who  has  not.  The 
former  he  places  on  elevated  ground  above  the 
laws;  the  latter  he  considers  subject  to  be  changed 
and  displaced  at  pleasure. f  In  ^  this  he  concurs 
with  Blackstone,  who  says  that  the  Parliament  is 
omnipotent.       It    is    only   in    governments   which 

2-  Book  IL  chap.  8,  section  105. 

f  Ibid.  chap.  1.3,  sections  151-2;  again,  chap.  17,  section  213. 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  145 

recognize  distinct  orders,  of  the  class  called  free, 
that  the  legislative  power  can  be  viewed  in  that 
light.  In  those  of  that  class,  the  government  is 
united  with  the  sovereignty,  and  in  consequence 
there  can  be  no  check  on  them  within  the  limit  of 
the  constitution.  There  can  be  none,  except  by 
popular  movements  and  the  overthrow  of  the 
government  itself.  In  supporting  the  power  of  the 
legislature,  he  supports  that  of  the  people  against 
that  of  the  kings,  because  it  is  in  the  legislature 
that  the  people  exercise  their  power  in  the  govern- 
ment; and  in  asserting  that  the  people  have  the 
right  to  rise  en  masse  and  overthrow  the  govern- 
ment, in  the  case  of  abuse,  he  supports  the  doctrine, 
that  all  power  originates  in  the  people,  whatever 
be  the  form  of  the  government,  or  great  the  power 
of  thfe  kings. 

In  his  definitions  of  the  powders  of  government, 
we  see  no  nice  discrimination  of  those  which  should 
be  vested  in  the  executive  and  judiciary.  In 
treating  of  prerogative,  we  find  that  he  allows  to 
the  executive  the  power  to  regulate  the  number  of 
members  in  every  county  or  borough  entitled  to 
representation,  as  the  j^opulation  may  increase  or 
diminish ;  and  likewise  to  establish  new  corpora- 
tions, and  fix  the  number  of  representatives  to 
each.*     In  this  he  transcends  our  idea  of  the  power 

■■■   Book  II.  chap.  13,  section  158. 
13 


146  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

which  should  be  held  by  that  branch,  even  under 
our  free  representative  government.  We  think 
that  it  should  be  vested  in  the  legislature  only. 
The  objection  to  the  exercise  of  it  by  an  hereditary 
prince  is  much  stronger,  since  by  the  abuse  of  the 
power,  which  should  always  be  guarded  against,  he 
might  multiply  the  dependents  on  him  and  thereby 
increase  his  influence.  He  says  nothing  in  favor 
of  the  independence  of  the  judiciary.  On  the  con- 
trary, by  giving  to  it  no  power  over  an  unconsti- 
tutional law,  the  legislature  being  supreme,  he 
makes  it  subservient  to  that  branch,  and  in  conse- 
quence, to  the  ruling  power  in  the  state. 

Mr.  Locke's  work  was  written  wdth  great  ability, 
and  was  certainly  very  interesting  and  useful  to  his 
country,  and  as  may  be  presumed,  to  Europe,  at  the 
time  it  was  written.  He  touches  no  subject  which 
he  does  not  thoroughly  analyze,  nor  advance  any 
doctrine  which  he  does  not  fully  illustrate  and 
ably  support.  But  whoever  examines  it  with 
attention,  will  find  that  there  is  little  in  it  other 
than  the  su^jport  which  he  gives  to  the  general 
cause  of  liberty,  which  can  be  considered  applicable 
to  us.  His  refutation  of  the  work  of  Filmer,  in 
favor  of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  may  certainly 
be  viewed  in  this  light.  No  one  here  has  a  claim 
to  that  station,  or  ever  had,  nor  does  any  one  enter- 
tain that  sentiment.     This  remark  is  equally  appli- 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  147 

cable  to  his  argument  iu  favor  of  the  right  of  the 
people  to  change  their  government  at  pleasure,  and 
to  punish  those  who  violate  the  laws,  or  are  other- 
wise guilty  of  misconduct.  There  is  no  difference 
of  sentiment  on  these  points  with  us.  All  our 
governments  are  founded  on  that  principle,  and 
have  been  in  practical  and  successful  operation 
since  the  Declaration  of  our  Independence.  Mr. 
Locke's  work  may,  therefore,  be  viewed  in  the 
light  in  which  I  have  placed  it;  as  characteristic 
of  the  epoch  at  which  it  was  written ;  as  exhibiting 
a  true  picture  of  the  nature  of  the  governments, 
the  state  of  society,  and  of  the  science  at  the  time. 
He  does  not  look  at  the  dangers  to  which  our  sys- 
tem is  exposed,  nor  suggest  the  means  of  averting 
them.  It  is  proper  to  add,  that  if  it  was  difficult, 
and  almost  impossible  to  sustain  the  mixed  form 
of  which  the  British  Government  was  composed, 
the  preservation  of  one  founded  on  the  sovereignty 
of  the  people  could  not  have  been  even  thought  of 
by  those  most  friendly  to  liberty.  This  remark  is 
justified  by  INIr.  Locke  himself,  for  it  is  manifest 
from  the  whole  work,  that  such  was  his  opinion, 
and  may  fairly  be  inferred,  that  he  thought  a  mixed 
government,  such  as  that  of  Great  Britain,  resting 
on  its  true  principles,  the  best  that  could  be  estab- 
lished. 

The  principles  which  were  cherished  by  this  very 


148  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

able  writer  and  virtuous  man,  rendered  him  ob- 
noxious to  the  Court,  and  of  which  he  felt  the  ill 
effect.  He  was  a  fellow  of  Christ  Church  College 
in  the  University  of  Oxford,  and  from  which  he 
was  ex23elled,  by  the  special  order  of  the  king, 
Charles  the  Second. 

The  view  which  has  been  taken  of  the  work  of 
Locke  is  equally  applicable  to  that  of  Sydney,  in 
reference  to  the  objects  of  this  inquiry.  It  was 
written  to  refute  the  doctrine  of  Filmer,  in  favor 
of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  and  of  which  he 
never  loses  sight  in  any  part  of  his  essay,  which 
comprises  two  volumes,  octavo,  of  about  400  pages 
each.  It  furnishes  a  complete  refutation  of  that 
doctrine,  and  likewise  demonstrates,  that  the  power 
of  princes,  however  great  or  long  its  continuance, 
is  derived  from  the  consent  of  the  peoj)le,  and  sus- 
tained afterwards  when  it  assumes  an  oppressive 
character,  by  their  inability  to  remove  it.  It  is, 
however,  not  confined  to  these  objects.  He  enters 
with  great  ability  into  a  comparison  of  the  merits 
of  governments  in  which  the  people  hold  a  portion 
of  the  sovereignty,  and  are  free,  with  those  "which 
are  absolute,  and  in  which  they  are  slaves.  In  the 
one,  he  gives  examples  of  every  great  and  noble 
quality  that  can  adorn  the  human  race  and  exalt 
the  character  of  the  community;  in  the  other,  of 
those  only  which  show  the  degradation  and  decrep- 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  149 

itude  of  man;  of  nothing  but  what  is  calculated  to 
excite  our  mortification  and  disgust.  His  work 
displays  a  profound  knowledge  of  ancient  and 
modern  history,  and  may  be  considered,  in  the  view 
stated,  as  one  of  the  most  able  ever  written  in 
favor  of  free  government  against  despotism.  There 
is  scarcely  an  individual,  of  those  most  distin- 
guished in  any  of  the  ancient  republics,  or  of 
modern  times,  down  to  his  own  period,  to  whose 
talents  and  virtues  he  does  not  pay  the  respect  to 
which  they  are  entitled.  But  beyond  this  limit  I 
do  not  perceive  that  his  work  extends.  In  several 
passages,  he  avows  explicitly  his  preference  of  a 
government  composed  of  three  (3)  orders,  a  king, 
lords  and  commons,  to  one  founded  exclusively  on 
the  sovereignty  of  the  people.*  In  this,  however, 
it  may  be  inferred  that  he  had  in  view  those  only 
of  the  latter  class,  in  which  the  people  exercised 
their  power  en  masse.  None,  like  our  own,  ever 
existed  before ;  and  of  course  he  could  contemplate 
none  of  which  history  had  furnished  no  example. 

Sidney  looked  to  the  dangers  which  menaced 
liberty  in  his  own  country,  and  as  Locke  did  to 
the  means  of  preserving  it,  on  the  principles  of  the 
British  Constitution,  to  Mhich  Jie  thought  the  peo- 
ple competent,  if  roused  to  make  the  necessary 
exertion.      Tyranny   had   existed;    civil   war   had 

•»■  Vol.  I.  chai).  i.  section  10:  chaj).  ii.  section  IG. 
13  « 


150  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

ensued;  a  king  had  been  overthrown  and  beheaded; 
a  commonwealth  had  been  established ;  but  under 
circumstances  which  proved  that  liberty  Avas  not 
secui-e  even  under  it;  the  family  of  Stuart  had  been 
restored,  and  with  incroa.-ed  danger  to  the  great 
cause  to  which  he  was  devoted.  It  could  not  be 
expected,  under  these  circumstances,  that  Sidney 
would  look  beyond  his  own  country,  or  to  other 
objects,  than  such  as  were  connected  Avitli  the  exist- 
ing crisis.  In  defense  of  those,  he  exerted  his  best 
eiforts  and  displayed  great  talents,  and  to  that  great 
cause  he  fell  a  victim. 

When  it  is  considered  that  such  men  as  Locke 
and  Sidney  found  it  necessary  and  were  compelled 
to  devote  their  talents  and  labors  to  the  refutation 
of  so  absurd  a  doctrine  as  that  of  the  divine  right 
of  kings,  most  of  whom  then  reigning,  or  of  their 
families,  had  been  placed  by  casual  events  at  the 
head  of  their  respective  governments,  Avhat  an  im- 
pression must  it  make  on  all  reflecting  minds,  of 
the  state  of  society  at  the  epoch  at  which  they 
lived?  If  such  were  the  prejudices,  superstition 
and  darkness  of  the  age,  to  make  it  difficult  to  con- 
vince the  people  that  they  had  any  rights,  and  were 
not  born  slaves,  how  idle  must  it  have  been  to 
have  drawn  their  attention  to  the  organization  and 
distribution  of  power,  in  self-government,  Avith  its 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  lol 

various  modifications,  and  to  the  dangers  to  which 
a  faikire,  in  any  of  those  respects,  would  expose  it. 
The  works  of  Montesquieu  and  Rousseau  merit 
a  like  commendation  with  that  which  has  been 
bestowed  on  those  of  Locke  and  Sidney.  They 
were  written  in  another  country,  under  a  govern- 
ment in  a  different  state,  and,  in  consequence,  in  a 
different  spirit.  The  work  of  INIontesquieu  is  called 
the  Spirit  of  Laws,  and  it  corresponds  with  the 
title;  but  as  the  laws  must  depend  on,  and  be 
adapted  to  the  nature  and  principle  of  the  govern- 
ment under  which  they  are  formed,  it  became 
necessary  to  give  a  distinct  idea  of  each  class  in  all 
its  most  important  features.  This  he  has  executed 
with  great  ability,  and  in  support  of  which,  he 
brings  into  view  all  the  ancient  governments,  and 
likewise  the  modern  down  to  his  own  time.  There 
is  no  subject  which  falls  wdthin  the  scope  of  legis- 
lation, under  any  species  of  government,  and  in 
every  part  of  the  globe,  which  escapes  his  attention, 
and  on  which  he  does  not  make  very  interesting 
remarks.  His  work,  therefore,  may  be  considered, 
as  embrjjcing,  according  to  his  view,  the  circle  of 
the  science,  with  the  examples  in  support  of  it, 
wdiicli  history  had  then  afforded.  In  the  range 
which  he  has  taken,  it  is  obvious  that  there  are 
many  subjects  on  which  he  treats,  to  which  no 
attention  is  necessary  on  my  part.      Whatever  lie 


152  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

says  of  despotic  governments,  and  of  the  laws  that 
are  adapted  to  them,  is  of  this  character.  The 
same  remark  is  applicable  to  mixed  governments, 
and  indeed  to  every  class;  for  if  self-government  is 
sound  in  principle,  and  merits  the  opinion  enter- 
tained of  it,  under  the  improvement  it  has  received 
with  us,  those  who  execute  it  will  adopt  the  laws 
correspondent  therewith,  and  necessary  to  its  sup- 
port. My  object  relates  to  that  point,  and  in  refer- 
ring to  the  works  of  different  writers,  I  do  it  to 
show  that  they  apply  to  governments  differently 
circumstanced,  and  that  so  far  as  liberty  is  an  ob- 
ject, and  cherished  by  them,  there  is  not  only 
nothing  discouraging  in  their  works  to  our  system, 
but  everything  in  its  supjwrt. 

Montesquieu  occupied  different  ground  from  that 
which  had  been  held  by  Locke  or  Sidney.  He  was 
not  a  i^arty  to  any  existing  conflict,  and  saw  the 
improvement  which  had  been  given  to  the  British 
Government  by  that,  for  their  services  in  promoting 
which  both  had  suffered,  and  one  fallen  a  victim. 
He  had  with  them  all  the  advantages  which  could 
be  derived  from  the  examples  of  the  anciei^fc  repub- 
lics, and  the  science  of  the  ancient  world,  and  like- 
wise of  the  modern,  aided  by  the  improvement  in 
the  government  referred  to,  and  by  their  works  in 
support  of  that  great  cause.  His  work  is  very 
favorable  to  liberty,  and  has  given  much  support  to 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  153 

it,  but  living  under  a  despotic  government  caution 
was  necessary  on  his  jjart.  It  was,  therefore,  of  a 
nature  so  elementary,  extended  to  so  many  objects 
unconnected  with  it,  and  was  written  in  a  spirit  of 
such  moderation,  that  it  could  not  be  considered  an 
attack  on  his  own  government. 

In  his  view  of  the  ancient  republics,  and  of  gov- 
ernments generally,  he  rejects  the  classification  which 
had  been  given  of  them  by  Aristotle,  as  he  likewise 
does  the  number  of  species  which  he  ascribes  to 
each  class.  He  notices  his  first  species  of  Monarchy, 
wdiich  he  considers  visionary,  being  founded  on  the 
good  or  ill-conduct  of  the  incumbent,  and  not  on 
principle.*  His  view  is  more  simple  than  that  of 
the  ancient  authors,  arising  from  the  character  of 
the  Feudal  system ;  but  it  does  not  extend  to  the 
precise  objects  of  this  inquiry,  and  in  some  points 
which  involve  general  principles,  is  not  free  from 
objection.  This,  however,  may  fairly  be  attributed 
to  the  state  of  the  science  at  the  time,  and  to  the 
nature  and  form  of  the  government  to  which,  in 
comparison  with  all  others,  he  gave  the  preference. 
In  treating  of  Democracy  he  contemplated  that 
only  which  was  known  to  the  ancients,  in  which 
the  people  exercised  their  power,  en  masse,  and 
the  government  was  united  with  the  sovereignty. 
Whatever  he  says  of  this  class  of  government,  is 

■-•■  Book  XI.  ohap.  ix. 


154  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

under  this  impression,  and  can,  in  consequence, 
refer  only  to  the  defects  of  that  state,  and  not  to 
the  improvements  of  the  present  day  by  represen- 
tation.* Such  a  government  would  be  impracti- 
cable, as  will  be  shown,  even  for  a  small  state.  For 
a  large  one  it  could  not  have  been  thought  of 

In  the  view  which  he  took  of  the  Constitution  of 
England,  and  his  remarks  on  it,  it  is  obvious  that 
he  considered  it  the  most  that  perfect  human  wis- 
dom could  devise.  That  it  was  the  best  then  known 
I  readily  admit;  but  that  it  is  inferior  to  our  own, 
is,  according  to  my  judgment,  certain.  As  I  pro- 
pose to  treat  of  this  government,  and  to  make  a 
comparison  between  it  and  those  of  the  United 
States  hereafter,  it  is  unnecessary,  and  it  would  be 
improper  to  enter  into  the  subject  here. 

He  observes  that  the  constitution  may  be  free, 
and  the  citizen  not:  that  the  citizen  may  be  free, 
and  the  constitution  not.f  From  this  it  may  be 
inferred,  that  he  meant  that  liberty  does  not  depend 
altogether  on  the  government,  and  his  illustration 
of  the  idea  docs  not  preclude  the  inference.  It 
must  now  be  obvious,  that  the  liberty  of  the  citizen 
depends  solely  on  the  government,  and  that  if  the 
government  be  founded  on  just  principles,  and  be 
in  the  hands  of  a  virtuous  and  intelligent  people, 
he  cannot  fail  to  enjoy  liberty.     Such  a  people  will 

*  Book  II.  chap.  i.       |  Book  XII.  chap.  i. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  155 

always  see  that  such  laws  are  made,  and  are  so  exe- 
cuted, as  in  a  manner  to  secure  to  every  citizen  the 
enjoyment  of  that  blessing.  It  is  also  equally  ob- 
vious, that  if  the  government  be  absolute,  the  peo- 
ple must  be  slaves,  A  virtuous  and  humane  prince 
might  not  molest  them,  but  as  their  security  and 
peace  would  depend  on  his  Avill  they  could  have 
no  rights  of  their  own.  Objections  occur  to  other 
passages  in  this  work,  but  it  does  not  fall  within 
the  limit  of  this  inquiry  to  enter  into  the  subject 
in  that  view.  Many  of  these  have  been  shown  by 
Mr.  De  Tracy,  a  French  writer  of  talents,  in  a  work 
which  will,  I  doubt  not,  be  read  with  great  atten- 
tion and  satisfaction  by  those  who  peruse  that  on 
which  it  is  a  commentary.  On  a  vicw^  of  the  whole 
work  it  certainly  merits  the  commendation  which 
has  been  bestowed  on  it. 

The  W'Ork  of  Rousseau,  to  which  attention  is 
next  due,  is  entitled  the  Social  Compact.  It  traces 
government  to  the  peoj^le,  and  maintains  with  great 
force  that  none  is  legitimate,  which  is  not  founded 
on  their  consent.  The  manner  in  which  the  com- 
pact is  formed,  when  regularly  entered  into,  its 
extent  and  the  obligation  w'hich  it  imposes  on  the 
people  who  are  parties  to  it,  are  treated  with  ability, 
and  the  work,  taken  in  all  its  parts,  is  consistent 
with  itself,  and  an  able  essay.  It  is  obvious  that 
he  was   thoroughly  acquainted  with    ancient   and 


156  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

modern  history,  and  with  the  works  of  the  writers 
of  both  epochs  on  the  subject  of  government. 

He  explicitly  avows  his  opinion  that  the  govern- 
ment should  be  vested  in  and  be  exercised  by  the 
people  collectively,  in  a  general  assembly,  and  in 
consequence  be  united  with  the  sovereignty.  He 
maintains  the  doctrine  that  the  sovereignty  cannot 
be  represented.*  Every  law  which  the  people  do 
not  pass  themselves  he  considers  void.  The  people 
of  England,  he  says,  think  that  they  are  free,  but 
they  deceive  themselves.  They  are  free  only  while 
engaged  in  the  election  of  members  to  Parliament, 
and  as  soon  as  that  act  is  performed,  they  are  slaves. f 
He  asserts  that  the  idea  of  representation  is  modern, 
and  derived  from  the  Feudal  system,  by  which  the 
human  race  are  degraded,  and  the  name  of  man 
dishonored.  He  adds  that  in  the  ancient  republics 
the  people  had  no  representatives:  that  even  the 
term  was  unknown  to  them.| 

His  whole  work  is  founded  on  this  principle,  and 
the  organization  which  he  gives  to  the  government, 
and  the  distribution  of  its  powers,  correspond  with 
it.  The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  general 
assembly  of  the  peo^jle,  without  the  aid  of  any 
other  branch,  to  digest  measures  for  their  consider- 
ation or  to  form  a  check  on  their  decision.     He 

«■  Book  III.  chajj.  xv.  Vol.  II.  page  185. 
t  Ibid,  page  1 86.     J  Ibid. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  157 

contemplates  an  executive  distinct  from  the  legisla- 
ture, but  as  forming  in  eiFect  no  part  of  the  govern- 
ment, its  members  being  merely  commissaries  or 
agents  under  it.  Respecting  the  judiciary,  he  makes 
no  comment,  nor  does  he  propose  any  jjlan  for  the 
performance  of  that  portion  of  the  public  duties, 
in  questions  arising  either  between  the  citizens 
themselves  or  between  the  government  and  the 
citizens.  The  legislature,  according  to  his  view, 
held  the  sovereignty  of  the  state.  When  the  people 
were  assembled,  the  government  in  all  its  functions 
was  suspended."^  The  magistrates  became  members 
of  that  body  with  no  other  rights  or  authority 
than  belonged  to  every  other  citizen.  Every  power 
was  concentrated  in  a  general  assembly  of  the  peo- 
ple. He  made  some  nice  distinctions  between  those 
powers  which  that  assembly  would  exercise,  calling 
one  portion,  such  as  were  of  a  general  nature,  and 
applied  to  the  whole  community,  acts  of  sovereignty ; 
and  such  as  related  to  special  objects,  or  to  individ- 
uals, the  acts  of  magistrates,  giving  thus  to  the 
same  body,  and  to  the  same  man,  in  the  discharge 
of  their  ordinary  duties,  a  different  character.f  He 
was  aware  that  such  a  government  could  apply  only 
to  a  state  of  very  limited  extent  and  population  ;  to 
a  village,  and  little  more;  and  that  it  would  be  ex- 
posed to  imminent  danger,  both  internal  and  ex- 

*  Book  III.  ohap.  xiv.  Vol.  II.  page  IGl.      f  Cliap.  xvii. 


158  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

tcrnal.  For  these  evils  he  suggests  a  remedy,  by 
extraneous  and  temporary  provisions,  such  as  the 
Tribunate  of  Rome,  or  tlie  Ephori  of  Sparta,  and 
in  great  emergencies  of  a  dictatorship.  The  plan 
of  this  writer  was  evidently  founded  on  that  of  the 
ancient  republics,  with  some  modifications  which 
experience,  aided  by  his  reflections,  had  suggested. 
It  is  obvious  that  he  considered  the  alternative 
to  be  between  the  government  of  the  people 
en  masse  and  that  in  which  they  were  to  hold  a 
very  limited  portion  of  power  only,  to  form  what 
was  called  the  tiers  etats  or  third  estate;  and  that 
he  preferred  the  former.  Having  been  born  in 
Geneva,  a  small  state,  it  may  be  inferred  that  he 
took  his  impressions  in  j^art  from  that  circumstance; 
and  in  many  respects  his  plan  accords  w^ith  that  of 
Athens,  one  of  those  with  which  I  propose  to  com- 
pare our  system.  As  therefore  all  the  remarks 
which  I  sliall  make  on  that  government  will  apply 
to  this  sketch,  it  will  be  unnecessary  to  make  further 
comments  on  it. 

I  might,  with  propriety,  notice  the  w^orks  of  other 
writers,  and  particularly  of  Machiavel  and  De 
Lohme;  the  first  of  whom  composed  an  essay  on 
the  first  decade  of  Livy,  and  the  other  on  the  Con- 
stitution of  England,  both  of  which  display  talent. 
But  as  they  relate  to  the  two  preceding  epochs,  and 
not  to  the  third,  it  is  deemed  unnecessary  to  enter 


THE  PEOFLE   THE  80VEBEIGN8.  159 

on  them.  When  I  reach  the  subjects  on  Avhieh 
they  treat  I  may  advert  to  them.  The  works  of 
the  writers  to  which  I  have  referred  are  sufficient 
for  my  object.  They  give  a  clear  and  distinct  idea 
of  the  state  of  society,  of  the  governments,  and  of 
the  science  in  the  first  two  epochs,  which  was  my 
motive  for  referring  to  them.  They  confirm  the 
opinion  advanced,  that  the  contest  on  the  part  of 
the  people  in  the  first  was  for  the  whole  power  to 
be  exercised  by  them  en  masse ;  and  in  the  second, 
that  it  was  to  prevent  their  entire  exclusion  from 
the  government  in  any  and  every  form  whatever; 
to  rescue  themselves  from  abject  slavery. 

In  reference  to  the  second  epoch,  and  to  Great 
Britain,  whose  people  took  the  lead  among  the 
great  powers  in  support  of  human  rights,  I  think 
proper  to  insert  here  a  comment  from  the  posthu- 
mous works  of  an  enlightened  patriot  and  great 
statesman,  Mr.  Fox,  which  confirms  the  view  taken 
of  the  character  of  that  epoch,  and  of  the  dangers 
incident  to  it.  The  struggle  to  which  I  allude 
was  that  during  which  the  works  of  Locke  and 
Sidney  were  composed,  and  which  commenced  in 
the  reign  of  Charles  the  First,  of  the  family  of 
Stuart,  and  in  which  all  hope  of  success  depended 
on  the  part  which  the  House  of  Connnons  might 
act  in  it.  In  adverting  to  that  crisis,  he  states  the 
following  propositions,  which  all  people  should  con- 


160  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

stantly  have  in  view  who  may  be  engaged  in  such 
a  straggle,  or  who  may  be  blessed  with  free  govern- 
ments of  the  best  kind.  Under  the  excitement  of 
party  feeling,  those  who  take  the  lead  on  each  side 
have  it  much  in  their  power  to  abuse  the  confidence 
of  the  people,  especially  if  the  controversy  be  car- 
ried to  great  extent,  and  of  which  they  seldom  fail 
to  take  advantage,  and  for  the  worst  purposes.  He 
asks,  "In  what  manner  Avill  that  house  conduct 
itself?  will  it  be  content  Avith  its  regular  share  of 
legislative  power,  and  with  the  influence  which  it 
cannot  fail  to  possess,  whenever  it  exerts  itself  upon 
the  other  branches  of  the  legislative  and  executive 
J30wer?  or  will  it  boldly  (perhaps  rashly)  pretend 
to  a  power  commensurate  with  the  natural  rights 
of  the  representatives  of  the  people?  If  it  should, 
will  it  not  be  obliged  to  support  its  claims  by- 
military  force?  And  how  long  will  such  a  force 
be  under  its  control?  How  long  before  it  follows 
the  usual  course  of  all  armies,  and  ranges  itself 
under  a  single  master?  If  such  a  master  should 
arise,  will  he  establish  an  hereditary  or  an  elective 
government?  If  the  first,  what  will  be  gained  by 
a  change  of  dynasty?  If  the  second,  Avill  not  the 
military  power,  as  it  chose  the  first  king  or  pro- 
tector (the  name  is  of  no  importance),  choose  in 
effect  all  his  successors  ?  Or  Avill  he  fail,  and  shall 
we  have  a  restoration,  usually  the  most  dangerous 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  161 

and  worst  of  all  revolutions?"  These  interroga- 
tories contemplate  the  great  epochs  of  such  a  strug- 
gle, with  the  means  by  which  the  people,  in  case 
they  succeed  and  overthrow  their  antagonist,  may 
be  made  in  each  and  every  stage,  by  the  abuse  of 
their  confidence,  by  those  who  take  the  lead  on  their 
side,  the  instruments  of  their  own  destruction. 
They  afford  a  very  strong  proof  of  the  enlightened 
mind  of  a  practical  statesman  who  watched  with 
care  the  dangers  to  which  the  great  cause  to  which 
he  was  devoted  was  exposed.  They  apply  particu- 
larly to  the  state  in  which  the  people  of  England 
then  were;  but  the  example  to  which  they  refer 
must  be  instructive  to  all  people,  under  every  spe- 
cies of  free  government.  The  work  of  this  writer 
was  not  finished,  which  is  much  to  be  regretted, 
since  had  it  been  completed  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  it  would  have  shed  much  light  on  every 
branch  of  the  subject  to  which  it  might  have  ex- 
tended. 

The  people  of  England  held  their  station  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  they  were  the  only  people 
of  any  great  power  in  Europe  who  enjoyed  that 
advantage  at  that  period.  That  hold  enabled  them 
to  prostrate  every  order  in  the  state,  because  they 
moved  with  vast  force  and  with  great  energy  to  the 
accomplishment  of  that  result.  In  suffering  their 
leader  to  take  essentially  the  station  of  the  chief 
14  « 


162  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

whom  tlioy  had  deposed  and  beheaded,  they  furnish 
a  strong  proof  that  they  were  incompetent  to  the 
support  of  a  government  which  belonged  exclu- 
sively to  themselves.  If  any  doubt  existed  on  that 
point,  the  restoration  to  the  throne  of  a  member  of 
the  same  family  soon  after  the  decease  of  that 
leader  would  remove  it.  It  is  proper  to  add  that 
Mr.  Fox,  in  sjieaking  in  terms  of  high  commenda- 
tion of  the  works  of  Locke  and  Sidney,  gives  a 
further  confirmation  of  the  difference  between  that 
and  the  preceding  epoch,  by  observing  that  they 
had  never  conceived  the  -vnld  project  of  assimilating 
the  Government  of  England  to  that  of  Athens,  of 
Sparta,  or  of  Rome. 

The  third  epoch  is  that,  as  has  been  observed, 
which  is  marked  by  the  emigration  of  our  ancestors 
to  this  territory,  by  the  Revolution  which  followed, 
and  the  governments  which  have  been  erected  on 
its  basis,  in  all  of  which  the  sovereignty  is  vested 
in  the  people,  but  the  government  separated  from 
it  and  committed  to  representative  bodies.  This 
epoch  is,  therefore,  altogether  different  from  the 
others.  The  governments  being  different,  the  dan- 
gers which  menace  them  are  likewise  so.  Happily 
they  are  in  all  respects  of  inferior  magnitude. 
Such  dangers  however  do,  and  will  exist,  which 
ought  to  be  understood  and  guarded  against.  The 
principles  and  passions  of  men  are  always  the  same, 


THE  PEOrLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  163 

and  lead  to  the  same  result,  varying  only  according 
to  the  cii-curastances  in  which  they  are  placed. 
Self-interest  is  the  ruling  passion,  whether  under 
free  or  despotic  governments.  Highly  improved 
and  generous  minds  will  move  on  a  scale  correspon- 
dent therewith,  but  a  large  portion  of  mankind 
will  look  to  themselves,  and  turn  every  incident  of 
which  they  may  take  advantage  to  their  own  ac- 
count. It  is  against  these  propensities  that  we  have 
to  guard.  The  principle  of  the  government  will 
go  far  to  infuse  a  correct  spirit  into  the  body  of  the 
people,  and  will  have  great  influence  on  those  Avho 
are  appointed  to  high  and  honorable  trusts,  provided 
the  people  perform,  with  judgment,  their  essential 
duties.  A  failure,  and  even  a  relaxation  on  their 
part,  may  produce  the  worst  consequences.  If  they 
make  judicious  selections  for  office,  reward  those 
who  have  merit,  and  punish  those  who  commit 
oflPenses:  if  they  act  for  themselves,  are  intelligent, 
impartial  and  firm,  and  do  not  become  the  instru- 
ments of  others,  the  whole  movement  cannot  fail 
to  be  mild,  harmonious  and  successful. 

In  what  relates  to  the  ancient  world,  we  read 
with  peculiar  interest  the  history  of  the  ancient 
republics,  and  particularly  of  those  specified.  In- 
deed there  is  nothing  beyond  that  limit,  relating  to 
that  epoch,  in  Avhich  we  take  a  serious  interest. 
The  career  of  despotic  governments  viewed  inter- 


164  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

nally  exhibits  a  gloomy  spectacle;  and  externally, 
even  where  talents  are  displayed,  by  their  respective 
chiefs,  being  generally  of  a  military  character,  and 
employed  in  the  subjugation  and  oppression  of  other 
people,  although  it  may  excite  a  species  of  admi- 
ration, it  cannot  give  pleasure.  The  people  are 
held  by  such  governments  in  a  state  of  degradation 
and  oppression,  deprived  of  opportunities  of  dis- 
playing those  noble  and  generous  qualities  which 
do  honor  to  the  human  race.  Their  conduct  is 
watched  in  every  circumstance,  and  rejDorted  by  a 
vigilant  and  active  police.  Pligh  qualities  are 
dreaded.  But  in  republics,  even  in  those  in  which 
the  people  enjoy  a  portion  of  the  sovereignty  only, 
a  different  state  of  things  exists,  and  a  different 
spectacle  is  exhibited.  The  society  moves  itself. 
The  springs  of  action  are  within  it.  Great  virtues 
and  talents,  wherever  found,  exalt  the  possessors, 
and  increase  the  energy  and  stability  of  the  govern- 
ment. Notwithstanding  all  the  disadvantages  to 
which  the  ancient  republics  were  subject,  we  find 
in  them  a  greater  display  of  all  the  higher  qualities 
of  talent  and  virtue,  more  to  grarify  our  feelings, 
to  command  our  admiration  and  applause,  than  in 
the  history  of  every  other  people  from  the  earliest 
record  of  time.  Their  rise  and  progress  form  a 
great  epoch  in  the  history  of  the  Avorld.  Under 
their   protection   the  arts   and    sciences  flourished. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  165 

and  the  human  mind  acquired  an  expansion  never 
known  before.  With  their  overthrow  universal 
darkness  overspread  the  earth,  and  held  it  in  igno- 
rance and  barbarismrfor  ages.  From  that  degraded 
state  we  may  date  the  commencement  of  its  eman- 
cipation in  several  of  the  countries  of  Europe, 
with  that  of  the  sixteenth  century,  which  was  fur- 
ther marked  with  the  discovery  of  this  hemisphere. 
That  great  event  paved  the  way  to  our  Eevolution, 
which  laid  the  foundation  of  a  system  of  govern- 
ment under  circumstances  more  favorable  to  success 
than  were  ever  enjoyed  by  any  of  the  ancient  repub- 
lics, and  with  the  light  derived  from  their  example, 
with  the  best  means  of  correcting  their  errors  and 
avoiding  their  fate. 

Tlie  discovery  of  this  hemisphere  was  made  in  a 
spirit  of  philosophic  calculation  and  speculation, 
and  on  the  part  of  those  who  first  embarked  in  it 
of  adventure ;  but  the  emigrants  who  soon  followed, 
and  who  laid  the  foundation  of  the  communities 
which  have  since  grown  up  in  these  states,  were 
persons  of  enlarged  views  and  elevated  character. 
Although  of  different  political  parties  and  of  dif- 
ferent religious  sects  in  the  parent  country,  yet  they 
all  flew  from  persecution,  in  pursuit  of  liberty,  and 
they  inculcated  that  sentiment  on  their  descendants. 
In  the  convulsions  to  which  the  British  Govern- 
ment was  then  subject,  and  the  transition  of  power 


1G6  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

from  one  order  to  another,  the  cause  of  emigration, 
in  the  masses  who  came  over,  was  different,  but  the 
moral  effect  soon  became  uniform.  It  is  known 
that  two  of  the  regicides,  if  not  more,  were  buried 
in  the  Eastern  States,  and  that  Cromwell  himself 
was  at  one  time  prepared  to  fly.  And  incidents 
occur,  even  at  this  late  day,  to  show  that  many  of 
distinction  of  the  opposite  party  found  then  an 
asylum  in  the  Middle  and  Southern  States.  The 
immediate  emigrants,  therefore,  felt  this  difference 
sensibly,  but  in  the  new  relation  which  was  formed 
between  them  and  between  the  colonies  and  the 
parent  country,  that  feeling  subsided,  and  was  un- 
known to  their  descendants.  The  charters  under 
which  they  emigrated,  which  formed  a  compact 
between  the  peojjle  and  the  crown,  nursed  the  infant 
state  and  reared  it  to  maturity  under  the  influence 
of  free  principles.  Distinct  orders  were  precluded. 
All  the  emigrants  and  their  descendants  were 
jilaced  on  a  footing  of  equality.  Had  those  of  the 
highest  rank  in  England  visited  any  of  the  colo- 
nies without  commissions  authorized  by  their  char- 
ters they  would  have  held  the  grade  only  of  private 
individuals.  Had  the  king  himself  come  over,  he 
could  have  taken  the  place  only  in  tlie  colony  in 
which  he  landed,  of  his  governor.  Thus  successive 
generations  grew  up  in  each  colony  in  the  same 
principles,  and  bearing  the  same  common  relation 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  167 

to  the  crown,  the  only  extraneous  power  which 
was  recognized.  As  its  pressure  was  felt,  and  other 
pretensions  were  advanced,  the  whole  people  were 
gradually  drawn  together  by  the  powerful  bond  of 
interest  and  affections,  so  that  when  the  revolution- 
ary struggle  commenced,  they  moved  in  a  body  as 
a  single  community. 

The  elevation  of  mind  which  was  brought  over 
by  those  emigrants  was  never  lost;  but  by  the 
operation  of  the  causes  stated  was  infused  into  the 
mass  of  each  community.  There  never  was  a  period 
when  an  appeal  was  made  to  the  talents  and  virtue 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  colonies,  notwithstanding 
the  difficulties  they  had  to  encounter,  in  making 
their  establishments  in  the  new  world,  that  indi- 
cated the  least  inferiority  between  them  and  those 
of  the  old.  Their  conduct  in  the  war  of  1756 
extorted  that  confession  in  their  favor  from  the 
government  of  the  parent  country,  and  the  display 
which  was  made  in  both  respects  in  the  war  of  the 
Revolution  commanded  the  applause,  not  only  of 
the  first  men  there,  but  of  the  whole  civilized 
world.  In  these  very  important  circumstances, 
therefore,  the  good  people  of  these  states  enjoyed 
advantages,  which  there  is  good  reason  to  believe 
were  peculiar  to  themselves;  advantages  which 
could  not  fail  to  have  the  happiest  effect  in  enabling 


168  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

to  form,  as  well   as   to  sustain,  the   governments 
which  have  been  instituted. 

In  forming  our  governments  the  question  of  city 
and  country,  of  the  rich  and  the  poor,  could  never 
have  come  into  view.  By  the  charters  to  the 
colonies  vast  territories  were  granted,  and  a  great 
proportion  thereof  in  each  was  settled  before  the 
commencement  of  the  contest.  As  the  population 
had  increased  and  moved  westward,  each  colony 
was  laid  off  into  counties,  from  which  representa- 
tives were  sent,  to  a  general  assembly  in  each. 
The  power  of  the  colony  was  in  the  hands  of  this 
assembly,  and  in  consequence,  of  the  country,  the 
cities  having  their .  equal  share  in  it,  which  was 
scarcely  felt  as  such  in  any  colony.  The  poor  as 
a  class,  organized  against  the  rich,  was  unknown, 
and  still  is.  The  aged  and  infirm,  who  are  indi- 
gent, are  provided  for  in  every  county,  in  every 
state,  with  houses,  food,  clothes,  and  medical  aid, 
at  the  expense  of  the  other  citizens  of  the  county. 
The  claim  is  founded  on  motives  of  charity,  which 
there  is  no  necessity  either  to  withhold  or  to  carry 
beyond  its  just  limits.  The  great  mass  of  our 
population,  consisting  of  persons  who  were  neither 
very  poor  nor  very  rich,  a  discrimination,  in  any 
form,  to  protect  the  one  against  the  other  could  not 
have  been  thought  of.  The  sovereignty  being  in 
the  people,  the  door  might  be  left  open  with  perfect 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  169 

safety,  to  every  citizen,  to  every  office,  and  without 
distinction  as  to  the  right  of  suffrage,  other  than 
such  as  marked  him  as  an  inhabitant  of  the  county 
or  township,  with  such  small  interest  there  as 
should  enable  him  to  act  as  a  free  agent. 

The  good  people  of  these  states  have,  therefore, 
been  placed  in  a  situation  to  make  a  fair  experi- 
ment of  the  great  problem,  whether  the  people,  as 
a  people,  are  competent  to  self-government.  All 
the  circumstances  with  which  they  are  blessed, 
more  favorable  to  such  a  result  than  were  ever 
enjoyed  by  any  other  people,  impose  on  them,  in 
like  degree,  the  great&r  obligation  to  succeed.  Satis- 
fied I  am  that  success  is  not  only  practicable,  but 
certain,  if  equal  virtue  and  talents  are  displayed  in 
future  with  those  which  have  brought  us  to  the 
present  stage. 

To  do  justice  to  the  subject,  it  will  be  proper  in 
regard  to  our  system  to  extend  the  inquiry  in  like 
manner  to  its  origin,  and  to  the  great  events  which 
have  so  far  marked  its  career.  From  such  a  view, 
a  fair  comparison  may  be  made  of  our  govern- 
ments, state  and  national,  with  those  referred  to, 
and  a  correct  estimate  be  formed  of  the  merits  and 
defects  of  our  own  in  both  its  branches.  A  like 
comparison  may  be  made  of  the  state  of  society  on 
each  side,  and  a  fair  conclusion  be  drawn  of  the 
competency  of  our  ])eople  to  self-government.     We 

15 


170  THE  PEOPLE   TEE  SOVEREIGNS. 

have  had  divisions  which  have  disturbed  the  har- 
mony, and  at  certain  epochs,  excited  great  inquie- 
tude as  to  the  future.  To  what  causes  were  these 
imputable?  An  impartial  and  candid  statement  of 
facts  can  injure  no  one  individually,  and  may  be 
useful  to  our  country.  Passions  have  long  since 
subsided,  and  such  is  the  state  of  the  public  mind, 
and  even  of  those  who  felt  and  acted  under  the 
greatest  excitement,  that  they  can  now  look  back 
with  moderation  and  calmness  on  the  past,  and 
profit  by  the  instruction  it  affords.  Having  been 
an  active  party  in  many  of  the  most  interesting 
scenes,  I  am  aware  that  I  may  have  taken  im- 
pressions in  some  instances  that  were  unfounded. 
Should  this  be  the  case,  the  view  which  I  may 
present  will  be  open  to  correction :  and  if,  in  any 
instance,  I  be  in  error,  I  wish  to  be  corrected. 
My  gi'eat  object  is  the  success  of  our  system  in 
both  its  branches,  because  I  well  know  that  on  it 
the  happiness  of  the  whole  nation  depends.  In 
pursuit  of  this  object  I  have  no  feeling  of  resent- 
ment to  any  one  to  gratify;  and  am  far  from  wish- 
ing to  detract  from  the  fame,  or  wound  the  feelings 
of  those  with  "whom  I  differed,  many  of  whom 
had,  in  council  and  in  the  field,  deserved  well  of 
their  country. 


ATHENS. 

It  is  impossible  to  proceed  iu  the  comparison  of 
our  governments  with  those  of  Greece,  either  State 
or  National,  without  being  forcibly  struck  with  the 
difference  between  them  in  all  those  circumstances 
which  are  most  important.  There  is  not  one,  either 
in  the  extent  of  territory,  the  number  of  inhabitants, 
the  state  of  society,  the  manner  of  instituting  the 
government,  its  organization,  or  the  distribution  of 
its  powers,  in  which  there  is  the  least  similitude. 
Athens,  comprising  Attica,  contained  a  territory 
not  larger  than  several  of  the  counties  in  some  of 
our  states.  Lacedemon  was  not  more  extensive 
than  the  smallest  state  in  our  Union,  and  all  Greece 
was  smaller  than  Scotland  or  Portugal.  The  dif- 
ference in  the  other  circumstances  enumerated  was 
equally  great,  and  still  more  important.  These 
differences  must  be  taken  into  view  and  have  their 
due  weight  in  the  prosecution  of  this  work. 

The  Government  of  Athens,  of  which  I  propose 

to  treat,   is  that  which  was   instituted    by  Solon 

nearly  five  hundred  years  before  the  Christian  era. 

171 


172  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

In  that  government  many  ancient  regulations  Avere 
incorporated^  some  of  whicli  liad  been  adopted  about 
one  thousand  years  before,  and  had  formed  a  part 
of  the  existing  government  in  all  its  subsequent 
changes.  In  adopting  those  regulations,  Solon  must 
have  done  it,  either  because  he  believed  them  to  be 
correct,  or  was  satisfied  that  the  community  M^as  so 
wedded  to  them  by  habit  and  prejudice,  that  it 
would  tolerate  no  government  of  which  they  should 
not  form  a  part.  AVhen  the  nature  of  those  insti- 
tutions is  considered,  it  might  fairly  be  inferred  that 
the  latter  was  the  cause.  The  fact,  however,  was 
established  by  himself,  he  having  declared  that  he 
had  formed  for  the  people  of  Athens,  not  the  gov- 
ernment whicli  he  deemed  the  best,  but  the  best 
which  he  thought  they  were  capable  of  sustaining. 
By  this  it  appears,  that  in  the  formation  of  the  gov- 
ernment he  considered  the  condition  of  the  people, 
their  state  of  civilization,  their  weaknesses  and  vices, 
with  their  intelligence  and  virtues.  To  judge  cor- 
rectly of  the  considerations  w^hich  induced  their 
ado2:)tion  in  the  first  instance,  and  tlieir  preservation 
afterwards,  we  must  go  back  to  the  ejDoch  at  which 
they  were  adopted,  and  view  the  condition  of  the 
people  at  that  period  and  in  every  subsequent  stage. 
A  slight  knowledge  of  mankind  will  show  that  the 
condition  of  the  people  at  any  advanced  period 
could  not  have  been  formed  at  the  moment,  but 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  173 

Diust  have  been  the  result  of  many  causes  operating 
on  the  community  from  its  commencement. 

Historians  carry  the  origin  of  this  people  back 
to  a  very  remote  period.  They  nevertheless  all 
agree  in  fixing  on  one  beyond  which  nothing  oc- 
curred that  merits  attention.  In  regard  to  Athens, 
the  reign  of  Cecrops  forms  that  period,  which,  ac- 
cording to  the  most  authentic  chronology,  occurred 
more  than  sixteen  hundred  years  before  the  birth 
of  Christ  and  about  tAvo  thousand  three  hundred 
and  fifty  after  the  creation  of  the  world.  Cecrops 
emigrated  from  Egypt  and  settled  in  Attica,  taking 
with  him  many  of  his  countiynien,  wdiom  he  incor- 
porated into  the  same  community  with  the  natives, 
placing  himself,  by  common  consent,  at  their  head. 
Before  that  period  it  is  stated  by  the  best  informed 
historians  that  the  inhabitants  of  Attica  were  bar- 
barians; that  they  dwelt  in  caves,  and  fed  on  the 
rude  productions  of  the  earth  and  on  game.  The 
inhabitants  of  Egypt  were  more  advanced  in  civili- 
zation, and  in  the  arts  and  usages  of  civilized  life, 
than  those  of  Greece.  Such  improvement  as  existed 
in  Egypt  Cecrops  transplanted  with  him  into  his 
newly  adopted  country.  The  motive  for  union 
between  the  parties  was  strong.  The  one  sought 
an  asylum,  the  other  instruction. 

All  that  region  known  by  the  name  of  ancient 
Greece  was  at  that  epoch  in  the  same  state,  and  the 

15* 


174  THE  PEOPLE   TIiE  SOVEREIGNS. 

greater  part  of  it,  not  the  wliole,  owed  the  com- 
meucement  of  its  improvement  to  the  same  cause, 
the  arrival  and  establishment  among  them  of  colo- 
nies from  Egypt,  Phoenicia,  and  the  East.  Four 
other  colonies  are  particularly  mentioned  by  histo- 
rians, one  of  which  was  led  by  Inachus,  likewise 
from  Egypt,  who  settled  in  Argos;  another  by 
Pelops,  from  Asia,  Avho  settled  in  the  Peloponnesus; 
a  third  from  Phoenicia,  by  Cadmus,  who  settled  in 
Boetia;  a  fourth  by  Danaus,  likewise  from  Egypt, 
who  settled  in  Argos.  The  first  preceded  Cecrops 
about  three  huridred  years.  The  other  three  fol- 
lowed shortly  after  him.  Tlie  leaders  of  those 
colonies  had  each  the  same  fortune  which  had  at- 
tended Cecrops,  of  being  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
community  in  which  they  respectively  settled,  and 
for  the  same  reason  the  superior  intelligence  which 
they  possessed,  and  the  desire  of  the  people  to  avail 
themselves  of  it. 

Thucydides,  the  author  of  the  "  Peloponnesian 
War,"  which  occurred  rather  more  than  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  years  after  the  institution  of  the 
Government  of  Solon,  considers  the  history  of 
Greece  as  involving  no  event  of  real  imj^ortance, 
either  of  a  military  or  political  nature,  prior  to 
that  war.  His  opinion  is  the  more  interesting, 
because  the  war  with  Persia  and  the  invasions  by 
Darius  and  Xerxes  had  preceded  the  Peloponnesian 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  175 

war,  the  latter  a  few  years  only,  and  had  in  fact  led 
to  it.  It  justifies  the  inference  which  has  been 
drawn  from  a  passage  in  his  work,  that  he  thought 
that  Herodotus  had  greatly  exaggerated  the  force 
which  had  been  brought  against  Greece  in  those 
invasions ;  as  it  does  the  opinion  entertained  of  the 
feeble  and  effeminate  character  of  the  troops  and 
people  of  Persia,  compared  with  those  of  Europe. 
Thucydides  states  that  the  war  with  Troy  was  the 
first  enterprise  in  which  the  Greeks  united,  and 
that  they  were  drawn  into  that  war  more  by  the 
power  and  influence  of  Agamemnon,  King  of  Argos, 
and  leader  of  the  expedition,  than  by  any  general 
feeling  or  policy  of  their  own.  That  war  united 
them  in  the  expedition,  but  their  union  terminated 
with  it,  and  the  absence  of  the  chiefs  from  their  re- 
spective dominions  had  so  far  impaired  their  power 
at  home  that  the  efforts  they  were  compelled  to 
make  to  regain  it  on  their  return  exhibited  scenes 
of  internal  commotion  and  civil  war  for  a  long  time 
afterward,  in  many  of  the  states,  of  the  most  fright- 
ful character.  There  was  then  no  regular  bond  of 
union  between  the  states,  nor  were  the  people 
known,  until  a  remote  subsequent  period,  by  the 
common  name  of  Greeks.  Homer,  who  composed 
his  poems  long  after  the  Trojan  war,  called  those 
of  each  state  by  the  name  appropriate  thereto, 
Danians,  Argives,  Acheens,  etc.     Tliere  can  be  no 


176  THE  PEOPLE   TBE  SOVEREIGNS. 

doubt  that  that  exjjcdition  owes  its  renown  more 
to  the  sjilendid  genius  of  Homer,  and  the  poetic 
license  of  wdiich  he  availed  himself,  than  to  the 
talents  which  w^ere  displayed,  or  to  the  exploits  that 
were  performed  in  it.  The  people  were  uncivilized 
before  the  war,  and  they  remained  equally  so  a  long 
time  after  its  conclusion. 

The  enlightened  and  faithful  historian  referred 
to,  confirms  the  elementary  view  heretofore  pre- 
sented, founded  on  the  principles,  the  passions,  and 
the  qualities  of  man,  of  the  origin  of  societies  and 
of  governments  over  them,  in  the  rude  state,  and  of 
the  incidents  to  such  societies  and  governments  in 
their  progress  from  that  state  to  a  state  of  civiliza- 
tion. He  describes  them  as  unlettered  and  un- 
civilized ;  the  states,  he  says,  were  small,  and  their 
governments  for  a  long  time  monarchical  and  here- 
ditary, but  with  limited  authority.  The  first  step 
to  improvement  was  the  Trojan  war,  and  simply  by 
embarking  them  on  the  sea,  and  making  them  better 
acquainted  with  navigation.  Piracy  ensued,  and 
was  long  deemed  an  honorable  occupation  in  all  the 
maritime  states,  and  in  some  even  down  to  his  own 
time.  Tyrannies  then  grew  up,  and  civil  wars  were 
the  consequence.  His  sketch  is  concise,  but  it  may 
fairly  be  concluded  from  the  facts  wliicli  he  states, 
that  the  limitation  affirmed  by  him  to  have  existed 
to  the  power  of  the  jjrince  in  the  early  stages,  pro- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  177 

ceeded  from  the  manner  in  which  the  office  origi- 
nated, and  the  inability  of  the  people  in  their  rude 
state  to  form  any  other  kind  of  government,  or  to 
limit  its  powers  in  any  precise  form  or  on  any  just 
principles.  It  may  also  be  inferred  with  equal 
certainty  that  the  changes  which  afterwards  oc- 
curred in  those  governments,  with  the  contentions 
and  civil  wars  which  attended  them,  proceeded  from 
the  change  which  had  taken  place  in  the  pursuits, 
the  names  and  condition  of  the  people,  and  which 
required  a  more  extended  legislation  and  greater 
vigor  in  the  administration,  at  a  period  when  the 
science  of  government  had  not  experienced  a  degree 
of  improvement  adequate  to  the  object. 

A  sreneral  view  of  the  state  of  Greece  at  this 
early  epoch  is  all  that  is  deemed  necessary.  I  will 
give  a  more  detailed  one  of  that  of  Athens,  whose 
government  is  now  the  particular  object  of  atten- 
tion. 

The  regulations  which  were  adopted  by  Cecrops 
corresponded  with  the  barbarous  state  in  which  the 
people  of  Athens  then  were,  and  with  the  know- 
ledge which  he  had  acquired  in  Egypt,  the  country 
of  his  nativity.  This  coast  Avas  infested  by  pirates, 
and  the  frontiers  by  banditti  from  the  neighboring 
state  of  Bcetia.  To  protect  the  people  from  these 
invasions,  he  drew  them  together  into  cities,  of 
which  twelve  were  founded;  Athens  being  the  prin- 


178  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEPEIGNS. 

ci^ial  one.  He  transplanted  the  fruits  of  Egypt 
into  Attica,  and  trained  the  inhabitants  to  agri- 
culture, by  showing  them  the  manner,  as  well  as 
the  blessings  resulting  from  it.  I  give  these  details, 
in  which  all  historians  agree,  merely  to  show  the 
rude  state  in  which  the  people  then  were. 

His  political  institutions,  as  might  naturally  be 
expected,  were  few.  He  divided  the  people  into 
tribes,  of  which  he  formed  four,  and  regulated 
marriages  by  law.  In  each  of  the  villages  he 
instituted  a  species  of  corporation,  with  power  to 
administer  justice  for  the  inhabitants  thereof,  and 
he  likewise  gave  it  a  council  for  civil  purposes. 
The  power  of  these  bodies  approached  nearly  to  a 
state  of  independence,  and  formed  in  a  great  mea- 
sure so  many  separate  republics.  Some  writers 
ascribe  to  him  the  institution  of  the  Court  or  Senate 
of  the  Areopagus,  while  others  trace  it  to  his  son. 
It  certainly  owed  its  origin  to  that  epoch,  and 
whether  to  the  father  or  the  son,  in  reference  to  the 
object  in  view,  is  altogether  immaterial.  This  tri- 
bunal was  charged  with  criminal  offenses,  and  was 
preserved  through  every  change  which  afterwards 
occurred  in  the  government  of  Athens,  until  the 
time  of  Solon,  who  adopted  it  in  his  constitution 
with  increased  powers. 

From  the  reign  of  Cecrops  to  the  Constitution  of 
Solon  about  one  thousand  years  intervened.     The 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  179 

reisrns  of  Theseus  and  Codrus  form  the  most  inter- 
esting  epochs  in  the  history  of  that  people  and  of 
their  government  through  that  long  interval.  From 
Cecrops  to  Theseus  nearly  three  centuries  elapsed, 
and  from  the  latter  to  Codrus  rather  a  longer  term. 
The  government  from  the  first  to  the  last  of  these 
princes  continued  to  be  hereditary,  during  which 
seventeen  had  reigned.  When  Theseus  mounted 
the  throne,  the  power  of  the  prince  was  unsettled, 
passing  occasionally  from  one  extreme  to  the  other. 
The  progress  in  science  and  civilization  had  been 
inconsiderable,  while  in  other  respects  the  condition 
and  morals  of  the  people  had  grown  worse.  Agri- 
culture, commerce  and  the  arts  had  been  introduced 
among  them,  the  effect  of  which  was  sensibly  felt 
in  many  ways  by  every  class  of  society.  A  portion 
of  the  people  had  become  very  rich,  and  another 
portion  very  poor.  A  distinction  of  ranks  had 
grown  up  among  them,  founded  on  the  ascendancy 
and  control  which  the  rich  had  acquired  over  the 
poor,  and  which  Avas  promoted  by  the  nature  of 
the  government  itself.  The  spirit  of  equality  and 
independence  which  characterized  the  rude  age  was 
broken.  With  the  poor,  when  not  extinguished  or 
smothered  by  the  degradation  to  which  they  were 
subjected,  it  was  seen  only  in  convulsions  and 
insurrections.  And  with  the  rich,  pretensions  of  a 
different  character,  equally  inconsistent  with    the 


180  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

principles  of  rational  liberty  were  set  up  and  acted 
on.  The  authority  of  the  twelve  villages  which 
had  been  founded  by  Cecrops  had  augmented  to  a 
great  height.  They  often  quarreled  with  and  some- 
times made  war  on  each  other.  The  power  of  the 
prince  alone  could  control  them,  and  that  was  often 
opposed  and  shaken.  Under  these  circumstances, 
the  tendency  Avas  at  one  time  to  anarchy,  and  at 
another  to  despotism. 

Sucli  was  the  state  of  Athens  when  Theseus  suc- 
ceeded his  father  Egeas  as  its  sovereign.  Of  his 
previous  career  it  is  unnecessary  to  treat  here.  He 
lived  in  an  age  which  was  distinguished  by  the 
chivalric  spirit  and  personal  achievements  of  indi- 
viduals, among  whom  he  had  acquired  great  dis- 
tinction, and  it  is  conceded  that  he  sought  consider- 
ation and  fame  in  his  new  and  exalted  station, 
more  by  useful  services  and  concessions  to  his  fel- 
low-men, his  subjects,  than  by  the  augmentation  of 
his  power  at  their  expense.  He  made  many  regu- 
lations, the  great  object  of  which  was  to  improve 
the  condition  of  the  people  by  giving  them  a 
greater  participation  in  the  government.  He  abol- 
ished the  authority  of  the  several  villages,  and 
drew  the  whole  power  into  Athens,  wiiich  he  made 
the  metropolis  of  the  state.  He  vested  the  legisla- 
tive power  in  an  assembly  of  the  people,  whom  he 
divided  into  three  classes:  notables,  agriculturalists 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  181 

and  artisans,  taking  from  the  first  the  principal 
magistrates,  and  committing  to  them  the  charge  of 
religious  duties,  with  the  intei'pretation  of  the  laws. 
He  retained  to  himself,  in  the  character  of  chief 
hereditary  magistrate,  the  command  of  the  military 
force  only,  with  the  supervision  and  execution  of 
the  laws.  AVith  this  arrangement  the  poor  were 
highly  gratified,  and  the  rich,  although  they  were 
dissatisfied,  acquiesced. 

The  interval  between  Theseus  and  Codrus,  rather 
more  than  three  centuries,  was  marked  by  no  signal 
event.  The  government  remained  essentially  in  the 
state  in  which  it  was  placed  by  Theseus,  although 
frequent  dissensions  had  taken  jilace  between  the 
opposite  classes.  The  death  of  Codrus  formed  an 
interesting  ejioch.  The  cause  and  the  manner 
afford  proofs  equally  of  his  devotion  to  his  country, 
of  his  superstition,  and  of  that  of  the  age.  The 
Athenians  were  engaged  in  a  war  with  the  Dorians, 
who  inhabited  the  Peloponnesus,  and  it  being  re- 
ported that  the  oracle  had  declared  that  the  party 
whose  king  should  be  slain  would  succeed,  Codrus 
voluntarily  exposed  himself  in  disguise,  and  was 
killed.  The  Dorians  immediately  retired,  and 
abandoned  the  war.  On  this  event  the  Athenians 
abolished  royalty,  on  the  principle  that  no  human 
being  ought  to  succeed  Codrus.  As  a  substitute  to 
royalty  they  instituted  the  office  of  Archon,  which 

16 


182  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEBEIGNS. 

they  made  hereditary  in  tlie  family  of  Codriis, 
commeneing  with  his  son  Medon,  whom  they  placed 
by  the  side  of  the  throne  under  the  obligation  to 
render  an  account  of  his  administration  to  the 
people.  This  office  passed  in  regular  succession  to 
the  descendants  of  Medon,  about  three  hundred  and 
fifty  years,  when  it  was  made  elective  at  the  expi- 
ration of  every  ten  years.  About  seventy  years 
afterwards  another  more  important  change  was 
made  in  it  by  increasing  the  number  to  nine,  and 
making  the  election  annual. 

Two  other  incidents  occurred  in  the  Government 
of  Athens  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution 
of  Solon,  which  it  is  proper  to  notice.  The  first 
was  formed  by  the  legislation  of  Draco,  which  oc- 
curred about  sixty  years  after  the  change  last  men- 
tioned ;  the  second  by  that  of  Epeminides,  which 
followed  after  that  of  Draco  about  twenty-seven 
years.  The  laws  of  the  first  were  remarkable-  only 
for  their  extreme  severity  and  the  indiscriminate 
character  of  the  punishment,  no  distinction  being 
made  between  great  and  small  offenses.  Every 
crime  was  punished  with  death.  His  code  "was 
letrislative  onlv.  It  did  not  touch  the  government. 
The  laws  of  the  second  were  confined  to  religious 
duties,  which  he  regulated  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
people.     He  was  a  pious  man  from  Crete.     This 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGN'S.  183 

last  agency  preceded  the  Constitution  of  Solon  a  few 
years  only. 

So  great  had  become  the  disorder  in  Athens  at 
this  period  that  the  state  was  menaced  with  ruin. 
The  divisions  between  the  contending  factions  had 
risen  to  such  a  height  that  they  were  ready  to  tear 
each  other  to  pieces.  It  might  reasonably  have 
been  expected,  after  the  village  authorities  were 
abolished,  and  the  whole  people  called  into  one  as- 
sembly by  Theseus,  and  the  legislative  power  vested 
in  them,  that  they  would  have  controlled  the  state 
and  regulated  its  government  and  laws  as  they 
thought  fit:  and  afterwards,  when  royalty  was 
abolished,  and  an  Archon  substituted  for  a  king,  and 
more  especially  when  the  number  was  increased  to 
nine,  and  their  election  made  annual,  it  would  seem 
to  follow  as  a  necessary  consequence  that  all  impedi- 
ment to  their  power  was  removed.  Such  too  would 
have  been  the  result  if  the  people  of  Athens  had 
been  competent  to  self-government.  The  fact,  how- 
ever, was  that  they  were  incompetent,  and  in  con- 
sequence those  changes  operated,  comparatively, 
little  in  their  favor.  It  does  not  appear  that  the 
people  had  a  right  to  originate,  in  any  stage  in  those 
assemblies,  any  law  or  other  act  whatever.  It  may 
be  inferred  that  the  power  was  either  in  the  prince 
or  the  notables;  and  if  in  the  prince,  that  it  passed, 
after  the  abolition  of  royalty,  to  the  Ai-chons,  and 


184  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

as  all  offices  were  secured  to  the  rich,  that  it  always 
belonged  to  that  class.  Hence  it  would  follow  that 
the  power  of  the  king  was  thrown  exclusively  into 
their  hands  by  that  change,  whereby  a  complete 
ascendancy  was  given  to  them  in  the  government 
over  the  poor.  All  writers  agree,  ancient  and 
modern,  in  representing  the  condition  of  the  poor, 
at  that  epoch,  as  deplorable.  So  great  had  become 
the  ascendancy  of  the  rich  that  creditors  sold  their 
debtors  as  slaves  and  compelled  parents  to  sell  their 
children.*  There  were  three  classes  in  the  state  in 
different  circumstances  and  with  different  views. f 
Those  of  the  mountains  who  were  poor,  sought 
democracy;  those  of  the  plain,  who  were  rich, 
aristocracy;  and  those  of  the  coast,  who  held  the 
middle  ground  between  the  two  extremes,  a  mixed 
government.  The  poor  demanded  the  abolition  of 
debts  and  the  equal  division  of  lands,  which  the 
rich  opposed  with  the  utmost  violence.  They  were 
at  the  edge  of  war  and  no  prospect  of  accommoda- 
tion by  arrangement  between  themselves.  In  this 
state  an  appeal  was  made  to  Solon,  and  a  power 
granted  to  him,  by  common  consent,  to  institute  a 
government  for  them. 

It  is  proper  to  remark  that  in  giving  a  sketch  of 
the  government  of  the  ancient  republics,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  do  it  with  that  precision  wliich  may  be 

«  Plutarch,  Vol.  II.  page  29.  Life  of  Solon.       f  Ibid,  page  28. 


THE   PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  185 

observed  in  describing  tlie  Government  of  the 
United  States  or  of  any  of  the  individual  States. 
In  the  latter,  in  both  instances,  the  departments  of 
the  government,  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial, 
are  so  distinctly  separated  from  each  other,  and  the 
poAvers  of  each  so  well  defined,  that  they  may  be 
delineated  with  the  greatest  accuracy.  Each  of 
those  governments  is  an  object,  well  proportioned  in 
all  its  parts,  standing  fully  before  you.  Whereas, 
in  the  former,  powers  different  in  their  nature,  and 
properly  belonging  to  separate  and  independent 
branches,  are  so  involved  and  mixed  together,  vested 
in  and  exercised  by  the  same  body,  that  it  is  difficult 
to  ascertain  what  was  the  precise  extent  or  limit  of 
the  poAvers  of  any  branch,  or  the  true  features  and 
character  of  the  government  in  those  very  important 
circumstances.  This  difficulty  is  seriously  felt  in 
giving  a  sketch  of  the  Constitution  of  Solon.  The 
great  outline  may  be  taken  from  the  works  of  Aris- 
totle and  Plutarch,  and  particularly  the  latter. 
But  other  writers  have  given  details,  which,  under 
certain  circumstances,  affect  the  powers  of  each 
branch,  whence  I  have  not  been  able  to  decide 
whether  they  formed  a  part  of  the  preceding  govern- 
ment, originated  with  him,  or  were  introduced  by 
some  of  the  changes  that  were  afterward  made  in 
it.     Much  light  has  been  shed  on  the  subject  by 

Mr.  Berthelemy,  the  very  able  author  of  the  work 

it)« 


186  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

entitled  "  Aiiachai'sis/'  but  yet  he  has  not  entirely 
removed  the  difficulty.  My  objeet  is  to  present  the 
Constitution  in  its  best  form,  and  to  found  my  re- 
marks on  it  in  that  state,  and  in  doing  this  to  ren- 
der full  justice  to  Solon:  to  withhold  from  him 
nothing  to  which  he  was  justly  entitled;  to  ascribe 
to  him  nothing  which  was  not  strictly  his  own. 

Solon  did  not  enter  on  the  discharge  of  the  duties 
of  the  high  trust  committed  to  him,  by  commencing 
with  its  primary  object,  the  institution  of  the  gov- 
ernment. His  attention  was  drawii  in  the  first 
instance  to  those  of  a  different  character.  He  met 
the  complaints  of  the  contending  pai'ties  by  a  com- 
promise, by  wdiich  he  afforded  to  each  such  accom- 
modation as  he  thought  would  secure  the  peace  of 
the  state.  He  refused  to  make  a  division  of  lands, 
but  abolished  the  debts  of  individuals.*  He  pro- 
hibited also  the  sale  of  any  citizen  for  the  pay- 
ment of  debts.  He  repealed  some  of  the  laws  of 
Draco  and  modified  others.  These  facts  are  men- 
tioned as  evidence  of  the  nature  of  the  power  which 
was  vested  in  Solon,  whereby  that  of  making  laws 
and  instituting  a  government  were  confounded  to- 
crether.  He  was  called  Legislator,  which  shows 
that  no  nice  distinction  was  then  taken  between  a 
constitution  and  a  law. 

»  Plutarch,  Vol.  II.  page  36.  Life  of  Solon.  Gilliss,  Vol.  II. 
page  108. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  187 

The  CTOvermuent  ^vhich  he  instituted  consisted  of 
an  Assembly  of  the  People  and  a  Senate;  of  a  corps 
of  tribunals  or  Courts  of  Justice;  of  a  corps  of 
Archons  or  Magistrates,  and  of  the  Senate  of 
Areopagus.  These  were  the  only  bodies  whose 
powers  gave  a  character  to  the  government.  By  a 
strict  examination  of  the  organization  and  endow- 
ment of  each,  we  shall  be  enabled  to  form  a  correct 
judgment  of  its  merits. 

The  Assembly  of  the  People  consisted  of  the  Avhole 
body  of  the  people,*  every  citizen  above  the  age  of 
twenty  having  a  right  to  a  seat  in  it,  and  no  quali- 
fication of  property  being  necessary.  This  assembly 
had  the  power,  under  the  restraint  which  will  be 
noticed,  to  declare  war,  to  make  peace,  to  receive 
ambassadors,  make  treaties  of  alliance,  adopt  and 
repeal  laws,  establish  imposts,  appoint  all  the  jmn- 
cipal  officers  of  the  state,  to  reward  merit,  and  in 
short  perform  all  the  great  acts  of  the  government. 
Six  thousand  votes  were  necessary  to  the  passage  of 
its  most  important  acts,  and  it  was  a  fundamental 
principle  that  that  number  should  be  present  to 
constitute  an  assembly.  These  powers,  however, 
were  not  absolute.  This  assembly  could  originate 
no  proposition  whatever:  it  could  decide  on  none 

®  Aristotle  on  the  Science  of  Government,  Vol.  I.  Book  2d,  ch. 
10.     Plutarch,  Life  of  Solon,  page  88. 


188  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

nor  act  on  any  but  those  which  were  submitted  to 
it  by  the  senate. 

The  senate  consisted  of  four  hundred  members, 
who  were  appointed  in  the  following  manner: 
The  Republic  of  Athens  comprised  within  its  limits 
a  territory  of  little  more  than  thirty  miles  square. 
The  whole  population  of  the  state  was  divided  into 
four  tribes,  each  of  which  sent  annually  one  hundred 
members  to  that  body.  Rather  more  than  eighty 
years  afterward,  on  the  expulsion  of  the  Pisistra- 
tides,  the  number  of  the  tribes  Avas  increased  to  ten 
by  Clisthenes,  and  the  senate  to  five  hundred,  each 
tribe  numbering  fifty.  They  were  drawn  by  lot.* 
This  body  could  adopt  no  act  by  its  own  authority. 
It  formed  a  complete  check  on  the  Assembly  of  the 
People  since  the  latter  could  take  up  none  which 
had  not  been  discussed,  approved,  and  submitted  to 
it  by  the  senate,  f 

As  every  important  measure  depended  on  the 
sanction  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  People, 
frequent  meetings  were  indispensable.  It  was  pro- 
vided therefore  by  the  Constitution,  that  it  should 
meet  for  the  discharge  of  its  ordinary  duties  four 
times  in  every  thirty -five  or  thirty-six  days,  the 
precise  day  of  meeting  being  adapted  to  the  organi- 
zation and  arrangements  of  the  senate.     To  each 

®  Anacharsis,  Vol.  II.  page  274. 
I  Plutarch  :  Life  of  Solon,  page  42. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEBEIGNS. 


189 


meeting  special  duties  were  assigned  by  a  distribu- 
tion between  them  of  the  subjects  on  which  the 
assembly  had  a  right  to  act.  In  the  first  they  con- 
firmed or  rejected  the  magistrates  who  were  to  enter 
into  ofiice,  examined  the  condition  of  the  garrisons, 
heard  denunciations,  and  published  an  account  of 
the  confiscations  which  had  been  decreed  by  the 
tribunals.  In  the  second  they  heard  the  discourses 
of  every  citizen  who  thought  proper  to  address  them 
on  public  affairs.  In  the  third  they  received  am- 
bassadors who  had  been  presented  to  the  senate. 
In  the  fourth  they  attended  to  concerns  of  a  pious 
nature,  such  as  holy  feasts  and  sacrifices. 

Extraordinary  assemblies  were  convened  when- 
ever a  public  emergency  required  it.  On  these  oc- 
casions, and  especially  when  the  state  was  menaced 
with  invasion,  it  was  expected  that  the  whole  body 
of  the  people  would  attend. 

On  the  first  meeting  of  the  senate,  after  every  new 
election,  it  was  divided  into  ten  classes,  each  of  which 
in  succession  took  the  lead  in  public  affairs  for  an 
equal  term,  the  priority  being  decided  by  lot.  This 
class  was  entertained  at  the  public  expense  at  a 
place  called  Prytancum,  and  was  from  that  circum- 
stance called  the  Prytanus.  It  was  subdivided 
into  five  others,  the  members  of  each  of  which  were 
called  Presidents.  Special  duties  were  assigned  to 
each  in  succession.     Tlic'one  in  service  presided  in 


190  TEE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

the  senate  one  clay  and  performed  the  usual  duties 
of  that  station.  He  also  held  the  seal  of  the  re- 
public, the  keys  of  the  capitol  and  of  the  treasury 
for  that  day. 

The  nine  other  classes  of  the  senate  had  also  each 
at  its  head  a  President,  who  was  changed  at  every 
meeting  of  the  class,  and  the  successor  drawn  by  lot 
by  the  chief  of  the  Prytanus.  These  presidents 
carried  occasionally  the  decrees  of  the  senate  to  the 
assembly  of  the  people,  and  the  chief  among  them 
took  their  votes.  On  other  occasions  the  chief  of 
the  Prytanus,  or  one  of  his  assistants,  performed 
that  office.  The  Prytanus  convened  the  senate  and 
prepared  subjects  for  its  deliberation.  As  the  senate 
represented  the  tribes,  the  Prytanus  represented  in 
turn  the  senate.  It  was  the  duty  of  that  class  to 
watch  over  the  dangers  of  the  republic  and  to  warn 
the  senate  of  any  menacing  circumstance.  The 
chiefs  of  the  senate  presided  in  the  assembly  of  the 
people,  and  when  important  subjects  were  agitated, 
the  whole  body  attended. 

These  assemblies  had  not  the  power  in  them- 
selves to  repeal  an  ancient  law  or  to  pass  a  new 
one.  Very  extraordinary  restraints  were  imposed  on 
them,  and  forms  were  prescribed  for  the  exercise  of 
the  power  vested  in  them  in  every  instance.  The 
right  to  submit  propositions  to  the  consideration  of 
the  senate  was  not  confined  to  the  members  of  that 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  191 

body.  Any  citizen  might  j^ropose  to  it  the  repeal 
of  an  ancient  law  if  he  presented  at  the  same  time  a 
substitute  for  it.  If  the  senate  approved  the  propo- 
sition it  was  communicated  to  the  assembly  of  the 
people,  and  to  that  meeting  which  was  charged  Math 
the  examination  of  the  existing  laws,  which  met  on 
the  eleventh  day  of  the  first  month  in  each  year. 
If  it  should  appear  to  this  assembly  that  the  law 
ought  to  be  repealed,  the  Prytanus  sent  the  project 
to  the  assembly,  which  met  nineteen  days  after- 
wards, and  in  the  meantime  published  it  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  people.  Five  orators  were  then 
appointed  to  attend  the  assembly  to  defend  before 
it  the  law  which  was  attacked.  Even  this  assem- 
bly could  not  decide  the  question.  It  appointed 
Commissioners  or  Legislators,  sometimes  one  thou- 
sand and  one,  who  were  united  with  the  Court  of 
Keliastes,  the  nature  of  which  will  hereafter  be  ex- 
plained, and  who  thus  united  formed  a  tribunal 
before  which  those  who  attacked  and  those  who 
defended  the  law  appeared  and  performed  their 
resi^ective  duties.  This  tribunal  might  repeal  the 
old  law  without  referring  it  back  to  the  assembly 
of  the  people.  They  then  examined  the  substitute 
proposed,  and  if  they  approved  it,  might  either  con- 
firm it  themselves  or  submit  it  to  the  General  As- 
sembly of  the  People. 

Such  were  the  powers  of  the  General  Assembly 


192  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

of  the  People  and  of  the  Senate  witli  the  organiza- 
tion of  each  body  and  mode  of  communication  be- 
tween them.  Attention  is  now  due  to  the  other 
bodies  which  formed  a  part  of  this  government, 
and  in  the  first  instance  to  that  of  the  tribunals  or 
courts  of  justice  which  on  a  well-digested  principle 
is  the  next  in  order. 

Of  these  tribunals  there  were  ten,  most  of  which 
consisted  of  five  hundred  judges,  and  some  of  a 
greater  number.  The  judges  of  these  courts  were 
drawn  by  lot  annually  by  the  Archons  from  the 
body  of  the  people.  No  qualification  of  property  was 
required  for  either  Court.  Four  of  them  had  juris- 
diction of  the  crime  of  murder  under  the  classifica- 
tion of  accidental,  self-defense,  etc.  No  regular 
time  was  fixed  for  the  meeting  of  these  courts.  The 
Archons  had  the  power  to  convene  them  when  in 
their  judgment  the  duties  of  the  department  required 
it.  As  these  judicial  assemblies,  for  such  with  great 
propriety  they  might  be  called,  were  taken  from 
the  body  of  the  people  and  formed  a  large  portion 
of  the  same  persons  who  constituted  the  general  as- 
semblies of  the  people,  it  was  necessary  that  their 
meetings  should  not  interfere  with  each  other,  and 
to  prevent  which  interference  power  was  given  to 
the  Archons  to  fix  the  time  of  their  meeting. 

Of  these  ten  tribunals  that  of  the  Keliastes  was 
the  most  distinguished.     It  consisted   usnallv  of 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEPEIGNS.  193 

five  hundred  judges,  but  on  great  occasions  by  the 
reunion  of  the  other  tribunals  by  order  of  the 
Archons  the  number  amounted  to  six  thousand. 
These  judges  took  the  oath  to  be  governed  in  their 
decisions  by  the  laws  and  decrees  of  the  senate  and 
people — to  be  impartial — to  accept  no  present,  and 
to  support  the  government  in  its  then  form. 

The  delays  and  expenses  of  attending  trials  before 
these  courts  induced  many  to  submit  their  cases  to 
arbitration,  and  for  which,  the  necessity  being  anti- 
cipated, provision  was  made  by  the  constitution. 

The  corps  of  Archons  consisted  of  nine  members, 
who  were  elected  annually  by  the  people,  who 
assembled  on  the  last  four  days  of  each  year  for  the 
purpose.  Any  citizen  who  had  borne  arms  in 
defense  of  his  country,  who  had  the  requisite  qual- 
ification in  property,  and  who  enjoyed  a  fair  repu- 
tation by  the  test  of  a  strict  examination  in  the 
form  prescribed,  might  be  elected  to  this  office.  It 
was  the  duty  of  these  officers  to  preserve  order  in 
the  city  and  to  receive  in  the  first  instance  public 
denunciations  and  the  complaints  of  the  oppressed. 
The  first  three  formed  each  a  special  tribunal,  in 
which  two  assessors  chosen  by  the  person  himself 
assisted.  The  six  others  called  Thermothetes  formed 
a  single  tribunal  only.  To  these  tribunals  different 
causes  were  assigned.     The  first  was  charged  with 

the  concerns  of  widows  and  orphans.     The  second 
17 


194  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGN'S. 

with  the  protection  of  religious  ceremonies  from 
viokition.  The  third  with  the  supervision  of  for- 
eigners in  the  city.  The  last  consisting  of  the  six 
other  members  fixed  the  days  on  which  the  Superior 
Courts  should  hold  their  sessions,  and  formed  a 
police  for  the  preservation  of  order  in  the  city. 
The  Archons  who  formed  Courts  carried  to  the 
proper  tribunals  the  causes  of  which  they  had 
respectively  cognizance,  and  presided  in  the  trial. 

The  people  elected  at  the  same  time  with  the 
Archons  the  generals  of  the  army,  infantry  and 
cavalry;  those  who  were  charged  with  the  receipt 
and  safe-keeping  of  the  public  money;  with  the 
supply  of  the  city;  with  the  repair  of  the  public 
roads;  and  with  other  duties  of  less  importance. 
A  chamber  of  accounts,  composed  of  ten  officers, 
was  also  chosen  every  year,  and  to  whom  the 
Archons,  the  members  of  the  senate,  the  command- 
ers of  the  gallies,  ambassadors,  ministers  of  the 
altars,  and  all  others  employed  in  the  administra- 
tion were  bound  to  render  an  account  of  the  sums 
which  they  had  received,  and  of  the  disbursement 
thereof. 

For  the  senate  and  these  officers  a  qualification 
of  property  was  required  in  those  wlio  held  them, 
and  with  that  view  he  divided  the  citizens  into 
four  classes,  the  first  of  which  consisted  of  those 
who  owned  property  worth  annually  five  hundred 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  195 

measures  of  grain  or  oil;  the  second  three  hundred; 
the  third  two  hundred;  the  fourth  of  all  others 
whose  property  was  of  less  value  than  the  sum  last 
mentioned,  which  latter  were  excluded  from  every 
office. 

The  senate  of  Areopagus  was  likewise  incorpo- 
rated into  this  government  by  Solon.  The  office 
was  for  life.  The  Ai'chons  after  their  term  of 
service  had  expired,  who  could  prove  that  they  had 
discharged  the  duties  of  that  trust  with  integrity, 
became  members  of  that  body.  They  were  censors 
over  the  public  morals;  had  charge  of  almost  every 
crime:  homicide,  arson,  poisoning,  theft,  debauch- 
ery, and  likewise  of  innovations  in  the  government 
and  religion. 

Such  was  the  government  of  Athens  as  instituted 
by  Solon  according  to  the  view  which  I  have  taken 
of  it  from  the  works  of  the  most  enlightened 
authors,  ancient  and  modern.  It  will,  I  am  per- 
suaded, be  found  that  no  material  feature  has  been 
omitted  or  misrepresented.  Such  likewise  was  the 
state  of  society  in  which  that  people  were  when 
that  government  was  instituted.  On  this  subject, 
therefore,  in  both  views  I  shall  make  the  remarlcs 
in  execution  of  the  Avork  I  have  undertaken,  which 
appear  to  me  to  be  proper. 

It  will  I  think  be  easy  to  show  that  this  govern- 
ment was  altogether  an  impracticable  one;  that  no 


196  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEBEIGNS. 

government  thus  organized  and  endowed  could 
manage  the  concerns  of  a  state,  however  small  it 
might  be,  and  that  disorder,  convulsion,  and  its 
overthrow  were  inevitable.  It  will  be  equally  easy 
to  show  that  although  the  government  was  strictly 
democratical,  the  whole  arrangement  was  in  many 
important  circumstances  as  inconsistent  with  prin- 
ciple as  it  was  with  policy.  As  this  government 
has  been  referred  to  by  all  writers  on  the  subject  of 
government  through  the  whole  intermediate  space 
since  its  adoption,  comprising  U2:)wards  of  two 
thousand  four  hundred  years,  as  furnishing  the  best 
model  of  this  class,  it  will  be  proper  to  state  fully 
the  objections  which  occur  to  it.  Its  fate  has  been 
urged  as  a  proof  that  no  government  founded  on 
the  sovereignty  of  the  people  can  be  sustained.  It 
will  be  seen  on  the  contrary  that  so  numerous  and 
vital  were  its  defects,  that  no  inference  whatever 
unfavorable  to  our  system  can  with  j)ropriety  be 
drawn  from  it.  I  shall  nevertheless  be  as  concise  as 
possible,  for  so  glaring  and  obvious  were  its  defects, 
that  the  mere  development  which  has  been  given 
of  its  parts  might  be  sufficient  for  my  fellow-citizens 
aided  as  they  are  by  the  light  of  our  experience. 

In  forming  a  just  estimate  of  the  merits  of  this 
government  we  must  first  decide  to  what  class  it 
belonoed.  That  beins'  fixed,  the  organization  and 
distribution  of  its  powers  will  next   ■^- im  attention. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  197 

That  the  sovereignty  was  in  the  people  cannot,  it 
is  presumed,  be  controverted.  That  there  was  but 
one  order  in  the  government,  that  of  the  people. 
The  whole  power  was  vested  in  them.  The  senate 
had  no  pretension  to  any  right  distinct  from  the 
people.  The  members  were  elected  annually,  and 
by  lot.  The  Archons  had  none,  nor  had  the  Areo- 
pagus. The  first  were  elected  annually,  and  the 
second  derived  their  appointment  from  election,  the 
Archons  becoming  such  after  their  term  of  service 
had  expired.  The  qualification  in  property  required 
for  the  senators  and  other  officers  did  not  affect 
the  case,  because  any  citizen  who  acquired  it  was 
eligible,  and  such  changes  from  the  one  to  the  other 
state  in  every  community  are  unceasing.  The 
poor  acquire  property  and  become  rich,  and  the  rich 
lose  it. 

To  the  latter  objects,  the  organization  and  endow- 
ments of  the  government,  my  attention  will  now  be 
directed.  By  a  like  view  of  the  above  sketch  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  government  was  united  with  the 
sovereignty.  All  the  great  powers  of  the  govern- 
ment were  vested  in  a  General  Assembly  of  the 
People  consisting  of  the  whole  male  population  of 
the  state,  or  otherwise  so  concentrated  in  and  exer- 
cised by  them  as  to  produce  the  same  result.  The 
mere  enumeration  which  has  been  given  of  the 
powers  vested  in  that  Assembly  shows  that  all  those 

17  * 


198  THE   PEOPLE    THE  S0VEBEIGN8. 

which  were  legislative  and  executive  belonged  to  it; 
and  from  a  view  of  the  organization  of  the  courts 
of  justice  and  manner  of  electing  the  judges,  it  is 
equally  manifest  that  although  the  people  who  com- 
posed them  met  at  other  lines  and  at  another  place, 
they  were  members  of  and  fonued  a  large  portion 
of  that  Assembly,  and  as  may  be  inferred,  some- 
times the  whole;  and  in  consequence  that  the  judi- 
cial power  was  as  much  vested  in  it  as  if  it  had 
been  done  in  express  terms.  A  check  was  formed 
by  the  senate  on  the  exercise  of  these  powers,  but  it 
was  of  a  nature  to  affect  only  the  manner  of  exer- 
cising them,  and  not  the  deposit  or  right  of  the 
Assembly  to  the  powers  themselves. 

As  these  two  features,  the  exercise  of  the  govern- 
ment by  the  whole  male  population  of  the  state, 
and  the  union  by  means  thereof  of  the  government 
with  the  sovereignty,  gave  the  character  to  and 
essentially  formed  the  government,  I  shall  state  the 
objections  which  occur  to  each  in  the  first  instance, 
and  then  proceed  with  a  like  view  to  the  other 
branches.  As  I  consider  the  defects  in  tliese  two 
circumstances  radical,  it  will  become  an  object  of 
inquiry  in  the  analysis  of  the  other  branches, 
whether  they  were  so  formed  as  to  mitigate  in  any 
decree  the  evils  incident  to  those  defects  or  to  give 
them  greater  force.  That  they  produced  the  latter 
effect  is  according  to  my  judgment  certain. 


THE  PEOFLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  199 

When  we  hear  that  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
People  consisted  of  the  Avhole  male  population  of 
the  state,  and  that  the  attendance  of  six  thousand 
persons  Avas  requisite  to  form  a  meeting,  the  con- 
viction is  prompt  that  the  government  was  alto- 
getlier  impracticable.  The  nundier  alone  would 
have  that  effect.  A¥e  have  all  seen  collections  of 
this  kind,  and  know  from  experience  how  incapable 
they  are  of  discharging  the  duties  of  any  branch  of 
a  government,  and  how  much  more  so  they  would 
be  to  discharge  those  of  every  branch  in  all  its  con- 
cerns, foreign  and  domestic.  It  would  be  impos- 
sible to  preserve  order  in  such  an  assembly  in  the 
discussion  of  the  subjects  brought  before  it,  without 
subjecting  it  to  a  kind  of  military  discipline,  which 
would  be  incompatible  with  its  rights.  And  if 
order  could  be  preserved  all  the  members  could  not 
hear  the  debate  nor  understand  the  merits  of  the 
subject  under  consideration.  If  all  spoke  during 
the  meeting,  or  a  large  proportion  of  them,  the  ses- 
sion would  be  endless.  No  rule  could  be  enforced 
without  a  vote  of  the  majority,  and  to  ascertain  that 
in  a  single  instance  much  time  would  be  consumed. 
On  certain  occasions  and  for  special  objects  numer- 
ous assemblies  of  the  people  have  a  very  useful 
effect.  When  serious  dangers  menace  the  republic, 
or  great  emergencies  of  any  kind  occur,  it  is  natural 
and  proper  for  the  people  to  meet  together  and  de- 


200  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

clare  their  sentiments  respecting  them.  From  sueh 
declaration  the  government  may  derive  advantage, 
because  it  shows  the  support  which  may  be  calcu- 
lated on  if  the  course  designated  be  pursued.  But 
even  on  such  occasions  the  debate  must,  be  managed 
by  a  few,  or  the  proceeding  would  be  marked  with 
clamor,  disorder  and  violence. 

Other  objections  occur  to  the  practicability  of  a 
government  vested  in  such  numerous  assemblies, 
which  are  equally  decisive.  The  people  at  large 
cannot  spare  the  time,  however  limited  the  territory, 
which  a  proper  discharge  of  its  duties  will  require. 
Their  jirivate  concerns  in  the  various  occupations  in 
which  they  are  engaged,  Avith  the  care  of  their 
families,  forbid  it  unless  an  adequate  compensation 
is  allowed  for  the  service.  Whence  could  this  be 
drawn  ?  The  revenue  of  a  state  is  derived  from  the 
profits  of  labor,  and  if  there  be  no  labor  there  can 
be  no  profits.  If  a  trifling  compensation  be  allowed, 
none  but  the  poor  would  accept  it,  and  those  in 
the  most  Avretched  state,  and  thus  the  government 
would  be  thrown  into  the  hands  of  those  least  com- 
petent to  it,  the  consequence  of  which  would  be 
fatal. 

I  consider  this  feature  alone,  the  number  of  which 
the  General  Assembly  was  composed,  as  decisive 
against  this  constitution.  No  government  consist- 
ing of  such  a  number  can  be  practicable.    Its  failure, 


THE  PEOrLE   THE  SOVEBEIGIs'S.  201 

had  there  been  no  other  objection  to  it  was  inevita- 
ble, and  the  only  cause  for  surprise  is  that  it  was 
not  instantaneous. 

The  objections  which  apply  on  principle  to  the 
union  of  the  government  with  the  sovereignty  are 
equally  strong.  When  the  government  is  united 
with  the  sovereignty  there  can  be  no  checks  what- 
ever on  the  government.  All  its  acts  being  those  of 
the  sovereign  power  as  well  as  of  the  government 
are  conclusive.  It  is  the  sovereign  power  alone 
that  can  form  such  check,  and  when  it  is  vested  in 
those  who  hold  the  government  and  exercise  its 
powers  all  check  is  gone.  The  party  who  acts  in  the 
government  and  exercises  its  powers  is  responsible  to 
no  one  for  his  conduct.  There  is  no  superior  to 
call  him  to  account.  Each  individual  holds  an 
equal  portion  of  the  sovereignty,  as  well  as  of  the 
government,  and  if  he  votes  Avith  the  majority  and 
carries  the  measure  proposed,  he  has  both  the  con- 
stitution and  the  law  on  his  side  be  its  character 
what  it  may._  If  in  the  minority  and  he  is  dissatis- 
fied, and  shows  it,  the  worst  consequences  may  ensue. 

When  these  two  powers  are  united  in  the  people 
there  can  be  no  regular  division  of  power  into  three 
branches  distinct  and  independent  of  each  other. 
The  whole  will  be  in  one  body,  that  is,  in  the 
General  Assembly  of  the  People,  >vho  will  control 
every  measure  of  every  department.     Thus  all  the 


202  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

powers  of  government,  legislative,  executive  and 
judicial,  will  be  concentrated  in  the  same  body, 
a  concentration  wliicli  all  political  writers  agree  is 
despotic,  and  which  experience  has  shown  is  not 
less  so  when  united  in  the  people,  by  the  abuses 
inseparable  from  it  than  in  one  individual,  and  for 
a  reason  which  must  strike  the  common  sense  of  all 
mankind,  that  in  the  latter  instance  the  individual 
when  his  acts  are  oppressive  will  have  the  whole 
people  against  him;  whereas  in  the  other  the  majo- 
rity will  stand  together  and  support  each  other. 
If  a  diversity  of  interests  exist,  from  whatever  cause 
proceeding,  the  majority  will  look  to  its  own,  and 
make  laws  subservient  to  it.  If  differences  had  oc- 
curred and  much  acrimony  been  excited,  as  often 
happens  and  from  a  variety  of  causes,  the  oppression 
of  the  minority  would  be  certain.  Every  citizen 
of  the  state  is  not  competent  to  the  discharge  of  the 
duties  of  its  highest  offices,  or  of  any  office  whatever. 
Many  are  unfit  for  other  reasons  than  the  mere 
want  of  suitable  qualifications.  To  commit  to  the 
unlettered,  ignorant,  and  vicious,  trusts  whose  duties 
require  the  highest  talents  and  greatest  virtue, 
would  be  to  sacrifice  the  interests  of  the  community, 
to  abandon  all  respect  for  principle  or  character. 
Unite  the  sovereignty  with  the  government,  and 
deprive  the  latter  of  all  check  in  an  Assembly 
whose  poM^er  would  be  absolute  and  uncontrolled, 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  203 

and  the  overthrow  of  the  government  would  be  in- 
evitable. It  has  already  been  shown  that  such 
large  masses  were  by  their  number  alone  incompe- 
tent to  the  duties  of  any  branch  of  a  government, 
even  that  which  required  the  greatest  number. 
When  these  other  objections  are  duly  considered, 
what  must  be  the  conclusion  ?  It  must  be  obvious 
that  such  an  assembly  could  not  act  or  think  for  itself; 
that  the  majority  would  yield  to  a  leader  who  by  sub- 
serving their  purposes  had  acquired  their  confidence, 
and  who  at  a  favorable  moment  would  make  use  of 
them  for  the  accomplishment  of  his  own  purposes. 

Such  are  the  objections  which  occur  to  these  two 
featui'cs  in  this  government;  the  number  of  persons 
of  which  the  General  Assembly  was  composed,  and 
the  union  of  the  government  with  the  sovereignty. 
I  wall  now  state  those  which  apply  to  the  other 
branches,  and  first  to  the  Senate. 

The  Senate  had  the  right,  as  had  been  shown,  to 
originate  every  proposition  on  which  the  General 
Assembly  could  act.  Its  powers  were  therefore 
commensurate  in  that  respect  with  those  of  that 
Assembly.  To  form  a  just  estimate  of  thfe  compe- 
tency of  this  body  to  fulfil  the  purposes  intended 
by  it,  we  must  take  into  view  not  only  the  nature 
and  extent  of  its  powers  with  its  organization,  but 
the  relation  Avhich  it  bore  to  the  other  branch,  the 
General  Assembly  of  the  People.     The  one  con- 


204  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

sistcd  of  the  whole  male  population  of  the  state  in 
whom  tlie  soji^ereignty  was  vested ;  the  other  of  four 
hundred,  who  were  elected  by  the  tribes  by  lot. 
This  arrangement,  according  to  every  idea  which 
we  have  formed  of  the  organization  of  Democrat- 
ical  Government  was  utterly  repugnant  to  prin- 
ci^ile.  The  powers  of  the  Senate  comprised  every 
interest  within  the  scope  of  the  legislative  and  exe- 
cutive departments.  Examine  its  competency  in 
reference  to  the  duties  of  either,  and  how  will  it 
bear  the  test?  When  the  legislature  of  such  a 
government  is  formed  into  two  branches,  the  right 
to  ori«:inate  all  laws  and  other  measures  within  the 
limit  of  its  powers  is  invariably  committed  to  the 
most  popular  one,  and  if  restraint  is  imposed  on 
either,  it  is  always  on  the  less  numerous.  The 
reason  for  it  is  much  stronger  when  that  branch  is 
composed  of  the  people  themselves.  To  institute  a 
government  on  that  principle  and  in  that  form,  and 
to  enjoin  on  the  people  to  whom  the  sovereignty 
befonged,  silence,  until  they  heard  from  another 
body,  would  be  to  announce  to  them  that  they  were 
incompetent  to  the  duties  assigned  to  them,  and 
were  called  there  merely  as  instruments  in  the 
hands  of  such  body.  From  such  an  arrangement 
discontent  and  disorder  would  be  sure  to  ensue.  It 
might  be  expected  that  at  every  meeting  the  people 
would  break  through  such  restraint  and  take  the 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEBEIGNS.  205 

power  into  their  own  liands,  or  tliat  in  some  other 
manner  the  government  would  be  dissolved. 

The  number  of  which  the  Senate  consisted  w'as 
too  great  for  any  of  the  duties  assigned  to  it.  It 
was  too  great  for  the  popular  branch  of  the  legisla- 
ture of  such  a  state.  I  may  add  that  it  was  sufficient 
for  that  branch  of  the  legislature  of  any  state,  how- 
ever great  its  population  or  extent  of  territory  may 
be.  How  utterly  incompetent  then  must  it  have 
been  for  the  management  of  the  duties  assigned  to 
it,  and  especially  those  of  an  executive  nature. 

By  dividing  the  Senate  into  ten  classes  each  of 
equal  number,  and  giving  to  each  in  succession 
during  its  term  of  service  thirty-five  or  thirty-six 
days,  the  right  to  propose  subjects  for  the  delibera- 
tion of  the  body,  and  to  take  the  lead  in  its  affairs 
in  all  other  concerns,  the  object  undoubtedly  was  to 
give  greater  activity  and  efficiency  to  the  whole 
body  in  the  discharge  of  all  its  duties.  The  ar- 
rangement, however,  could  not  fail  to  defeat  the 
object.  By  permitting  the  class  in  service  called 
the  Prytanean  Corps,  to  serve  for  thirty-five  or 
thirty-six  days  only,  and  to  be  succeeded  by  a  like 
number  for  a  like  term,  and  so  on  by  the  others 
until  the  whole  number  had  had  their  turn,  and  the 
year  expired,  would  render  it  impossible  for  any  of 
them  to  acquire  the  knowledge  necessary  for  the 
discharge  of  any  of  the  duties.     That  a  provision 


20B  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

should  have  been  made  by  the  constitution  for  a 
division  of  the  Senate  into  classes,  with  the  assign- 
ment of  duties  to  each  class,  seems  strange.  If 
extensive  powers  are  given  to  any  branch  or  de- 
partment of  a  government  of  whatever  nature  they 
may  be,  the  more  that  branch  is  left  at  liberty  to 
devise  the  means  of  carrying  them  into  effect,  and 
the  more  complete  its  control  over  those  by  whom 
the  duty  must  be  performed,  in  the  selection  of 
proper  agents,  and  supervision  of  their  conduct, 
especially  if  of  its  own  members,  the  better  will  be 
the  prospect  of  success,  and  the  greater  the  responsi- 
bility of  both  parties  in  the  case  of  failure,  to  the 
proper  head.  By  the  arrangement  made  these  ad- 
vantages were  lost,  for  by  making  the  class  consist 
of  the  precise  number  which  each  tribe  sent  to  the 
Senate,  and  as  may  be  presumed,  of  the  very  mem- 
bers thereof,  it  would  seem  as  if  the  government 
of  that  body  was  more  a  government  of  the  tribes, 
each  in  succession,  than  of  a  Senate  of  the  Republic, 
the  ill  effect  of  which  may  easily  be  conceived. 

The  mode  of  proceeding  in  the  passage  of  laws 
is  a  feature  in  this  government  of  a  singular  char- 
acter. The  forms  to  be  observed  were  so  compli- 
cated, and  the  bodies  to  whom  the  bills  or  projects 
were  to  be  submitted,  so  numerous  and  different 
from  the  ordinary  course  of  legislation,  as  were  the 
persons  who  had  the  right  to  present  such  projects, 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  207 

that  it  seems  difficult  to  form  any  just  estimate  of 
the  real  objects  of  the  legislator.  That  which  I 
have  formed  from  a  view  of  the  whole  subject  is, 
that  he  intended  for  the  term  specified  to  shut  the 
door  against  all  change  of  every  kind.  By  giving 
to  any  and  every  citizen  the  right  to  present  to  the 
Senate  a  proposition  for  the  adoption  or  repeal  of  a 
law,  every  citizen  was  for  that  great  purpose  placed 
on  the  same  footing  with  the  members  of  that 
house,  and  in  consequence  the  obligation  on  the 
members  and  on  the  body  generally,  to  supervise 
the  police  of  the. state  in  the  operation  of  the  laws, 
as  to  their  merit  or  defect  was  diminished  if  not 
entirely  annulled.  By  opening  the  door  thus  wide 
to  improvement,  it  might  be  inferred  at  first  view 
that  great  encouragement  and  facility  had  been 
given  to  it.  But  the  eifect  could  not  well  fail  to  be 
otherwise.  It  is  a  maxim  which  we  often  hear 
repeated  in  the  common  concerns  of  life,  that  what 
is  the  business  of  every  one  is  that-  of  no  one:  a 
maxim  which  I  think  is  founded  in  reason,  and 
particularly  applicable  to  the  present  case.  The 
subsequent  process  was  calculated  to  produce  the 
same  effect,  as  neither  the  Assembly  of  the  People, 
or  Senate,  in  their  character  as  such,  were  by  the 
ordinary  rules  and  principles  applicable  to  legisla- 
tive bodies  responsible  for  the  final  decision,  either 
by  the  adoption  or  rejection  of  the  project,  they 


208  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

could  feel  in  that  capacity  little  solicitude  respecting 
it.  The  trial  to  which  the  author  of  the  project 
was  subjected,  and  the  punishment  which  might  be 
inflicted  on  him  if  the  decision  should  be  adverse 
to  its  policy,  could  not  fail  to  damp  the  zeal  of  all 
parties,  as  to  any  change  so  far,  at  least,  as  to  take 
the  responsibility  on  themselves,  let  the  state  of 
affairs  be  what  it  might. 

If  we  ask  the  motive  for  those  restraints,  the  fol- 
lowing occurs:  the  sovereignty  being  in  the  people, 
and  they  constituting  also  the  government,  and  hav- 
ing in  consequence  the  right  to  alter  the  constitution 
as  well  as  the  laws,  it  was  deemed  indispensable  to 
preserve  the  constitution,  to  oppose  almost  insur- 
mountable obstacles  to  the  passage  of  laws.  It  is 
obvious  that  Solon  had  no  confidence  in  the  capacity 
of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  People  to  perform 
the  duties  assigned  to  it,  and  that  he  also  thought 
if  he  did  not  restrain  it  from  making  any  change 
whatever,  that  the  constitution  which  he  had 
formed  would  be  of  short  duration.  He  preferred 
the  Democratical  principle;  but  in  instituting  the 
government  on  that  principle,  although  he  did  it  in 
the  most  popular  form  that  could  be  devised,  by 
vesting  all  the  great  powers  of  the  government  in 
the  people  and  making  them  act  in  the  discharge  of 
those  powers  collectively,  he  subjected  them  in  the 
mode  prescribed  to  such  restraints  as  made  them  pas- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEEEIGNS.  209 

sive  rather  than  active  agents  in  it.  It  was  doubtless 
for  tliis  reason,  that  the  right  to  originate  proposi- 
tions was  inhibited  to  the  Assembly  of  the  Peojjle, 
and  vested  in  the  Senate,  and  for  the  same  reason 
that  it  was  vested  in  a  company  or  class  of  that 
body,  rather  than  in  the  body  at  large. 

The  judiciary  is  the  branch  which  claims  atten- 
tion next  in  the  order  stated,  and  which  it  will  be 
found  merits  the  remarks  already  made  respecting 
it.  It  had  a  species  of  organization,  but  not  such 
as  to  make  it  an  independent  corps  distinct  from 
the  General  Assembly  of  the  People.  It  formed  a 
portion  of  that  Assembly,  and  often  as  may  be 
fairly  concluded  a  great  majority,  if  not  the  whole. 
It  consisted  of  ten  courts  composed,  each,  generally 
of  five  hundred  judges  who  were  chosen  by  lot 
from  the  body  of  the  peoj)le,  and  some  of  them, 
particularly  that  of  the  Keliastes,  on  im])ortant  oc- 
casions of  six  thousand.  The  concentration,  there- 
fore, of  the  judicial  with  the  legislative  and  execu- 
tive powers  in  the  General  Assembly  of  the  People 
was  complete.  The  objections  which  apply  to  the 
organization  in  other  respects  are  equally  decisive. 
The  sentiment  is  universal  that  justice  cannot  be 
rendered  unless  those  who  administer  it  possess  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  law  as  it  is;  that  such 
knowledge  can  be  acquired  only  by  long  study  and 
practice   in    the    discharge  of   professional    duties. 

18  « 


210  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

Numerous  assemblies  can  never  form  wise  and  safe 
judicial  tribunals.  They  can  neither  possess  the 
requisite  knowledge  of  the  law,  nor  be  capable  of 
that  calm  deliberation  which  is  so  necessary  to  a 
proper  discharge  of  the  duties  of  the  trust.  Strong 
appeals  will  be  made  in  every  important  case  and 
at  every  meeting  by  skillful  orators,  to  their  feel- 
ings under  the  influence  of  which  their  decision 
will  often  be  rendered  without  regard  to  principle, 
and  in  direct  opposition  to  judgments  previously 
rendered  in  similar  cases.  Experience  has  shoAvn 
that  even  for  the  most  extensive  and  populous  com- 
munities the  courts  of  justice  should  consist  of  a 
few  members  only,  who  should  be  selected  from  the 
whole  society  for  their  talents  and  virtues,  and 
particularly  those  which  qualify  them  for  the  office. 
Tliey  should  likewise  hold  office  during  good  be- 
haviour, or  at  least  so  long  as  they  were  able  to 
discharge  the  duties.  When  courts  are  thus  orga- 
nized and  composed  of  such  men  they  are  entitled 
to,  and  command  the  confidence  of  the  nation. 
Their  decisions  stand  together  and  form  a  consistent 
and  compact  system  which  all  approve.  The  judges 
are  detached  from  and  unconnected  with  local  and 
political  circles.  They  have  no  points  to  carry,  nor 
motive  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  generally  under- 
stood to  court  popular  favor.  They  represent  the 
nation  of  whom  they  take  nothing  but  its  good 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  211 

opinion,  founded  on  tlic  rectitude  and  wisdom  of 
tlieir  decisions. 

By  the  powers  vested  in  the  corps  of  Archons,  it 
appears  that  they  were  altogether  of  a  character 
judicial  and  ministerial.  This  corps  had  long  formed, 
as  has  been  shown,  a  part  of  the  existing  govern- 
ment of  that  people.  It  had  been  substituted  for 
monarchy  and  was  connected  with  the  idea  of  liberty, 
and  preserved  as  may  fairly  be  inferred,  more  in  ac- 
commodation with  the  prejudices  of  the  people  than 
for  any  other  cause.  When  so  many  courts  of  justice 
were  instituted,  it  cannot  but  excite  surprise  that  he 
should  have  taken  from  them  an}'' portion  of  the 
judicial  power  and  committed  it  to  this  corps.  The 
other  power  vested  in  it  might  likewise  have  been 
otherwise  easily  disposed  of  It  is  obvious  that  by 
preserving  the  corps,  he  made  the  government  more 
complicated  and  difficult  of  action. 

The  same  remarks  are  applicable  to  the  Senate  or 
Court  of  Areopagus.  This  court  had  been  instituted 
in  the  early  age  of  the  republic,  at  which  period  it 
formed  a  species  of  council  to  the  king  and  of  court 
for  the  community.  All  the  power  given  to  it  was 
so  much  taken  from  the  king,  and  a  step  in  the  de- 
gree towards  popular  government.  This  corps  was 
therefore  cherished  by  the  people  in  every  stage,  and 
the  more  so  because  being  composed  of  their  most 
enlightened  and  best  citizens  of  advanced  ase  it 


212  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

merited  their  confidence.  Solon  found  it  necessary 
to  preserve  it,  and  in  so  doing  to  invest  it  with 
such  powers  as  would  make  it  instrumental,  ac- 
cording to  his  view  of  the  subject,  to  the  general 
purposes  of  his  constitution.  It  had  held  from  its 
origin  judicial  powers.  By  committing  to  it  those 
of  that  nature  he  made  no  change  in  principle, 
although  he  made  the  government  more  complicated. 
A  censorship  over  the  public  morals  seemed  to  fall 
within  that  scope,  as  judges  generally  have  that 
kind  of  power.  In  what  manner  the  charge  given 
to  it  over  innovations  in  government  and  religion 
was  to  be  exercised  does  not  appear.  The  court 
could  not,  as  is  presumed,  declare  a  law  to  be  void 
as  unconstitutional,  because  so  numerous  and  great 
were  the  obstacles  to  the  passage  of  any  law,  that 
such  a  proposition  would  have  been  useless.  I  con- 
sider the  power  as  monitory  only  in  both  instances. 
He  retained  the  corps  for  the  same  reason  that  he 
did  the  Archous.  To  have  abolished  it  would  have 
shocked  the  public  feeling,  and  in  retaining  it  he 
was  compelled  to  carve  out  for  it  a  sphere  of  action 
in  the  discharge  of  the  duties  whereof  if  it  rendered 
no  important  service,  it  might  do  little  harm. 

From  this  view  of  the  government  of  Athens  I 
think  it  may  fairly  be  concluded,  by  the  numbers 
of  which  it  was  composed  in  every  department,  had 
there  been  no  other  objection  to  it,  that  it  was  an 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  213 

impracticable  one.  I  think  also  the  conclusion 
equally  obvious  that  the  organization  and  endow- 
ment of  its  j)arts  being  repugnant  to  principle,  were 
in  themselves  by  the  abuses  inseparable  from  them 
sufficient  to  overthrow  it.  These  caifses  united 
could  not  fail  at  an  early  day  to  produce  that  result. 
The  best  commentary,  however,  on  that  government 
is  its  career  and  fate,  of  which  I  will  now  give  a 
short  sketch. 

It  was  the  intention  of  Solon  that  it  should  be 
binding  on  the  people  one  hundred  years  without 
any  change,  on  the  presumption,  as  is  inferred,  that 
if  it  remained  in  force  that  term  the  power  would 
be  permanently  established  in  the  people ;  and  in 
case  it  should  appear  that  any  modification  of  it 
suited  them  better,  they  Avould  acquire  in  the  inter- 
val sufficient  knowledge  of  the  science  of  govern- 
ment  to  enable  them  to  amend  it  without  exposing 
themselves  to  any  danger.  All  the  public  officers 
and  the  people  bound  themselves  by  an  oath  to 
support  it  as  soon  as  it  was  reported.  The  Consti- 
tution and  laws  were  then  inscribed  on  rolls  of 
wood  and  posted  in  the  citadel  and  other  public 
places  for  the  inspection  of  the  people.  Immediately 
after  the  publication  he  was  beset  by  persons  of 
every  class  who  were  dissatisfied,  to  make  amend- 
ments of  it,  some  in  one  form  and  some  in  another, 
until,  to  rid  himself  of  the  annoyance,  he  resolved 


214  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

to  leave  the  countiy  and  to  remain  abroad  ten  years, 
which  purpose  he  executed.  Before  his  departure 
he  obtained  an  oath  from  the  whole  community  to 
preserve  it  during  his  absence.  On  his  return  at 
the  expiration  of  that  term  he  found  that  the  fac- 
tions had  revived  with  great  violence,  and  that  af- 
fairs had  relapsed  nearly  into  the  same  state  in 
which  they  were  before  his  government  was  adopted. 
An  incident  occurred  soon  after  his  return  and  in 
his  presence  which  showed  that  his  government 
had  no  adhesive  quality  or  efficiency:  that  it  was  a 
cobweb.  Pisistratus,  a  descendant  of  one  of  their 
ancient  kings,  a  man  of  fortune,  had  to  serve  his 
own  purposes  become  a  leader  of  the  poor,  who 
formed  the  most  numerous  class.  He  fomented  the 
discontent  between  the  factions  and  exposed  himself 
by  his  violence  to  the  hatred  of  the  rich.  Seizing 
a  favorable  occasion  lie  inflicted  his  body  with 
wounds  and  rushed  into  the  streets  covered  with 
blood,  declaring  that  his  enemies,  who  were  the 
enemies  of  the  people,  had  made  an  attempt  on  his 
life,  and  callino-  on  them  to  defend  him  as  the  best 
means  of  defending  themselves.  The  Assembly  of 
the  People  and  Senate  were  immediately  convened 
and  a  guard  granted  to  him,  of  which  he  soon  after- 
wards availed  himself,  to  take  possession  of  the 
citadel  and  usurp  the  government.  In  this  emer- 
gency Solon  sustained  his  character  for  integrity 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  215 

and  devotion  to  the  rights  of  tlie  people.  He  op- 
posed the  usurpation  and  exposed  the  fraud  by 
which  it  was  attempted,  but  without  effect.  The 
people  were  deceived  and  made  the  instrument  of 
their  own  depression  by  an  ambitious  and  unprin- 
cipled intriguer.* 

Pisistratus  lived  thirty-three  years  after  his  usur- 
pation, of  which  he  reigned  seventeen.  Twice  he 
was  deposed  and  as  often  recovered  the  power  of 
which  he  died  j)ossessed,  transmitting  it  to  his  sons, 
Hippias  and  Hipparchus.  The  latter  was  killed 
by  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton  in  revenge  for  a  per- 
sonal injury,  Hippias  maintained  his  authority  a 
few  years  but  was  at  length  overthrown,  principally 
by  the  exertions  of  Clisthenes,  chief  of  the  Ale- 
mseonides,  with  the  aid  of  Lacedemon.  The  usur- 
pation of  Pisistratus  was  of  a  peculiar  character.  It 
marked  the  rude  state  of  the  people  and  their  inca- 
pacity for  self-government,  as  it  likewise  did  the 
dexterity  with  M-hich  the  usurper  availed  himself 
of  the  good  qualities  as  well  as  the  weaknesses  to 
accomplish  the  object  of  his  unprincipled  ambition. 
He  did  not  assume  the  title  of  king,  nor  admit  that 
he  had  subverted  the  constitution  of  Solon.  He 
assumed  only  the  title  of  magistrate  or  perpetual 
chief  of  the  state,  under  which  he  exercised  his 
usurped  powers  to  what  extent  he  pleased.     He  left 

*  Herodotus,  Vol.  I.  page  57. 


216  THE  PEOPLi:   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

to  the  government  of  Solon  all  its  forms,  but  de- 
prived it  of  all  its  foree.  He  preserved  the  General 
Assembly  of  the  Peoj)le  and  Senate,  and  main- 
tained the  laws  in  their  ordinary  operation,  by 
means  whereof  he  secured  to  his  own  government 
the  character  of  Democracy,  while  he  ruled  every 
department  with  absolute  sway.  His  sons  followed 
his  example,  but  not  with  the  same  success.  Hip- 
pias  w^hen  expelled  found  a  refuge  in  Persia,  where 
he  joined  the  army  of  Darius  and  was  slain  in  the 
battle  of  Marathon  fighting  against  his  country. 

The  power  wrested  from  Hippias  jjassed  over  to 
Clisthenes,  the  leader  of  the  party  by  whom  he  was 
overthrown.  It  was  natural  and  accorded  with 
principle  that  it  should  have  returned  to  the  people, 
but  they  w^ere  not  competent  to  the  exercise  of  it. 
He  is  represented  to  have  been  governed  by  patriotic 
motives  and  to  have  been  a  friend  of  liberty.  He 
restored  the  constitution  of  Solon  with  some  chancres 
which  do  not  appear  to  have  touched  the  principle 
of  the  government.  He  increased  the  number  of 
the  tribes  to  ten,  and  of  the  Senate  to  five  hundred, 
and  of  the  officers  who  formed  the  board  of  accounts 
in  like  degree. 

From  the  overthrow  and  expulsion  of  Hippias, 
to  the  subjugation  of  Greece  by  the  armies  of  Rome 
under  the  Consul  INIummius,  about  three  hundred 
and  sixty-four  years  intervened.     The  improvement 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  Ill 

of  tlie  people  in  civilization  in  that  interval  was 
considerable,  and  grew  out  of  causes  natural  and 
obvious.  Their  progress  in  agriculture,  navigation, 
commerce  and  the  arts,  called  for  an  augmented  jdo- 
pulation  and  furnished  the  means  of  supporting  it. 
The  variety  of  pursuit  by  giving  birth  to  new  ideas 
expanded  the  human  mind.  It  was  in  this  interval 
that  the  States  of  Greece  acquired  their  greatest 
renown,  and  it  is  of  course  that  portion  of  their 
history  which  has  procured  for  them,  in  the  highest 
degree,  the  respect  and  admiration  of  all  succeeding 
ages.  No  one  hears  mention  of  the  battles  of  Ma- 
rathon, Salamis,  or  Platea ;  of  the  voluntary  sacri- 
fice of  the  illustrious  band  who  perished  at  the 
Straits  of  Thermopylse  in  defense  of  their  country ; 
or  of  the  abandoment  of  the  city  of  Athens  by  the 
whole  people  when  invaded  by  the  overwhelming 
force  of  Persia,  without  experiencing  sensations  of 
enthusiastic  delight.  Characters  were  then  formed 
in  many  of  the  states  whose  names  have  been  handed 
down  and  will  never  be  forgotten,  which  do  honor 
to  the  human  race.  But  it  is  not  in  this  view  that 
the  subject  on  which  I  treat  now  claims  my  atten- 
tion. How  M-ere  the  people  of  Athens  governed 
during  this  interval  ?  Did  they  maintain  the  con- 
stitution of  Solon  and  administer  it  strictly  according 
to  its  principles,  or  was  that  constitution  set  aside 
and  some  other  substituted  for  it?     If  changes  oc- 

19 


218  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

curred,  to  what  cause  or  causes  were  they  imputable? 
These  are  the  immediate  objects  of  inquiry,  and  to 
"which  I  shall  confine  myself  with  the  utmost  rigor. 
When  it  is  proved,  as  it  is  by  the  concurrent  tes- 
timony of  all  historians  that  this  constitution  was 
overthrown  immediately  after  its  adoption  by  the 
people  who  adopted  it,  and  who  were  bound  by  an 
oath  to  supjiort  it,  that  this  was  done  in  the  pre- 
sence of  its  author,  who  exerted  all  his  faculties  to 
maintain  it,  there  is  little  reason  to  presume  that  it 
could  be  maintained  afterwards.  Much  might  fairly 
be  ascribed  from  the  manner  in  which  that  event 
was  accomplished,  to  the  rude  and  unlettered  state 
in  which  the  people  then  w'cre ;  but  it  is  nevertheless 
true  that  the  government  was  an  impracticable  one : 
that  it  was  as  ill  adapted  to  the  civilized  as  to  the 
rude  state,  and  the  great  cause  for  surprise  is  that 
as  their  improvement  in  civilization  and  knowledge 
of  every  kind  was  great,  they  did  not  in  their  pro- 
gress, when  they  had  the  power  in  their  hands, 
amend  their  government  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give 
it  a  practical  and  efficient  form.  From  an  atten- 
tive view  of  the  state  of  Athens  and  of  Greece 
through  the  whole  of  that  interval  which  is  now  the 
object  of  attention,  it  would  be  obvious  that  many 
causes  united  to  produce  that  effect.  I  will  notice 
the  two  principal  only.  The  first  relates  to  the 
epoch   in  which  that  government  was  instituted. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  219 

The  second  to  the  state  of  Greece  generally  in  the 
relation  which  was  preserved  between  that  people 
as  a  power  and  other  nations,  and  likewise  between 
the  states  themselves. 

It  has  been  shown  that  when  the  government 
belonged  exclusively  to  the  people  they  exercised 
its  great  powers  collectively  or  en  masse,  and  that 
when  it  was  decided  between  different  orders,  of 
which  they  formed  one,  they  always  exercised  their 
portion  in  the  same  manner.  Such  was  then  the  state 
of  society  and  of  the  science  growing  out  of  it  that 
to  part  from  the  power,  and  place  it  in  other  hands, 
of  representatives  for  example,  would  have  been  re- 
garded by  them  as  the  abandonment  of  it.  The 
contest  which  took  place  between  the  people  and  the 
prince  in  the  several  states  after  the  societies  had 
increased  and  the  claim  to  hereditary  right  was  set 
up,  always  involved  the  question  whether  the  peo|)le 
should  exercise  the  power  in  that  mode  or  be 
governed  absolutely  by  him,  and  it  was  the  imprac- 
ticability of  tlie  government  when  they  got  posses- 
sion of  it  that  soon  overthrew  it.  An  amendment, 
therefore,  by  committing  their  power  to  representa- 
tives was,  it  is  presumed,  not  even  thought  of. 
They  nevertheless  still  retained  their  attachment 
and  devotion  to  liberty,  of  which  they  gave  un- 
ceasing and  very  strong  proofs. 

The  other  cause  alluded  to  formed  likewise  a  very 


220  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

serious  obstacle.  Almost  the  whole  of  this  interval 
was  employed  in  wars,  foreign  and  internal  or  civil. 
The  first  commenced  with  Persia  shortly  after  the 
expulsion  of  the  Pisistratide,  and  lasted  with  some 
intermissions  fifty-one  years.  The  Peloponnesiau 
war  followed  soon  afterward  and  consumed  almost 
an  equal  term.  This  war  commenced  between 
Athens  and  Lacedemon,  but  all  the  other  states  soon 
became  parties  to  it  as  allies  on  the  one  or  the  other 
side.  It  was  produced  by  the  war  with  Persia  and 
by  the  rivalship  and  jealousy  wdiich  were  excited  in 
that  war  between  those  two  states.  To  this  war  the 
ruin  of  Greece  may  in  a  great  measure  be  ascribed, 
since  it  formed  a  relation  between  the  states  which 
had  a  very  injurious  influence  on  their  respective 
governments,  and  also  on  the  bond  by  which  they 
were  then  held  together.  Other  wars  ensued,  among 
which  that  between  Sparta  and  Messenia  was  the 
most  durable  and  destructive.  That  between  Athens 
and  Syracuse  was  the  next,  which  shook  the  foun- 
dation of  the  Athenian  state.  The  war  between 
Sparta  and  Thebes  followed,  the  fortune  of  which 
raised  the  latter  from  a  very  inferior  to  a  very  dis- 
tins^uished  rank  among  the  states  of  Greece.  Other 
wars  occurred  between  the  states  which  did  great 
injury  to  the  local  as  well  as  the  general  interest,  of 
which  that  between  INIartena  and  Tigra,  to  which 
almost  all  the  states  became  parties,  had  the  most 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  221 

pernicious  eifect.  Such  continual  warfare  could  not 
fail  to  cheek  their  growth,  to  prevent  all  improve- 
ment in  their  local  governments,  and  to  weaken  and 
almost  annihilate  the  federal  bond. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  was  easy  for  a  power, 
even   of  inferior   population,    whose   force   should 
be  united  and  directed  against  them  with  energy 
and   talent   to   overwhelm   them.      Macedon   pre- 
sented such  a  power  with  a  leader  who  w^as  capable 
and    eager    to   profit    by  these  divisions    between 
the  states  and  to  raise  himself  at  their  expense. 
Until  then  Macedon  had  been  little  known.     She 
had  made  no  impression  on  the  affairs  of  Greece, 
and  been  dependent  on  some  of  the  states,  Sparta 
and  Athens,  at  different  intervals  for  protection. 
Her  rise  was  owing  altogether  to  the   talent   of 
Philip,  who  under  various  pretexts  made  war  first 
on  one  state  and  then  on  the  others,  until  finally  he 
succeeded    in    reducing    all    under   his   dominion. 
From  this  period  the  affairs  of  Greece  became  con- 
nected with  those  of  Macedon,  and   incidentally 
with  the  fortune  of  her  rulers  in  their  enterprises  in 
Asia.     Philip  did  not  treat  Greece  in  all  respects  as 
a  conquered  territory.     He  left  each  state  in  the 
enjoyment  of  its  own  government,  and  added  but 
little  from  the  dominions  of  either  to  his  own.     He 
became  a  member  of  tlie  Amphyctionic  Council, 
placed  himself  at  its  head  and  controlled  its  measures. 
19  « 


222  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

His  great  object  was  a  war  \vitli  Persia,  to  which  he 
was  tempted  by  her  wealth  and  a  confidence  in  suc- 
cess arising  from  the  repeated  defeat  of  her  vast 
armies  in  the  recent  invasions  of  Greece,  by  the 
comparatively  small  force  of  the  Grecian  states. 
Under  his  influence  the  Amphyctionic  Council  de- 
clared war  against  Persia,  and  committed  the  man- 
agement of  it  to  him  in  the  character  of  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  forces  employed  in  the  expedition. 

His  sudden  death  by  assassination  suspended  this 
war,  but  his  son  Alexander  who  succeeded  him, 
and  who  with  equal  if  not  su23erior  talents  adopted 
his  policy,  soon  renewed  the  war  and  prosecuted  it 
with  great  ardor  and  unexampled  success.  The 
death  of  Philip  excited  a  hope  in  the  Grecian  states 
that  they  might  extricate  themselves  from  the 
Macedonian  yoke,  but  that  was  transitory.  In  one 
year  it  was  fixed  more  firmly  on  them  by  Alexander 
than  it  had  been  by  his  father.  Of  his  conquests 
in  Asia  and  of  the  disorders  and  revolutions  pro- 
duced by  his  death,  by  the  contests  between  his 
lieutenants  for  portions  of  the  conquered  dominions 
to  which  they  respectively  set  up  their  pretensions, 
I  shall  not  treat.  Little  change  was  wrought  there- 
by in  the  aifairs  of  Greece.  New  efforts  were  made 
by  several  of  the  states  to  recover  their  liberties, 
which  were  attended  with  various  success.  The 
revival  of  the  Ochaien  Leaarue  with  its  efforts  in 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  223 

defense  of  that  cause  forms  an  interesting  epoch  in 
the  latter  stage  of  those  republics.  In  Athens  the 
Democracy  was  occasionally  subverted  and  restored, 
but  no  change  in  the  form  ever  attempted.  Such 
was  the  train  of  events  which  occurred  in  the  inter- 
val specified,  and  such  the  state  of  Athens  at  its 
termination,  which  was  marked  by  the  subjugation 
of  Greece  and  her  rendition  to  a  Roman  province. 

These  causes  are,  it  is  presumed,  sufficient  to  show 
why  the  people  of  Athens  never  improved  the  con- 
stitution of  Solon  at  any  time  during  their  exist- 
ence as  an  independent  state.  The  question  still 
remains  to  be  solved,  how  were  they  governed  when 
that  constitution  was  declared  to  be  in  force  ?  Did 
the  people  govern  themselves  in  the  only  mode 
which  can  be  regarded  as  self-government,  or  were 
they  mere  instruments  in  the  hands  of  individuals 
in  whom  they  reposed  their  confidence  ?  That  the 
latter  was  the  fact  must  be  evident  to  all  who  ex- 
amine their  history  with  impartiality  and  candor. 
Their  confidence  was  at  one  time  placed  in  one  in- 
dividual, and  at  other  times  in  others,  who  shaped 
the  course  pursued  and  ruled  them  absolutely  while 
it  lasted.  The  people  stood  collected  in  the  General 
Assembly  with  their  eyes  fixed  on  the  tribune,  from 
which  the  orators  addressed  them,  with  their  minds 
made  up  whose  counsel  to  adopt  and  whose  to  reject, 
before  they  heard  the  proposition  of  cither.     Mil- 


224  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.      • 

tiades,  Themistocles,  and  Aristides,  ruled  them 
through  a  great  part  of  the  Persian  war;  Cimon, 
Alcibiades,  Nicias  and  Phocion  liad  their  turn. 
Pericles  ruled  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  others 
succeeded  on  other  occasions.  No  instance  can  be 
given  in  which  the  people  took  aiFairs  into  their 
own  hands,  digested  propositions  adapted  to  existing 
exigencies,  debated  and  amended  them  as  they 
thought  fit,  and  acted  as  a  government.  The  con- 
stitution forbade  it,  and  had  it  been  otherwise,  it 
would  have  been  impracticable  under  the  existing 
organization.  The  individuals  who  ruled  did  it 
altogether  by  personal  influence.  It  was  not  by 
virtue  of  any  office  which  they  held  of  Senator, 
Areopagate,  Archon  and  any  other.  In  these  offices 
no  such  power  was  vested,  nor  were  they  even  held 
by  the  individuals.  The  people  under  the  govern- 
ment as  organised  were  incompetent  to  the  discharge 
of  its  duties,  and  in  consequence  while  they  pre- 
served the  form  and  in  truth  held  the  power  in 
their  own  hands,  transferred  the  actual  exercise  of 
it  to  leaders  whose  instrument  they  were. 

Confidence  is  due  to  exalted  talents  and  merit, 
and  respect  to  the  individual  to  the  extent  of  that 
claim ;  but  so  soon  as  the  influence  of  any  one 
citizen  l^ecomes  a  power  which  undermines  and 
destroys  the  independence  of  the  people,  whether 
it  be  wielded  by  himself  or  a  party,  the  effect  is 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  22.'j 

for  the  time  despotic.  Pisistratus  usurped  the 
governmeut  and  exercised  its  powers  in  his  own 
right.  In  the  accomplishment  of  that  object  the 
peoj)le  were  his  instruments.  They  were  so,  because 
they  considered  him  their  friend  and  the  friend  of 
liberty.  They  thought  themselves  free,  and  that 
in  supporting  him  they  defended  their  own  cause. 
They  were  deceived.  The  principle  in  his  case 
was  different  from  that  which  existed  in  the  latter 
instances,  but  the  effect  in  regard  to  the  agency  of 
the  people  in  the  government  was  essentially  the 
same.  The  power  of  the  individual  while  he  en- 
joyed their  confidence  v,*as  absolute,  and  the  loss  of 
it  was  marked  by  convulsion.  They  treated  him 
as  a  tyrant,  and  punished  him  by  banishment  or 
death.  It  was  the  same  with  Miltiades,  Themis- 
tocles,  Alcibiades,  Aristides  and  others,  that  it  was 
with  Pisistratus  and  his  son,  Hippias.  Their  most 
illustrious  men  either  died  in  prison  under  fines 
which  they  could  not  pay,  or  were  banished,  and 
perished  in  foreign  countries.  The  whole  body  of 
the  people  must  have  the  knowledge  necessary  to 
make  them  competent  to  self-government,  and  the 
government  must  be  wisely  organized  and  endowed 
or  it  cannot  be  free  or  durable. 

How  happened  it  then  that  Solon  should  have 
instituted  such  a  government?  Data  exist  to  afford 
the  answer.     The  basis  on  which  his  constitution 


226  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

rested,  and  which  couhl  not  be  changed,  furnishes 
it.  It  was  not  his  object  to  take  the  power  from 
the  people  and  reduce  them  to  slavery,  nor  could 
he  have  done  it  if  he  had  been  so  disposed;  and  if 
they  held  any  it  could  only  be  in  a  General  Assem- 
bly of  the  whole  people,  the  form  in  which  they 
had  held  it  from  the  time  of  Theseus,  upwards  of 
eight  hundred  years.  To  take  it  from  them  in 
that  form  would  have  been  viewed  in  that  light. 
The  principle  of  election  and  of  representation  to 
certain  offices  and  in  certain  stations  was  well 
understood  and  practiced  in  several  of  the  Grecian 
republics,  but  it  was  never  carried  beyond  a  certain 
limit.  It  never  touched  the  great  powers,  or  what 
might  be  called  the  share  which  the  people  held  in 
the  sovereignty  of  the  state.  He  was  forced,  there- 
fore, to  jn-eserve  that  feature  in  the  government. 
How  then  accommodate  the  diiferenccs  which  ex- 
isted in  the  community  between  the  rich  and  the 
poor,  or  as  may  be  understood,  the  class  of  notables 
which  had  been  instituted  by  Theseus,  without 
prostrating  the  latter?  How  make  an  efficient 
government  in  any  form  whatever?  If  the  power 
of  the  General  Assembly  which  consisted  of  a  vast 
majority  of  the  poor  was  not  checked,  the  accommo- 
dation would  not  have  sto})ped  with  the  abolition 
of  debts.  The  lands  would  also  have  been  sold  and 
in  all  other  respects  the  notables  have  been  pros- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  227 

trated  or  the  government  have  been  overset.  How 
form  that  check  ?  The  Archons  could  not  be  made, 
by  any  power  which  might  be  given  to  them,  a 
balance  against  the  Assembly  of  the  People.  The 
first  of  that  corps  had  been  instituted  to  get  rid  of 
a  king,  and  the  number  was  afterwards  increased 
on  the  same  principle  to  abolish  all  regal  power. 
An  attempt  to  restore  the  power  in  that  form  would 
have  been  absurd.  Nor  could  the  Court  of  Areo- 
pagus have  been  made  instrumental  to  such  a  pur- 
pose. It  had  always  been  composed  of  aged  men 
who  had  filled  other  offices  and  retired  into  that 
corps  as  it  were  from  the  contentious  scene  of  public 
life.  To  vest  it  in  the  notables  as  an  hereditary 
brai^ch  would  have  been  impossible,  as  it  would 
have  been  sure  to  have  brought  on  the  convulsions 
and  civil  war  which  it  was  sought  to  avoid.  There 
seemed,  therefore,  to  be  no  other  resource  than  to  in- 
stitute a  body,  Avhich  by  its  numbers,  mode  of 
election  and  weight  of  character,  might  stand  well 
with  and  command  the  confidence  of  the  General 
Assembly,  and  by  the  qualification  required  for  the 
members  in  property  and  the  power  vested  in  that 
body,  forming  in  like  extent  a  restraint  on  the 
General  Assembly,  should  secure  the  rich  from  ruin 
and  obtain  likewise  their  confidence.  It  was  on 
this  ])rinciple  and  with  this  view,  as  I  presume, 
that  the  Senate  was  instituted. 


228  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

Had  the  Senators  been  elected  by  the  whole 
people  in  any  other  mode,  by  the  General  Assembly 
for  example,  or  by  a  vote  of  every  citizen  for  every 
member,  the  Senate  would  have  been  in  effect  a 
Committee  of  the  General  Assembly,  and  Avould 
have  been  essentially  under  its  control.  By  making 
the  members  eligible  by  the  tribes,  he  detached  the 
body  in  some  measure  from  the  General  Assembly, 
and  by  requiring  a  certain  portion  of  property  as 
a  qualification  for  the  ofl&ce  he  gave  some  security 
to  the  rich,  while  by  leaving  the  door  open  to  all 
who  might  acquire  it,  the  objection  which  would 
have  applied  to  hereditary  rank  was  precluded,  and 
some  hope  was  presented  to  the  poor.  And  by 
giving  to  the  Senate  the  exclusive  power  to  originate 
every  proposition  on  which  the  General  Assembly 
could  act  he  gave  an  additional  protection  to  the 
rich.  Give  to  the  General  Assembly  the  poAver  to 
originate  measures  and  no  resistance  could  have 
been  made  to  it.  The  rich  would  have  been  over- 
whelmed at  once.  Confine  its  agency  to  proposi- 
tions whicli  the  Senate  should  submit  to  it,  and 
that  consequence  would  be  avoided.  The  rich 
would  never  propose  any  act  which  would  operate 
aoainst  themselves.  The  Senate  therefore  seemed 
to  be  as  well  adapted  to  all  these  objects  as  any 
corps  which  he  could  have  instituted  could  be. 
But-  the  government  was  impracticable  in  every 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  229 

part,  as  has  been  shown  by  a  fair  analysis  of  the  or- 
ganization and  endowment  of  each,  when  tested  by 
the  natnre  and  qualities  of  man,  and  likewise  by  the 
career  and  fate  of  the  government  itself.  For  the 
defects  of  the  system  we  must  look  to  the  age  in 
which  it  was  instituted  and  to  the  state  of  society 
and  of  the  science  in  that  age.  That  nothing  better 
could  have  then  been  done,  the  devotion  of  the 
people  to  the  government  and  their  observance  of 
its  injunctions,  so  far  as  they  understood  and  were 
able  to  execute  them  under  all  their  difficulties 
afford  the  best  proof. 

The  General  Assembly  could  be  preserved  only 
by  investing  it  with  the  powers  committed  to  it ; 
but  in  the  execution  of  those  powers  that  it  should 
not  act  from  its  own  impulse  but  be  the  instrument 
of  some  other  party.  To  accomplish  this  it  was 
necessary  that  it  should  take  that  position  of  its  own 
accord  and  not  by  compulsion;  that  it  .should 
believe  that  it  was  the  ruling  party  while  it  w^as 
ruled ;  that  it  did  everything  when  it  did  nothing. 
This  was  seen  in  the  instance  of  Pisistratus,  and 
likewise  in  the  others  that  have  been  noticed,  for 
although  the  principle  was  different  the  effect  was 
the  same.  The  tendency  in  all  governments,  even 
those  which  are  representative,  in  which  the  bodies 
are  too  numerous,  and  in  which  those  who  compose 
them  act  as  the  multitude  connecting  in  the  degree 

20 


230  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS 

the  sovereignty  with  the  government,  is  to  precipitate 
their  overthrow  and  termination  in  one,  that  is,  in 
despotism.  Wlien  the  sovereignty  is  held  by  a 
prince  in  the  early  and  rude  state  of  society,  and  the 
people  in  the  progress  of  civilization  and  increase  of 
population  contend  for  their  rights,  compromises  are 
natural  and  are  generally  entered  into.  Whatever 
the  people  obtain  is  so  much  gained,  and  they  are 
often  satisfied  with  small  gains.  In  the  early  stages 
the  poAver  of  the  prince  is  not  despotic.  There  is 
always  a  class  of  nobles  around  him  who  share  a 
portion  of  the  power,  and  the  spirit  of  equality  per- 
vades the  whole  society,  prince,  nobles  and  people. 
The  effort  is  therefore  to  improve  the  condition  of 
the  people,  and  in  doing  this  the  hold  Avhich  the 
two  hereditary  branches  have  acquired  though  di- 
minished is  not  always  destroyed.  But  when  the 
people  possess  the  whole  power,  and  a  change  is 
made,  it  is  generally  by  a  transition  to  the  opposite 
extreme.  Possessing  the  whole  power  and  not 
being  able  to  retain  it  they  lose  the  whole.  There 
is  no  resting-place ;  no  point  at  which  to  stop ;  no 
party  with  whom  to  negotiate :  and  they  will  never 
voluntarily  degrade  themselves  by  creating  a  class 
of  nobles  with  a  prince  over  them,  and  retain  a 
portion  of  the  power  only  in  the  government. 
Changes  in  this  state  generally  grow  out  of  contests 
between  rival  ])arties  and  I'ival  chiefs.     Civil  wars 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOYEBEIGNS.  231 

ensue,  in  the  result  of  which  the  leader  of  the  suc- 
cessful party  is  placed  at  the  head  of  the  govern- 
ment with  unlimited  power.  Our  object  is  to  pre- 
serve the  sovereignty  in  the  people  and  to  give  them 
that  agency  in  the  government  which  will  be  best 
adapted  to  that  end,  and  in  those  instances  in  which 
the  agency  of  a  few  or  of  one  will  be  most  effectual, 
to  avail  ourselves  of  it,  but  in  a  manner  which  will 
make  them  or  him  perform  their  duties  with  fidelity 
as  representatives  and  servants,  without  the  possi- 
bility of  their  wresting  the  power  from  us  and 
becoming  our  masters. 

From  the  view  above  presented  it  is  obvious  that 
the  Government  of  Athens  had  not  a  sing-le  feature 
in  it  except  the  principle  on  which  it  was  founded, 
which  was  free  from  serious  objection ;  and  that  its 
defects  were  so  numerous  and  vital  as  to  make  its 
overthrow  certain  and  immediate.  There  was  no 
regular  division  of  power  in  it ;  of  legislative,  exe- 
cutive and  judicial,  separated  from  each  other.  The 
whole  was  an  amalgamation. 

For  these  evils  no  remedy  can  be  found  but  by 
the  separation  of  the  sovereignty  from  the  govern- 
ment, retaining  the  forms  in  the  people,  and  com- 
mitting the  latter  to  representatives  to  be  by  them 
elected  or  otherwise  appointed,  deriving  their  au- 
thority from  them,  and  placed  in  offices  or  depart- 
ments organized   and   endowed   by  a   comj)act  or 


232  THE  FEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

constitution  to  which  the  whole  people  are  parties, 
and  by  which  their  duties  in  their  capacity  of  the 
sovereign  power  and  of  their  representatives  in  the 
departments  to  which  they  may  be  called,  shall  be 
specially  and  distinctly  defined.  If  the  two  powers 
be  thus  separated  and  the  government  be  organized 
on  just  principles,  divided  into  the  three  departments 
specified  with  the  proper  number,  and  proper  powers 
be  vested  in  each,  with  a  line  strictly  drawn  between 
them,  and  each  be  made  independent  of  the  others, 
and  armed  with  the  means  of  securing  that  inde- 
pendence by  checking  encroachments  of  either  on 
the  other,  it  is  impossible  that  the  government 
should  fail,  provided  the  peoj^le  be  competent  to 
self-government  and  perform  their  duty.  When 
the  sovereign  power  is  separated  from  the  govern- 
ment by  a  compact  to  which  the  whole  people  are 
parties,  and  by  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  all 
are  placed  on  the  same  footing,  all  are  equally  inter- 
ested in  the  faithful  execution  of  its  conditions  ac- 
cording to  their  true  intent  and  meaning,  by  a  fair 
and  just  construction,  and  are  equally  bound  to 
enjoin  it  on  those  who  represent  them.  In  this  case 
the  people  may  form  a  complete  check  on  the  gov- 
ernment, and  if  they  be  intelligent  and  virtuous, 
keep  it  in  its  true  course.  The  path  for  every  de- 
partment will  be  traced  and  seen  by  those  in  each, 
in  any  and  every  emergency  as  well  as  by  their  con- 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  233 

stituents.  The  people  who  are  calm  spectators  at  a 
distance  of  the  measures  pursued  and  of  the  conduct 
of  those  in  office  will  be  guided  by  principle,  and 
expect  a  faithful  observance  of  it  by  those  who 
represent  them.  Upright  and  honorable  men  will 
always  pursue  that  course,  and  even  those  who  are 
less  scrupulous,  knowing  that  their  conduct  is 
watched  will  be  afraid  to  go  wrong. 

20  » 


LACEDEMON. 

I  WILL  now  proceed  to  examine  the  Government 
of  Lacedemon.  The  constitution  instituted  by  Ly- 
curgus  is  that  of  which  I  sliall  treat.  It  was  insti- 
tuted eight  huudred  aud  forty-five  years  before  the 
Christian  era  and  two  hundred  and  fifty-one  before 
that  of  Athens.  It  will  be  found  that  this  govern- 
ment was  in  many  of  its  features  peculiar:  that  no 
such  government  ever  existed  either  in  the  ancient 
or  modern  world.  It  affords  in  all  its  2)arts  the 
strongest  exemplification  of  the  epoch  in  which  it 
was  formed. 

In  tracing  the  origin  of  the  Athenian  state  with 
its  progress  for  the  purposes  of  this  inquiry,  it  was 
necessary  to  take  a  concise  view  of  that  of  all  Greece. 
The  view  thus  presented  is  equally  applicable  to 
Lacedemon.  The  early  or  rude  ages  of  all  the 
states  are  similar.  So  far  as  any  incidents  occurred 
in  the  progress  of  those  two  communities  of  a  dif- 
ferent character,  I  shall  endeavor  to  notice  and  give 
them  the  weight  to  which  they  are  entitled. 

Their  government  had  a  like  origin  in  princes ;  a 

234 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  235 

form  which  was  common  to  tlie  Grecian  States,  and 
incident  to  the  rude  age  in  which  they  commenced. 
A  difference  occurred  in  that  of  Lacedemon,  which 
distinguished  it  in  that  respect  from  every  other 
state.  The  first  prince  died,  leaving  two  sons  who 
inherited  the  office  of  the  father  with  equal  rights, 
and  which  descended  to  the  eldest  son  of  each 
branch  through  successive  generations  for  many 
ages. 

It  has  been  already  observed  that  Danaus  from 
Egypt,  and  Pelops  from  Phrygia,  emigrated  to  the 
Peloponnesus  at  a  very  early  age,  while  the  people 
were,  in  a  rude  state,  and  that  they  were  each  placed 
at  the  head  of  the  section  in  which  they  settled. 
These  princes  had  respectively  a  long  train  of 
descendants  who  had  great  power  in  that  Penin- 
sula. The  Heraclidae  were  the  offspring  of  Danaus, 
so  called  from  Hercules,  one  of  his  descendants, 
the  Pelopidse  of  Pelops.  These  two  houses  con- 
tended for  the  supremacy  in  the  Peloponnesus,  in 
which  struggle  the  Pelopidse  succeeded,  and  the 
Heraclidte  were  banished  from  it.  This  occurred 
some  time  before  the  Trojan  war,  in  which  Aga- 
memnon of  the  house  of  the  Pelopidte  took  the 
lead  as  commander  of  the  confederate  force  em- 
ployed in  it.  The  long  absence  of  the  chiefs 
engaged  in  that  war  had  so  far  impaired  their 
authority  in  their  respective  dominions,  that  many 


236  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

of  them  were  compelled  on  their  return,  to  engage 
in  new  wars,  to  reinstate  themselves.  Agamemnon 
was  betrayed  by  his  wife,  and  cut  off  immediately 
after  his  return.  The  Heraclidae,  aware  of  these 
disorders,  and  of  the  favorable  opportunity  which 
it  ]3resented,  made  several  attempts  to  regain  their 
power,  in  which  they  failed;  but  at  length  they 
succeeded.  In  the  latter  they  were  aided  by  the 
Dorians  and  Etolians.  Temenus,  Cresphontes,  and 
Aristodemus,  three  brothers  in  the  fifth  degree 
from  Hercules,  led  the  invading  force.  Almost  the 
whole  of  the  Peninsula  was  conquered.  In  the 
division  of  the  portion  claimed  by  the  Heraclidae, 
Argos  was  allotted  to  Temenus,  Messiuia  to  Cres- 
phontes, and  Laconia  to  the  two  twin  brothers, 
Euryelpenes  and  Procles,  the  infant  sons  of  Aris- 
todemus, who  died  pending  the  struggle.  The 
other  conquered  provinces  were  divided  betAveeu 
the  Dorians  and  Etolians,  who  had  assisted  in 
making  the  conquest. 

The  Heraclidffi  were  thus  restored  to  their  posses- 
sions in  the  Peloponnesus  about  eighty  years  after 
the  taking  of  Troy,  and  one  thousand  three  hun- 
dred and  five  before  the  Christian  era.  Two  kinoes 
were  thus  placed  at  that  early  period  in  the  govern- 
ment of  Lacedemon,  and  in  that  state  Lycurgus 
found  it  when  he  instituted  his  constitution,  four 
hundred  and  sixty-eight  years  afterwards.      What 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEBEIGNS.  237 

were  at  that  period  the  other  modifications  of  the 
Lacedemonian  government  does  not  distinctly  ap- 
pear in  any  work  that  I  have  seen,  ancient  or 
modern.  It  may  be  inferred  from  the  remarks  of 
some  writers  that  there  existed  a  class  of  nobles 
with  limited  powers.  The  power  of  the  kings  is 
said  to  have  been  absolute  whenever  they  could 
agree,  but  that  diiFerences  between  them  were  fre- 
quent, and  sometimes  serious;  and  that  these  differ- 
ences laid  the  foundation  of  the  power  held  either 
by  the  nobles  or  people.  In  general  it  is  under- 
stood from  the  view  which  has  been  presented  by 
different  writers,  that  the  progress  of  affairs  in 
Lacedemon  was  similar  in  other  respects  to  that 
which  occurred  in  the  other  states.  There  were 
frequent  contentions  through  the  whole  interval, 
between  the  different  orders  for  power,  and  it  may 
be  presumed  had  not  the  difference  between  the 
two  kings,  mitigated  in  the  exercise  of  that  which 
belonged  to  them,  and  thereby  given  a  popular 
cast  to  the  government,  that  it  would  have  expe- 
rienced the  fate  which  befel  monarchy  in  all  the 
other  states,  and  been  overthrown  at  the  same  time. 
All  writers  agree  that  these  contentions  had  risen 
to  a  great  height  at  the  period  when  Lycurgus  was 
called  on,  apparently  by  the  general  voice,  to  in- 
stitute the  government  of  which  I  shall  give  a 
sketch. 


238  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOYEBEIGNS. 

The  attention  was  drawn  to  him  by  causes  which 
marked  the  epoch  at  which  the  constitution  was 
formed,  as  well  as  the  confidence  reposed  in  his 
virtue  and  talents.  He  was  the  son  of  Eunomus, 
and  brother  of  Polyd^tes,  one  of  the  reigning 
kings  and  a  descendant  of  Hercules  in  the  eleventh 
degree.  His  brother  dying  without  offspring,  he 
was  supposed  to  be  entitled  to  the  crown,  and 
actually  did  succeed  to  it  for  a  short  term;  but  it 
appearing  that  the  deceased  king  had  left  his  wife 
pregnant,  he  disclaimed  any  right  to  it,  in  case  the 
offspring  should  be  male.  The  widow  offered  to 
destroy  the  infant  if  he  would  marry  her.  He 
amused  her  with  hope  until  a  son  was  born,  whom 
he  acknowledged,  and  in  whose  fivor  he  immedi- 
ately abdicated.  This  proof  of  disinterested  virtue 
elevated  his  character  in  the  state;  but  the  disap- 
pointment and  mortification  to  M'hich  the  widow 
was  thereby  subjected  excited  her  deep  resentment, 
and  exposed  him  to  danger.  She  soon  raised  fac- 
tions against  him,  in  consequence  whereof  he  left 
the  state  and  traveled  into  Crete,  and  thence  to 
Asia,  studying  the  laws  and  governments  of  differ- 
ent countries,  and  comparing  them  with  each  other 
as  to  their  relative  success  in  promoting  the  happi- 
ness of  the  people.  In  his  absence  Lacedemon  M'as 
convulsed  by  factious  and  the  state  menaced  Avith 
dangers,  for  which  no  remedy  could  be  found  within 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  239 

it.  They  all  united  in  pressing  his  return,  and  in 
giving  him  a  power  to  make  such  reforms  as  would 
avert  the  impending  ruin.  I  shall  present  this 
constitution  as  instituted  by  him,  and  notice  the 
changes  afterwards  made  in  it  while  in  force.  He 
complied  with  the  invitation  and  reported  the  con- 
stitution which  was  established  before  the  Christian 
era,  of  which  I  will  now  give  a  sketch,  wdth  the 
changes. 

The  government  of  Lacedemon  consisted  of  two 
kings,  of  a  Council  of  twenty- eight  members,  and 
of  an  Assembly  of  the  People.  The  crown  was 
hereditary  in  both  branches,  descending  to  the 
oldest  son  of  each,  and  if  no  son  to  the  brother,  or 
other  nearest  connection  of  that  branch ;  but  in  no 
event  to  the  other  house.  Their  rights  Mere  joint 
and  equal,  not  divided  between  them.  The  senators 
who  composed  the  Council  were  elected  for  life  by 
the  people.  The  election  Mas  made  in  full  as- 
sembly. The  kings  presided  in  the  senate.  The 
measures  carried  there  were  communicated  to  the 
people  in  General  Assembly,  mIio  M^ere  bound  either 
to  accept  or  reject  them  M'ithout  amendment. 

When  the  two  kings  concurred  in  any  proposi- 
tion there  M'as  no  opposition  to  it.  Neither  could 
leave  the  state  in  time  of  peace,  nor  could  both 
do  so  in  time  of  war;  unless  there  were  two 
armies  in  the  field,  in  M'hich  case  each  took  tlie 


240  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

command  of  one.  They  were  placed  at  the  head 
of  relig-ion,  and  had  the  command  of  the  armies, 
might  sign  truces,  and  receive  and  dismiss  ambas- 
sadors while  in  the  field.  In  peace  they  were 
regarded  only  as  the  first  citizens  of  the  state. 
They  mixed  in  society  with  the  other  citizens  on  a 
footing  of  equality,  and  were  received  with  respect 
but  without  parade. 

The  Senate  being  the  Supreme  Council  of  the 
state,  war  and  peace,  alliances,  and  all  the  other 
high  concerns,  were  treated  of  in  the  first  instance 
in  it.  No  person  under  the  age  of  sixty  could  be 
elected  to  it.  In  addition  to  the  high  political 
powers  already  noticed,  others  of  a  judicial  charac- 
ter belonged  to  that  body.  When  a  king  was 
accused  of  having  betrayed  the  state,  or  having 
violated  the  laws,  the  Senate  wdth  the  other  kings 
and  five  Ephori,  after  that  corps  was  instituted, 
formed  the  tribunal  by  which  he  was  tried. 

Of  the  Assembly  of  the  People  there  existed  two 
distinct  species.  One  regulated  affairs  which  were 
peculiar  to  the  inhabitants  of  Sparta.  The  other 
those  which  were  common  to  them,  and  to  the 
inhabitants  of  the  different  villages  of  Laconia. 
The  kings,  senators,  and  different  classes  of  magis- 
trates assisted  in  both. 

When  the  succession  to  tlie  throne  was  regulated, 
magistrates  were  chosen  or  dismissed.  The  Assembly 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  241 

was  composed  of  Spartans  only.  This  Assembly- 
was  convened  in  the  ordinary  course  of  aifairs 
every  month  at  full  moon,  and  at  other  times  when 
circumstances  required  it. 

The  other  Assembly  was  convened  when  war, 
peace,  or  alliances  were  treated  of.  It  was  composed 
of  Spartans,  and  likewise  of  deputies  from  the 
villages  of  Laconia,  and  often  of  those  from  their 
allies,  and  of  nations  who  came  to  solicit  aid 
from  Lacedemon.  In  these  Assemblies  their  mu- 
tual pretensions  and  complaints,  the  infractions  of 
treaties  by  other  people,  the  means  of  conciliation, 
the  projects  of  campaigns,  and  the  contributions 
they  had  to  furnish,  were  brought  forward  and  dis- 
cussed. 

Other  provisions  w^ere  introduced  into  this  gov- 
ernment of  a  very  peculiar  character,  which  although 
they  do  not  constitute  essentially  a  part  of  the 
organization,  or  of  the  endowment  of  either  branch, 
or  touch  directly  the  question  of  hereditary  or  pop- 
ular right,  yet  as  they  formed  a  part  of  the  com- 
pact between  the  people  and  the  kings,  and  the 
people  themselves,  and  had  great  influence  on  the 
fortune  of  the  government,  it  is  equally  proper  to 
notice.  These  provisions  were  the  basis  on  which 
the  system  rested,  and  were  in  fact  a  part  of  the 
constitution   itself.     I    shall    notice  the  most   im- 


21 


242  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

portant  only.      They  mark  distinctly  the  state  of 
society  at  the  age  of  which  I  treat. 

He  made  an  equal  division  of  all  the  land  among 
the  citizens  of  the  state.  He  divided  Laconia  into 
thirty  thousand  parts  or  lots,  and  distributed  them 
among  the  people  of  the  country.  He  divided 
Sparta  into  nine  thousand,  -which  he  distributed  in 
like  manner  among  the  people  of  that  section.  The 
proprietors  of  these  lots  could  neither  sell  nor  divide. 
They  descended  to  the  oldest  son  of  each  citizen, 
and  were  rather  the  property  of  the  state  than  of 
the  individual.  He  banished  gold  and  silver  and 
substituted  iron  as  the  currency,  and  of  such  weight 
and  little  value  that  it  required  a  cart  and  two 
oxen  to  carry  a  piece  worth  comparatively  a  few 
dollars.  He  expelled  the  fine  arts  by  prescribing 
the  kind  of  furniture  which  should  be  used,  and 
giving  every  other  possible  discouragement  to  them. 
He  established  public  repasts,  and  made  all  the 
citizens  mess  together  on  the  same  food,  which 
was  regulated  by  law,  of  the  simplest  kind,  and 
dressed  in  like  manner.  Each  table  consisted  of 
fifteen  persons,  and  each  person  furnished  monthly 
an  equal  portion  of  the  provisions  requisite,  which 
was  calculated  with  great  precision.  The  kings 
attended  these  tables,  and  partook  of  the  public 
repasts  with  the  citizens  without  other  distinction 
than  the  allowance  of  a  double  portion  to  each. 


THE  FEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  243 

From  these  tables  they  were  obliged  to  return  to 
their  houses  in  the  dark.  It  was  ordained  that 
the  laws  should  not  be  written,  but  preserved  in 
the  memory  alone;  and  science  of  every  kind  was 
discountenanced  except  that  of  war  and  the  exer- 
cises connected  with  it.  Marriages,  births,  and  the 
education  of  children  were  specially  provided  for. 
Girls  were  taught  to  perform  manly  exercises,  to 
throw  the  quoit  and  the  javelin,  to  run  the  race, 
and  wrestle  in  public  naked.  The  same  instruction 
was  given  to  boys.  ^The  infant  as  soon  as  born  was 
inspected  by  persons  appointed  for  that  purpose 
and  taken  in  charge  of  the  government.  If  well 
formed  and  robust,  vigorous  nourishment  was  pro- 
vided for  him,  and  a  lot  of  land  assigned  to  him. 
If  deformed,  delicate  and  weak,  he  was  thrown 
into  a  bog  and  destroyed.  He  discouraged  all  in- 
tercourse between  the  citizens  of  Sparta  and  those 
of  other  nations  by  a  visit  of  either  to  the  country 
of  the  other,  especially  in  that  class  whose  ex- 
ample could  have  any  effect,  from  a  fear  that  the 
morals  of  the  Spartans  might  thereby  be  corrupted. 
His  object  was  to  keep  them  as  much  as  possible  at 
home  under  the  daily  influence  of  the  institutions 
which  he  had  established,  and  to  exclude  all  extra- 
neous usages  which  might  tend  to  produce  a 
change. 

Such    was    the   government   of    Lacedemon,  as 


244  THE  PEOPLE  THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

instituted  by  Lycurgus,  and  in  Avhich  state  it  re- 
mained about  one  hundred  and  thirty  years,  in  the 
course  of  wliich  time  the  people  being  dissatisfied 
with  the  restraint  imposed  on  them,  either  to  accept 
or  reject  the  projjositions  which  were  sent  to  them 
by  the  senate,  without  amendment,  gradually  as- 
sumed the  right  of  making  such  alterations  as  they 
thought  fit.  This  abuse,  as  it  was  called,  was  cor- 
rected in  the  reign  of  Potedorus  and  Theopompus, 
by  whom  the  constitution  was  restored  to  its  original 
state.  The  discontent  which  that  measure  produced 
among  the  people  may  easily  be  conceived.  To 
reconcile  them  to  it,  the  corps  called  the  Epliori 
was  instituted  as  a  substitute  in  defense  of  their 
rights,  and  by  which  a  very  important  change  was 
introduced  into  the  system.  I  shall  make  the 
remarks  which  appear  to  me  to  be  proper  on  this 
constitution,  as  originally  formed  by  its  author, 
and  then  notice  the  effect  which  was  produced  by 
this  change. 

The  most  celebrated  writers  of  antiquity  repre- 
sent this  government  as  one  of  the  best,  if  not  the 
best,  which  was  instituted  at  that  epoch.  Aristotle, 
Polybius,  and  Plutarch  have  explicitly  avowed 
that  sentiment,  and  some  modern  writers  of  great 
merit  seem  to  acquiesce  in  it.  I  will  examine  it  on 
principle,  giving  full  force  to  every  provision  in  it 
which  could  have  had  any  influence  on  its  fortune. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  245 

I  will  then  test  it  by  its  career,  since  that  is  the  best 
criterion  by  which  a  just  estimate  can  be  formed 
of  its  merit.  A^'ith  this  view,  it  will  be  proper  to 
inquire  in  the  first  instance  to  what  class  did  it 
belong?  Did  it  recognize  distinct  orders  in  such 
extent  as  to  belong  strictly  to  that  class,  and  to 
move  on  that  principle? 

The  character  of  a  government  must  depend  on 
the  source  from  whence  it  derives  its  powers.  All 
governments  which  emanate  directly  from  the  peo- 
ple, whether  the  term  of  service  of  those  who  fill 
its  branches  be  long  or  short,  are  popular  or  demo- 
cratical,  provided  when  the  term  expires  the  vacancy 
is  supplied  by  election.  The  length  of  the  term 
will  vitiate  the  government,  but  cannot  be  said  to 
change  the  principle  although  it  be  for  life.  It  is 
not  the  name  or  title  given  to  any  incumbent  in 
any  branch  which  fixes  the  character  of  the  govern- 
ment. An  officer  may  be  called  king,  and  the 
office  may  be  hereditary  in  his  family,  and  yet  if 
he  has  no  power,  or  the  power  vested  in  him  be 
very  limited,  and  especially  if  the  people  have  a 
control  over  his  conduct,  the  government  cannot  be 
considered  as  strictly  monarchical.  For  the  o-qv- 
ernment  to  be  placed  in  that  class,  the  person  having 
the  title  must  hold  a  portion  of  the  sovereignty, 
otherwise  it  will  be  nominal  only.     This  may  be 

done  in  various  forms  and  in  diffiirent  degrees  in" 
21  » 


246  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

different  governments,  but  still  in  the  degree  that 
the  control  of  the  great  affairs  of  the  state,  and 
especially  the  power  which  is  generally  considered 
as  executive,  is  taken  from  him  and  vested  in  the 
people  and  the  office  made  ministerial,  will  the 
principle  and  character  of  the  government  be 
changed,  and  an  approach  be  made  to  democracy. 

The  power  of  the  kings  was  very  limited.  They 
were  chiefs  of  religion,  and  commanded  the  armies 
in  time  of  war.  In  the  internal  government  of  the 
state  they  had  no  effective  pow^er  whatever.  They 
were  members  of  and  presided  in  the  senate,  but 
their  v'otes  were  counted  like  those  of  other  mem- 
bers, and  they  had  in  its  measures  when  they  dis- 
agreed no  other  weight  than  wdiat  arose  from  the 
respect  which  was  due  to  their  talents  and  merit. 
They  did  not  receive  ambassadors  from  nor  appoint 
them  to  foreign  powers,  nor  instruct  them  M^hen 
appointed,  nor  make  treaties,  nor  appoint  officers, 
nor  had  they  any  other  powers  than  those  above 
enumerated. 

The  government  of  Lacedemon  resembled  that 
of  Athens  in  its  most  important  features.  The 
sovereign  power  was  essentially  in  the  people,  in 
the  one  government  as  well  as  in  the  other,  and  all 
the  great  powers  of  the  government  were  vested  in 
and  exercised  by  the  people  collectively  in  a  Gen- 
eral Assemblv  in  both.    The  o-overnment  was  united 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  247 

with  the  sovereignty,  and  in  consequence  the  same 
concentration  of  legislative,  executive  and  judicial 
powers  existed  in  the  General  Assembly  of  the  one 
state  as  in  that  of  the  other.  The  material  differ- 
ence between  the  two  governments  consisted  in  the 
power  held  by  the  two  kings,  in  that  of  Lacedemon 
and  in  the  hereditary  quality  of  that  power;  and 
likewise  in  the  number  of  members  of  which  their 
senates  respectively  were  composed,  and  in  their 
term  of  service.  How  far  these  differences  may  be 
considered  as  forming  a  difference  between  the  two 
governments  on  principle,  and  introducing  distinct 
orders  into  that  of  Lacedemon,  and  were  calculated 
to  produce  a  difference  in  their  fate,  are  objects  of 
inquiry  which  merit  attention. 

The  senators  of  Lacedemon  held  their  offices  for 
life;  those  of  Athens  for  one  year  only.  In  both 
states  they  were  elected  by  the  people.  The  length 
of  service,  as  has  been  remarked,  will  weaken  the 
tone  and  spirit  of  the  government,  but  cannot 
change  the  principle;  nor  will  it  entirely  change 
the  principle  of  action  in  those  who  hold  the  office, 
for  as  their  offspring  will  be  in  the  hands  of  the 
people  the  dread  of  the  revenge  which  might  fall 
on  them,  would  deter  the  incumbents  from  commit- 
ting acts  to  incur  their  resentment.  The  hereditary 
right  of  the  kings  as  members  of  and  to  preside  in 
the  senate,  and  to  command  the  armies  in  war,  are 


248  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

the  only  powers  over  which  the  people  had  not  a 
direct  control,  by  the  election  of  those  in  whom 
vested;  and  is,  therefore,  the  only  feature  in  the 
government  of  Laccdemon  which  takes  it  out  of 
the  democratic  class. 

If  a  democratical  government  be  so  badly  formed 
as  to  be  impracticable,  and  the  people  avail  them- 
selves of  a  resource  founded  on  the  opposite  prin- 
ciple, to  sustain  it,  of  very  limited  extent,  and  with 
effect,  it  can  furnish  no  proof  other  than  the  excel- 
lence of  the  democratical  principle.  It  can  furnish 
none  of  the  excellence  of  that  of  the  opposite 
character,  nor  of  the  comparative  merit  of  demo- 
cratical government  in  its  best  form,  with  those 
which  are  mixed. 

When  a  principle  opposite  to  that  on  which  the 
government  is  founded  has  no  hold  on  the  gov- 
ernment, and  is  merely  an  outward  prop  or  stay  on 
which  it  rests,  under  difficulties  which  admit  of 
obvious  remedies,  we  cannot  reason  on  it  as  a  con- 
flicting power,  nor  can  it  afford  any  proof  of  the 
defect  of  one  principle  or  merit  of  the  other.  A 
drowning  man  it  is  said  will  catch  at  a  straw.  He 
will  certainly  take  the  hand  of  his  enemy  to  save 
his  life.  If  the  opposite  principle  has  such  strong 
hold  on  the  government  as  to  be  able  to  check  its 
progress  in  case  of  division,  and  to  endanger  its 
existence  in  that  of  conflict,- then  the  question  of 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  249 

distinct  orders,  and  the  comparative  merit  of  the 
two  classes  will  come  fairly  under  consideration. 
But  if  the  hold  is  trifling,  and  the  hereditary  right 
essentially  at  the  mercy  of  the  governing  power, 
then  the  person  in  whom  vested  must  be  in  constant 
dread  of  destruction;  and,  in  consequence,  be  the 
mere  creature  of  such  power,  administering  to  its 
aid  in  such  manner  as  it  pleases. 

From  this  view  it  appears  to  me  that  the  govern- 
ment of  Lacedemon  could  not  be  considered  as 
one  which  moved  on  the  principle  of  distinct  orders, 
or  \vhich  derived  its  support  from  that  source.  The 
senate  did  not  rest  on  that  ground,  nor  could  it 
resist  the  Assembly  of  the  People  in  case  of  conflict, 
nor  could  the  kings  afford  them  any  aid,  for  it  was 
only  as  members  of  the  senate  that  they  had  any 
share  in  the  government.  In  time  of  war  com- 
manders of  the  troops  were  necessary,  and  they 
held  that  station  by  hereditary  right,  but  it  was 
distinct  from  and  subordinate  to  the  government 
and  under  its  control.  By  what  means  then  was 
the  government  supported  for  the  term  that  it 
existed?  We  must  look  for  these  to  other  causes, 
and  not  to  that  to  be  derived  from  a  balance  be- 
tween distinct  orders,  or  the  principle  on  which 
such  government  is  founded. 

The  government  of  Athens  was  found  to  be  an 
impracticable  one,  and  it  was  made  so  by  the  union 


250  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

of  the  government  with  the  sovereignty  in  the 
peo2)le,  and  the  exercise  of  all  the  great  powers  of 
the  government  by  the  people  collectively.  All 
the  objections  then  which  apply  to  the  Athenian 
government  in  those  respects  are  equally  applicable 
to  the  I^acedemonian.  How  happens  it  then  that 
the  government  of  Lacedemon  was  more  perma- 
nently tranquil  in  its  movement  than  that  of 
Athens?  Many  causes  contributed  to  that  result, 
but  the  career  and  fate  of  the  Athenian  government 
alone  afford  all  the  demonstration  on  this  point 
which  can  be  desired  by  the  most  skeptical.  Where 
the  defects  are  the  same,  the  remedy  which  saved 
the  one  government  would  save  the  other.  To 
sustain  the  government  of  Athens,  some  expedient 
which  should  take  the  exercise  of  its  powers  out  of 
the  hands  of  the  people  collectively,  and  commit  it 
by  their  consent  to  another  party  and  make  them 
the  deluded  instruments  was  indispensable.  That 
expedient  soon  presented  itself,  and  of  which  they 
availed  themselves.  It  has  been  shown  that  about 
ten  years  after  the  government  of  Solon  was  insti- 
tuted, the  people  suffered  the  power  to  be  taken 
from  them  by  Pisistratus,  and  actually  aided  him 
in  the  usurpation,  and  supported  him  in  the  exercise 
of  it  with  occasional  interruptions  during  his  life, 
and  as  they  thought  in  defense  of  their  rights  and 
of  the  constitution,  though   in  direct  violation  of 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  251 

both.  They  were  afterwards  ruled  by  Miltiades, 
Themlstocles,  Aristides,  Pericles,  and  others,  by 
their  own  consent.  The  people  in  General  Assembly 
never  ruled  themselves  by  any  arrangement  of 
their  own.  Physicians  administer  drugs  to  cure 
diseases.  The  remedy  is  not  pleasant,  and  a  strong 
dose  would  often  kill  the  patient.  A  moderate  one 
affords  relief. 

If  the  defects  of  the  government  of  Athens 
compelled  the  peojjle  of  that  state  to  resort  to  an 
expedient  in  actual  subversion  of  the  constitution, 
while'  the  power  remained  in  their  hands  ostensibly 
only,  how  much  more  natural  was  it  for  those  of 
Lacedemon  to  avail  themselves  of  a  resource  pro- 
vided by  the  constitution  itself,  which  should  pre- 
serve the  constitution  and  with  it  the  powers  to 
the  exercise  of  which  they  were  competent.  The 
Senate  of  Lacedemon  could  not  be  an  object  of 
jealousy  with  the  people,  and  consisting  of  fewer 
members  than  the  Prytanean  Corps  which  formed 
only  one-tenth  of  that  of  Athens,  was  more  capable 
of  digesting  and  preparing  measures  to  be  proposed 
to  the  General  Assembly  of  the  People,  and  of 
executing  all  its  other  duties.  Nor  could  the  kings 
be  an  object  of  dread.  Those  people  had  always 
been  subject  to  the  rule  of  kings,  and  they  enjoyed 
under  the  constitution  of  Lycurgus  more  freedom 
than  they  had  ever  experienced  before.    As  senators, 


252  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

they  certainly  could  not;  and  when  called  to  the 
command  of  armies  in  time  of  war  their  hereditary 
quality  in  that  station  would  give  support  to  the 
General  Assembly  of  the  People  in  two  important 
circumstances.  By  exciting  a  jealousy  of  their 
power  and  views  it  would  unite  the  people  more 
closely  together:  and  by  holding  it  in  their  own 
right  the  necessity  to  fill  it  by  election,  whereby 
contests  between  popular  leaders  for  the  command,, 
the  tendency  of  which  always  is  in  such  a  state  of 
society  and  under  a  government  so  formed  to  divide 
the  people  into  violent  j)arties,  and  convulse,  if  not 
overthrow  it,  would  be  prevented. 

The  division  of  the  regal  power  between  two 
kings  could  not  have  failed  to  contribute  much  to 
reconcile  the  General  Assembly  of  the  People  to 
the  portion  which  they  enjoyed,  and  to  their  agency 
in  its  concerns.  The  history  of  that  state  shows 
that  it  had  an  important  influence  on  its  fate  at  a 
very  early  period  and  in  every  subsequent  stage. 
The  constitution  of  Lycurgus  Avas  adopted,  as  has 
already  been  stated,  about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
years  before  that  of  Solon,  when  the  people  of 
Greece  generally,  and  especially  those  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesus had  made  but  a  slight  progress  in  civili- 
zation. The  tyrannies  which  had  grown  up  in  all 
the  states,  the  offspring  of  the  governments  which 
had    been   formed    in    their   most  early  and  rude 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  253 

state,  were  overthrown  except  in  Laeedemon.  The 
preservation  of  monarchy  in  that  state  was  o^ving 
to  that  cause,  the  division  of  the  royal  power  be- 
tween tM'o  kings,  descendants  of  Hercules,  but  of 
different  branches  of  that  house.  The  rivalry  and 
jealousy  which  existed  between  them  and  which 
descended  to  their  successors  weakened  their  jDower, 
and  gave  to  the  government  a  milder  tone.  Each 
to  sustain  himself  and  undermine  his  competitor 
courted  popular  favor,  and  thus  the  government 
was  thrown  more  immediately  on  the  people.  The 
motive  for  a  change  was,  therefore,  less  urgent  in 
Laeedemon  than  in  the  other  states,  and  to  that 
cause  it  is  presumed,  it  was  owing  that  monarchy 
was  not  overthrown  there  at  the  same  time  that  it 
was  in  the  other  states.  It  may  fairly  be  inferred, 
therefore,  that  it  continued  to  have  a  like  effect 
after  that  constitution  was  adopted,  and  in  the  mode 
sugjj-ested. 

Thei'e  were  other  causes  which  must  have  con- 
tributed to  secure  to  the  Lacedemonian  government 
a  more  tranquil  movement  and  a  longer  existence 
tlian  befell  that  of  Athens.  By  the  equal  division 
of  lands  among  the  citizens,  the  opposite  and  con- 
flicting classes  of  the  rich  and  the  poor  could  not 
exist  among  them.  By  messing  together  at  public 
tables  at  common  charge,  they  formed  a  species  of 
company  in  which  the  interest  of  one  was  that  of 

22 


254  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

the  whole.  All  domestic  concerns  of  the  most 
interesting  nature  became  those  of  the  public.  By 
the  education  of  their  children  by  the  state,  ever/ 
individual  was  made  a  public  man,  and  by  the  sub- 
stitution of  iron  for  gold  and  silver  as  a  currency, 
by  the  suppression  of  commerce  and  the  discourage- 
ment of  all  intercourse  with  foreign  nations  by  the 
more  intelligent  class  of  society  on  each  side,  the 
people  were  attached  to  and  preserved  in  the  rude 
state  in  which  they  then  were,  especially  as  all  the 
great  powers  of  the  government  were  in  principle 
in  their  hands  and  ostensibly  so  in  practice. 

There  was  another  cause  of  a  character  equally 
marked  which  must  have  had  a  like  effect.  It 
appears  from  the  history  of  Lacedemon,  that  the 
large  crowds  which  were  collected  in  the  general 
assembly  at  every  meeting  became  impatient,  as 
those  of  Athens  likewise  did  of  the  restraint  im- 
posecl  on  them,  to  accept  or  reject  without  amend- 
ment the  propositions  which  were  sent  to  them  by 
the  senate,  and  that  they  often  broke  through  it, 
and  made  such  amendments  as  they  thought  fit. 
In  this  course  the  government  moved  on  about  one 
hundred  and  thirty  years,  the  senate  and  the  kings 
yielding  to  the  pressure.  At  length  they  took 
alarm  from  a  conviction  that  if  those  encroachments 
were  not  checked,  and  the  constitution  restored  to 
its  original  state,  their  poAver  w^ould  be  annihilated. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  255 

They  made  an  effort  to  that  effect,  and  succeeded  in 
it;  but  to  reconcile  the  people  to  it,  they  proposed 
an  amendment  to  the  constitution  by  the  institution 
of  the  Ephori,  which  was  adopted  and  which  gave 
a  new  character  to  the  government.  This  amend- 
ment was  adopted  at  the  particular  suggestion  of 
Theopompus,  one  of  the  then  reigning  kings,  and 
as  he  avowed  to  preserve  the  power  which  he  then 
held. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  institution  of  this 
corps  diminished  considerably  the  cares  and  duties 
of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  People,  and  pro- 
duced in  other  respects  a  very  important  effect  on 
the  fortune  of  the  government.  The  members  of  the 
corps  being  elected  by  the  people  possessed  the  con- 
fidence of  the  General  Assembly,  and  standing  be- 
tween that  Assembly  and  the  senate  and  kings,  the 
natural  tendency  of  its  action  was  to  take  all  the 
powers  from  the  General  Assembly  which  it  could 
not  discharge  with  advantage,  and  in  the  exercise 
of  them  to  encroach  on  those  of  the  senate  and 
kings.  The  members  of  the  corps  would  seek 
popularity  with  their  constituents,  which  might  be 
gained  by  exciting  suspicions  of  the  views  of  the 
other  branches  and  by  an  unceasing  pressure  on 
them.  In  pursuit  of  this  object  some  might  not 
be  over  scrupulous  as  to  the  means,  while  others 
would   be  modest  and   honest,  and  perform  their 


256  THE  PEOPLE  THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

duty  -with  perfect  integrity.  Zeal  in  jlie  represen- 
tative in  defending  the  rights  and  promoting  the 
interest  of  his  constituents  is  correct  and  honorable, 
but  the  cause  may  be  abused.  It  requires  great 
knowledge  of  constitutional  principles,  and  of  the 
policy  which  a  due  regard  to  the  public  interest 
dictates,  to  fix  the  precise  limit  to  which  that  zeal 
should  be  carried,  and  great  firmness  of  nerve  and 
loftiness  of  sentiment  in  moments  of  great  public 
excitement  to  stem  in  any  degree  the  current,  and 
to  stop  at  that  point  on  the  responsibility  of  the 
individual.  Some  will  expose  themselves  to  that 
hazard.  Others  will  go  with  the  current  regardless 
of  the  consequences,  be  they  what  they  may.  I 
speak  of  man  as  he  is  and  has  always  been. 

The  direct  tendency  of  the  powers  vested  in  this 
corps  would  be  to  enable  it  by  the  exercise  of  them, 
should  selfish  motives  be  yielded  to,  to  acquire  in 
the  progress  of  aifairs  all  those  of  every  other 
branch.  Being  elected  annually  by  the  people  and 
considered  as  the  defenders  of  their  rights,  it  would 
take  from  the  General  Assembly  by  its  consent  all 
the  powers  which  it  could  not  discharge  with  ad- 
vantage, which  would  leave  it  a  very  limited  sphere 
of  action.  The  opinion  of  that  Assembly  would 
be  sought  and  be  pursued  by  the  corps,  but  the 
latter  would  constitute  the  efficient  government, 
with  the  support  of  the  former,  which  would  be 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  257 

the  instrument.  The  General  Assembly  being  thus 
relieved  by  a  corps  of  its  own  creation,  from  a 
dependence  on  the  kings  and  senate  for  a  perform- 
ance of  any  of  the  duties  to  which  it  was  incom- 
petent, would  not  only  cease  to  repose  on  the  latter 
for  any  of  those  aids,  but  yield  to  and  cherish  the 
jealousy  which  the  hereditary  right  of  the  one  and 
long  service  of  the  other  would  naturally  inspire. 
The  Ejihori  would  in  consequence  soon  acquire  the 
control  of  the  kings  and  in  a  great  measure  of  the 
senate,  and  thus  have  the  whole  government  in  its 
hands.  Had  the  corps  consisted  of  one  member 
only,  and  he  been  vested  with  the  right  to  command 
an  army,  or  had  that  right  been  vested  in  the 
president  of  the  corps,  he  would  soon  have  usurped 
the  government,  making  use  of  the  people  as  his 
instruments;  but  there  being  five,  and  their  powers 
being  exclusively  civil,  all  that  they  could  accom- 
plish would  be  to  supplant  by  means  thereof  the 
plan  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  People,  and 
impair  the  authority  of  the  kings  and  senate.^ 

The  career  of  the  Lacedemonian  government 
corresponded  after  this  corps  was  instituted  with 
the  view  thus  presented.  It  is  attested  by  the 
highest  authorities  that  by  degrees  it  absorbed  all 
the  great  powers  of  the  government:  that  it  had  a 
censorship  over  the  jjublic  morals,  supervised  the 
conduct  of  the  magistrates  and    suspended    them 

22* 


258  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

from  office  at  pleasure;  rai.sed  troops,  gave  orders 
to  their  commanders,  interrupted  them  in  victory, 
controlled  their  operations  and  recalled  them  from 
service,  two  of  their  body  attending  them  in  the 
field  as  spies  on  their  conduct;  that  it  received 
ambassadors  from  foreign  powers,  convened  the 
General  Assembly,  scrutinized  the  conduct  of  the 
kinofs,  summoned  them  before  them  to  answer 
charges  alleged  against  them;  seized  their  persons, 
brought  them  to  trial,  and  sometimes  imposed  fines 
on  them  by  their  own  authority.  Many  of  these 
powers  belonged  to  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
People,  and  were  exercised  as  may  fairly  be  pre- 
sumed, with  their  sanction  and  by  their  desire; 
the  others  were  derived  from  encroachment  on  the 
senate  and  kings.  By  exei-cising  them  they  sup- 
plied the  defects  of  the  one,  and  broke  down  the 
feeble  barrier  which  the  constitution  had  erected  in 
defense  of  the  others. 

Whether  the  government  could  have  sustained 
itself  without  the  institution  of  the  Ephori  for  the 
term  it  did,  is  a  question  of  very  serious,  and  I 
may  add,  of  very  doubtful  import.  How  far  the 
other  re";ulations  would  have  had  that  effect  with- 
out  the  aid  of  that  corps,  must  be  matter  of  con- 
jecture. Many  writers  of  great  distinction  ap- 
plaud in  the  highest  degree  the  equal  division  of 
lands  among  the  citizens,  with  the  establishment  of 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  259 

public  repasts,  and  the  education  of  children  by  the 
state.  Polybius  thinks  that  these  regulations  Avitli 
a  view  to  the  liberty  of  the  people  and  the  safety 
of  the  state  from  foreign  invasion,  indicate  a  divine 
inspiration;*  and  other  writers  concur  in  that  senti- 
ment. I  have  no  doubt,  regarding  the  period  at 
which  that  constitution  was  instituted,  and  the  rude 
state  of  society  at  the  time,  that  they  had  great 
effect  in  sustaining  the  government  at  that  epoch, 
and  in  every  subsequent  stage  while  the  society 
remained  in  that  state.  But  still  it  is  uncertain 
whether  of  themselves  they  would  have  been  ade- 
quate to  the  object.  My  inipression  is  that  they 
would  not.  Under  those  regulations,  w^ith  the  aid 
of  the  kings  and  senate,  in  the  manner,  on  the 
principle,  and  for  the  reasons  stated,  the  govern- 
ment moved  on  in  tolerable  tranquillity,  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty  years.  In  that  interval,  however, 
the  General  Assembly  of  the  People  manifested  the 
discontent  which  was  shown  by  the  General  As- 
sembly of  Athens,  and  which  at  the  period  adverted 
to  had  risen  to  such  a  height  as  to  alarm  the  kings 
and  senate  and  excite  their  opposition ;  the  result 
of  which  was  the  institution  of  this  corps  at  the 
instance  of  one  of  the  kings  for  their  safety.  Had 
it  not  been  instituted,  it  may  fairly  be  presumed 
that  the  contentions  which  had  commenced  on  that 

■■•   Polybius,  Vol.  III.  extract  iii.  chap.  i. 


260  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

point  would  have  been  extended  to  others,  and 
overthrown  the  government  at  a  much  earlier 
l^eriod.  As  soon  as  the  friendly  relation  between 
the  parties  was  broken,  all  ties  between  them  would 
have  ceased,  and  full  force  have  been  given  to  the 
defects  of  the  system  under  aggravated  circum- 
stances. The  institution  of  this  corps  restored 
tranquillity  to  the  state,  and  its  powers  in  the  com- 
mencement beino;  rather  of  a  neo-ative  than  of  a 
positive  character,  gaining  on  each  side,  and  en- 
larging the  sphere  of  action  by  the  force  of  circum- 
stances, it  was  thereby  enabled  to  prevent  any 
direct  explosion,  and  to  keep  the  machine  in  motion 
for  a  much  longer  term  than  it  otherwise  could 
have  done. 

This  government  in  its  organization,  in  the  en- 
dowment of  its  branches,  and  in  all  its  provisions 
and  regulations  was  adapted  to  the  rude  state  of 
society  and  none  other.  To  that  state  the  govern- 
ment was  peculiarly  suited,  and  to  preserve  it  in 
that  state  the  regulations  specified  were  eminently 
well  calculated.  If  the  j^eople  were  admitted  into 
the  government  in  that  early  age,  whether  it  was 
in  complete  sovereignty,  or  in  participation,  it  could 
only  be  en  masse,  or  collectively,  and  if  they  pre- 
served the  power  for  any  term  especially,  it  could 
be  only  by  availing  themselves  of  extra  or  artificial 
aids,  repugnant  to  the  principle  of  the  government, 


THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS.  201 

and  adverse  to  their  improvement  in  civilization. 
The  defects  of  their  ])ower  could  not  be  cured  by 
any  provision  consistent  with  it;  and  if  such  pro- 
vision was  carried  beyond  a  very  limited  scope  it 
would  involve  controversies  which  Avould  be  sure 
to  subvert  the  government.  No  arrangement  had 
ever  been  made  to  put  the  government  in  operation 
on  the  princij)le  of  distinct  orders,  in  a  manner  to 
preserve  a  balance  between  them.  It  is  thus  that 
we  account  for  the  harmonious  co-operation  between 
the  General  Assembly  of  the  People  and  the  kings 
and  senate.  All  the  other  provisions  tended  to 
keep  the  people  in  the  rude  state,  and  to  support 
the  government  in  its  then  form.  The  equal  divi- 
sion of  lands  among  the  citizens,  public  repasts  in 
which  all  messed  together,  kings,  senators  and 
laborers;  the  education  of  children  by  the  state; 
the  suppression  of  commerce;  exclusion  of  foreign- 
ers; all  had  that  tendency,  as  they  had  to  keep 
affairs  in  their  then  state.  Improve  the  society, 
civilize  it,  and  the  whole  fabric  would  fall  to  pieces. 
Had  the  government  of  Lacedemon  rested  on 
the  same  ground  with  that  of  Athens,  on  a  General 
Assembly  of  the  People  and  a  numerous  senate, 
and  been  left  to  itself  without  other  aids,  it  would 
in  my  opinion  have  blown  up  at  once  as  that  of 
Athens  did.  If  an  edifice  falls  when  certain  props 
which  rest  against  it  are  removed,  the  proof  is  com- 


262  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

plete  that  it  was  sustained  by  those  props.  Such 
too  was  the'  fate  of  the  government  of  Lacedemon. 
By  wars  and  other  causes  the  state  of  the  country 
was  gradually  changed.  An  intercourse  took  place 
with  foreign  nations.  The  door  was  opened  to 
commerce.  Iron  was  laid  aside  and  gold  and  silver 
restored  as  the  currency.  The  people  became  more 
civilized,  and,  in  consequence,  all  those  internal 
regulations  which  were  adapted  to  the  barbarous 
state  were  abandoned.  The  props  which  had  sus- 
tained the  government  were  removed  and  it  fell  of 
course. 


CARTHAGE. 

The  government  of  Carthage  is  that  next  in 
order,  according  to  the  plan  originally  laid  down, 
which  claims  attention.  This  people  inhabited 
Africa,  another  quarter  of  the  globe,  and  they 
aiFord  the  only  example  ever  known  in  that  quarter 
of  a  government  which  might  be  called  free.  The 
ruins  of  their  city  are  still  visible  on  the  Mediter- 
ranean, near  Tunis,  and  are  often  visited  by  travel- 
ers. No  vestige  or  remnant  of  liberty  is  seen 
there.  A  perfect  despotism  prevails,  and  with  it  an 
ignorance  and  barbarism  which  exhibit  man  in  the 
most  degraded  state. 

In  treating  of  a  republican  government  in  Afi'ica 
we  are  led  to  inquire  by  what  race  of  people  it  was 
instituted,  what  their  origin,  and  the  intermediate 
stages  in  their  history  Avhich  led  to  that  result.  ISTo 
other  portion  of  the  people  in  that  quarter  could 
have  instituted  such  a  government,  and  had  one 
been  instituted  for  them  it  must  have  failed  imme- 
diately by  their  utter  inability  to  preserve  it.  The 
aborigines  of  Carthage  were  not  Africans.      The 

263 


264  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEPEIGNS. 

founders  of  the  city  emigrated  from  Tyre,  in  Phoe- 
nicia, a  province  of  Syria.  Their  origin  is  traced 
to  a  far  more  remote  source.  The  Phoenicians 
emigrated  from  Saboa,  a  part  of  Arabia,  which 
borders  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Ped  Sea.  The 
history  of  the  Phoenicians  and  of  the  Saboans  of 
whom  they  were  a  colony,  the  state  of  civilization 
which  they  had  attained,  with  the  causes  which 
produced  it,  their  emigration  from  Saboa  to  Syria, 
and  of  a  portion  of  their  population  thence  along 
the  Mediterranean  to  Carthage,  with  the  different 
stages  in  this  progress,  is  intimately  connected  with 
the  history  of  the  eastern  world.  It  is  neverthe- 
less certain,  that  taken  in  its  greatest  extent,  in- 
cluding the  rise  and  fall  of  empires  in  tliat  quarter, 
with  the  state  of  science,  commerce,  and  the  arts, 
so  far  as  it  is  known,  it  sheds  little  light  on  the 
subject  on  which  I  treat.  It  is  generally  admitted 
that  Egypt  and  Asia  are  the  countries  which  were 
first  settled,  since  in  going  back  to  the  earliest 
records  of  time  and  comparing  them  with  other 
countries,  with  Greece  for  example,  we  find  the 
population  there  much  greater  than  with  them,  and 
improvements  in  civilization  and  the  arts  generally 
more  advanced.  Emigrants  from  Egypt  and  Asia 
to  Greece  introduced  commerce,  agriculture,  alpha- 
betical writing,  and  some  knowledge  of  the  arts 
among  the  people.     But  what  was  the  state  of  that 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  2G5 

epoch  on  each  side?  The  Greeks  were  altogether 
rude  and  uncivilized.  The  Egyptians  and  Asiatics, 
the  Phoenicians  particularly,  somewhat  advanced 
beyond  them.  The  imi^rovement  of  the  Greeks, 
though  gradual  and  slow  was  great,  while  that  of 
the  eastern  nations  has  remained  in  the  state  in 
which  it  then  was. 

The  origin  of  Asia,  and  of  Egypt,  the  only  part 
of  Africa  which  merits  attention  in  the  view  under 
consideration,  compared  with  that  of  Greece  and 
the  European  states  generally  is  little  known,  and 
what  we  do  know  of  it  is  derived  almost  altogether 
from  Greek  and  Roman  authors.  The  accounts 
which  those  writers  give  of  those  people  represent 
them  at  the  most  distant  ages  kno^¥fi,  essentially  in 
the  state  in  which  they  now  are,  as  very  populous 
communities;  despotism  with  great  wealth  and 
splendor  at  the  head;  slavery  with  ignorance, 
poverty,  and  wretchedness  among  the  people.  The 
opposite  classes  in  society  were  separated  at  a  vast 
distance  from  each  other,  and  which  could  have  been 
produced  only  by  the  great  age  of  those  communi- 
ties, and  other  causes  which  tend  in  the  progress 
of  time  to  promote  inequality  among  the  peoj)le. 
When  communities  reach  that  state,  improvement 
in  their  governments  in  favor  of  the  rights  of  the 
people,  with  corresponding  checks  on  the  power  of 
the  crown  becomes  extremely  difficult,  and  must  be 

23 


266  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

attended  with  convulsion.  If  the  people  have  not 
acquired  an  improvement  in  intelligence  and  other 
circumstances  to  render  them  capable  of  discharging 
the  duties  and  sustaining  the  station  thus  obtained, 
these  efforts  must  fail,  or  terminate  in  the  case  of 
change,  in  the  transfer  only  of  the  power  from  the 
existing  circumstances  to  some  leader,  and  thus 
form  the  commencement  of  a  new  dynasty  over 
them.  In  this  state  Asia  and  Africa,  with  the 
exception  of  Phoenicia  in  the  former,  and  of  Car- 
thage in  the  Phoenician  colony  in  the  latter,  have 
been  always  known  to  modern  times,  according 
to  the  best  accounts  which  have  been  transmitted 
to  us. 

The  government  of  Carthage  resembled  that  of 
Athens  in  the  two  most  important  features.  The 
sovereignty  was  in  the  people,  and  the  government 
united  with  the  sovereignty;  but  in  many  of  its 
modifications  it  essentially  varied  from  it.  It  con- 
sisted of  a  General  Assembly  of  the  People ;  of  a 
Senate;  and  of  two  magistrates,  who  were  called 
Suffetes.  The  Senators  were  elected  by  the  people, 
as  were  the  Suffetes.  The  number  of  members  of 
which  the  Senate  was  composed  is  unknown.  Their 
term  of  service  was  for  life.  The  Suffetes  were 
elected  annually. 

The  people  in  General  Assembly  had  the  power 
to  elect  the  magistrates,  to  regulate  the  finances,  to 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  267 

make  peace  and  war,  and  to  form  alliances  in  the 
mode  prescribed  by  the  constitution. 

Every  individual  born  of  parents,  both  of  whom 
were  citizens,  was  a  citizen.  The  revenue,  to  be 
eligible  to  office,  was  prescribed.  Every  citizen 
was  an  elector. 

From  the  Senate  two  corps  or  councils  w^ere 
formed,  one  consisting  of  one  hundred  and  four 
members,  and  the  other  of  five.  Those  of  the  first 
held  their  offices  for  life.  Those  of  the  second  for 
a  term  only:  the  precise  length  of  which  is  un- 
known. 

The  Suffetes  had  a  right  to  convene  the  Senate,  to 
propose  to  it  subjects  for  deliberation,  and  to  take 
the  votes  of  the  members.  They  presided  in  the 
tribunals  and  were  agents-general  of  the  republic. 
They  likewise  sometimes  commanded  the  armies. 
On  retiring  from  that  office  they  became  Pretors,  in 
which  character  they  had  a  right  to  propose  new 
laws,  and  to  call  to  account  those  who  were  charged 
with  the  administration  of  the  public  finances. 

The  powers  of  the  Senate  were  very  extensive. 
Its  decrees  had  the  form  of  laws  when  the  vote  was 
unanimous.  In  case  of  a  division  the  proposition 
was  sent  to  the  Assembly  of  the  People.  The  vote 
of  a  single  member  in  opposition  produced  that 
result.  When  the  proposition  was  submitted  to 
the  people,  they  were  not  compelled   to  adopt  or 


268  THE  PEOPLE    THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

reject  it  as  presented,  but  had  a  right  to  disj^ose  of 
it  as  they  thought  fit. 

Tlie  Council  of  One  Hundred  and  Four  was 
called  the  Council  of  Ancients,  and  charged  with 
the  superintendence  of  the  constituted  authorities, 
and  particularly  of  the  conduct  of  the  generals  and 
admirals  of  the  republic.  It  was  considered  the 
guardian  of  the  constitution.  The  Council  of  Five 
had  likewise  extensive  powers.  They  appointed 
their  colleagues  when  vacancies  occurred,  and  like- 
wise the  members  of  the  Council  of  One  Hundred 
and  Four,  into  which  body  they  returned,  when 
their  term  of  service  had  expired. 

Such  was  the  government  of  Carthage,  according 
to  the  best  information  that  I  have  been  able  to 
obtain  from  the  works  of  Aristotle,  Polybius,  Livy, 
and  Diodorus  Siculus,  among  the  ancients,  and  such 
modern  writers  as  I  have  had  access  to.  Aristotle 
bestowed  on  it  a  very  high  commendation.  It  had 
existed  when  he  wrote  about  five  hundred  years, 
during  which,  he  observes,  that  the  state  had  never 
been  disturbed  by  sedition,  nor  had  the  liberties  of 
the  people  been  menaced  by  a  tyrant.  He  con- 
sidered it  as  one  of  the  most  perfect  constitutions 
that  had  then  been  known.  For  this  tranquillity 
very  satisfactory  causes  may  be  assigned.  The  ex- 
ample of  the  governments  of  Athens  and  Lacedemon 
furnishes  them. 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  269 

The  great  causes  to  which  the  overthrow  of  the 

AthcDian    government   was    imputable,   were   the 

union  of  the  government  with  the  sovereio;ntv,  and 

the  exercise  of  the  powers  of  the  governmcut  by 

the  people  collectively.     It  was  the  inability  of  the 

people  to  perform  the  duties  of  a  government  in 

that  manner,  which  enabled  Pisistratus  to  wrest  it 

from  them  and  to  exercise  its  powers  in  his  own 

t 
right,  and  which  made  them  after  his  overthrow 

mere  iustruments  in  the  hands  of  popular  leaders. 
It  was  the  same  cause  which  induced  the  people  of 
Lacedemon  to  acquiesce  in  the  power  of  the  Senate 
and  kings,  by  whom  many  of  those  duties  were 
performed,  the  discharge  of  which  by  them  col- 
lectively would  have  overthrown  it.  In  the  gov- 
ernment of  Carthage  the  arrangement  was  the  same 
on  principle  that  it  was  in  the  Athenian  ;  the 
government  was  united  with  the  sovereignty  in  the 
people,  to  be  exercised  by  them  collectively,  or  en 
masse,  but  such  was  the  arrangement,  that  they 
could  scarcely  ever  be  called  on  to  act  in  that  form. 
Whenever  the  vote  of  the  Senate  was  unanimous,  the 
question  was  decided.  A  reference  to  the  people 
became  unnecessary,  and  such  was  the  organization 
of  the  Senate,  that  while  it  was  calculated  to  inspire 
confidence  in  the  people,  it  remedied  in  a  consider- 
able degree  the  defects  of  a  body  thus  constituted. 
The  great  number  of  which  it  was  composed  en- 
23  «• 


270  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

abled  it  to  form  a  kind  of  substitute  for  the  General 
Assembly  of  the  People,  and  thus  to  prevent  their 
discontent.  Incapable  of  discharging  the  duties 
themselves,  they  would  readily  yield  their  place  to 
so  large  a  portion  of  their  mass  whom  they  had 
elected.  And  the  defects  inseparable  from  so  nu- 
merous a  body  as  the  Senate  in  the  discharge  of  the 
powers  vested  in  it,  were  mitigated  by  the  duties 
which  were  performed  by  the  Council  of  One  Hun- 
dred and  Four,  wliich  was  composed  of  members 
of  the  Senate,  and  likewise  by  the  Council  of  Five, 
who  were  taken  from  the  One  Hundred  and  Four. 
All  writers  agree  that  the  powers  vested  in  these 
two  councils  were  great,  and  which  cannot  be 
doubted,  as  it  may  fairly  be  inferred  that  every 
measure,  legislative  as  well  as  executive,  originated 
with  these  councils.  Those  of  an  executive  nature 
with  that  of  the  Five,  and  after  being  prepared 
were  submitted  by  them  to  the  whole  body  of  the 
Senate.  In  this  mode  it  seems  as  if  the  best  pro- 
visions which  such  an  organization  admitted  of, 
were  adopted  to  remedy  the  great  defects  of  the 
system. 

The  great  difference  between  the  government  of 
Carthage,  and  that  of  Athens,  consisted  in  the  fol- 
lowing circumstances.  By  the  constitution  of 
Athens  no  measure  could  be  adopted  without  the 
sanction  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  People, 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  271 

and  for  this  purpose  they  were  convened  regularly 
every  month,  and  frequently  several  times  in  a 
montli.  By  the  constitution  of  Carthage  no  propo- 
sition of  any  kind  Avas  submitted  to  the  people 
when  the  vote  of  the  Senate  was  unanimous.  The 
whole  business  of  the  state  was  managed  in  that 
event  by  the  Senate,  and  the  councils  formed  by  its 
members,  and  by  the  Suffetes.  This  principle 
being  established,  it  may  be  presumed  that  appeals 
were  seldom  made  to  the  people,  and  were  avoided, 
except  in  cases  of  great  emergency,  in  accord  with 
the  wishes  of  both  bodies,  the  General  Assembly 
and  the  Senate.  The  incompetency  of  the  people 
to  perform  the  duties  of  a  government,  in  General 
Assembly,  would  reconcile  them  to  the  performance 
of  them  by  the  other  bodies,  especially  as  they 
would  be  taken  from  the  pursuits  of  industry, 
received  no  compensation  for  the  service,  and  those 
who  did  perform  them  took  their  appointments 
from  their  suffrage.  It  is  equally  presumable 
that  the  Senate  would  harmonize  in  such  a  policy, 
and  be  glad  both  from  personal  and  public  consid- 
erations to  be  freed  from  the  embarrassment  that 
would  attend  frequent  meetings  of  the  whole  peo- 
ple, and  the  control  by  them  in  General  Assembly 
of  all  the  measures  of  the  state.  To  avoid  such 
embarrassment  it  would  be  natural  in  the  trans- 
action of  the  business  that  an  understanding  should 


272  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

be  formed  among  the  members,  even  before  the 
discussion  of  any  proposition,  what  the  sentiment 
of  the  majority  respecting  it  would  be;  and  that 
the  minority  would  accommodate  with  it.  It  does 
not  apjiear  that  regular  meetings  on  fixed  days 
in  each  month  were  provided  for,  and  special  duties 
assigned  to  each,  as  was  done  by  the  constitution  of 
Athens,  and  would  be  necessary  if  the  government 
was  to  be  managed  by  the  people,  or  depended 
uniformly  on  their  sanction.  The  appeal  to  them 
being  contingent,  even  in  the  most  important  cases, 
makes  this  view  the  more  presumable. 

What  then  sustained  the  government  for  such  a 
length  of  time,  and  with  such  tranquillity  and  con- 
tentment among  the  people?  What  produced  a 
like  eflPect  Avith  the  government  and  people  of  Lace- 
demoD,  when  the  Senate  consisted  comparatively  of 
a  few  TMRmbers,  and  the  kings  were  hereditary? 
The  great  causes  were  essentially  the  same  in  each 
instance.  The  people  were  attached  to  liberty,  and 
being  incompetent  to  its  preservation  by  the  dis- 
charge of  the  duties  of  the  government  themselves, 
collectively,  and  incapable  of  instituting  any  other, 
they  acquiesced  in  the  performance  of  a  large 
portion  of  those  duties  by  other  bodies,  with  the 
transfer  to  them  of  the  necessary  powers,  retaining 
in  their  own  hands  wdth  the  sovereignty  those  only 
to  which  they  were  more  competent.      The  equal 


THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS.  273 

division  of  land  among  the  citizens  with  public 
repasts  in  Lacedenion,  it  may  be  presumed,  con- 
tributed much  to  reconcile  the  peoj)le  of  that  state 
to  the  commission  of  the  power  to  so  small  a  Senate, 
and  likewise  to  the  hereditary  quality  of  the  kings. 
How  long  could  such  a  system  be  preserved,  and 
what  the  causes  which  would  be  sure  to  overthrow 
it?  In  tracing  these  I  shall  not  advert  to  casual 
events  to  which  all  governments  and  peoj^le  are 
subject,  and  which  produce  great  changes  in  the 
communities  in  which  they  occur.  While  the 
morals  and  intelligence  of  the  people  remain  un- 
changed, and  no  pressure  is  made  from  abroad 
which  menaces  to  overwhelm  them,  their  acqui- 
escence with  the  government  in  its  existing  state 
would  probably  continue.  If  the  morals  of  the 
people  should  become  corrupted  they  would  be  in- 
capable of  sustaining  the  station  they  held  in  the 
government,  and  sink  under  a  tyrant.  Or  if  any 
cause  occurred  which  should  induce  the  people  to 
take  a  more  active  part  in  the  administration ;  to 
assume  powers  to  which  they  were  incompetent; 
such  as  were  exercised  by  the  people  of  Athens, 
and  which  produced  the  overthrow  of  their  govern- 
ment, a  like  fate  would  befall  the  government  of 
Carthage.  This  might  happen  while  the  morals  of 
the  people  remain  unchanged,  and  their  attachment 
to  liberty  equally  great.     Instances  might  occur  in 


274  THE  PEOPLE   THE  SOVEREIGNS. 

M'hich  those  who  managed  the  affiiirs  of  the  state 
excite  the  distrust  and  even  the  indignation  of  the 
people.  Wars,  for  example,  might  be  undertaken 
imprudently,  which  might  by  ill-success  menace 
their  independence.  If  the  people  had  borne  the 
existing  government  as  the  only  means  of  preserv- 
insr  their  liberties,  the  bond  between  them  and  those 
who  wielded  it,  would  be  slight.  It  must  have 
been  of  a  nature  compulsory  rather  than  confi- 
dential. Under  such  circumstances  it  would  be 
incumbent  on  a  virtuous  people,  attached  to  liberty, 
to  exert  all  their  faculties  to  preserve  it.  Convul- 
sions might  ensue,  which  might  be  productive  of 
the  most  fatal  consequences. 


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